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ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN THE KATHMANDU VALLEY: SOME ISSUES IN PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

Ambika P. Adhikari

The problems resulting from rapid urban growth, haphazard development, and general lack of planning have been apparent in the towns of the Kathmandu valley¹ for more than three decades. During that period, Kathmandu routinely experienced serious lack of access, deficiency of infrastructure, traffic congestion, and inadequacy of housing. These problems were compounded by the continuing damage to the valley's cultural heritage and the rapid loss of precious agricultural land to urban uses. In addition to these chronic deficiencies, severe environmental degradation now threatens the quality of life in the valley.

Of late, the Nepali government has recognized environment as an important agenda in the nation's development programs.² For example, the seventh plan (1985-1992) for the first time treated environment as an integral component of development. Even the new constitution of Nepal (1991) mandates environmental protection and conservation as national priorities for the state policy. Nepal signed the 1992 UNCED convention in Rio and firmly put environmental considerations in her eighth plan (1992-1997). However, little real action has been directed towards environmental protection so far. As a result, Kathmandu's environmental degradation continues unabated.

Since the publication of the Brundtland report, Nepal and the many international donors that support her development efforts have articulated environmental sustainability as a crucial objective in Nepal's development. This is evident from the numerous workshops, seminars, and publications sponsored by the Nepali policy makers and external donors in Kathmandu over the past few years. However, because Nepal is still struggling to achieve basic necessities of life, environmental issues are often ignored during project implementation. Given her delicate natural landscape epitomized by the fragility of the Kathmandu valley, it is critical to ensure that Nepal's development efforts are environmentally sustainable.

This paper provides an overview of the environmental problems in urban Kathmandu that are relevant from planning perspective, and suggests an approach to tackle them.

Aspects of Environmental Problems

Environmental decay in the valley is reflected in all aspects of the physical landscape and urban living: land, water, air, and noise.³ These problems are not mutually exclusive, and they combine to intensify their overall negative impact on the environment and quality of life in the valley.

Land Pollution

Kathmandu municipality's record of solid waste management so far has been dismal. Consequently, land pollution is evident in the heaps of uncollected solid waste, illegal dump sites, open landfills, and exposed human and animal excreta in the streets. Open latrines are common sights in the Kathmandu valley towns where many residents, especially children, use the sidewalks for defecating.

Frustrated by the lack of services from the municipality, some business groups in Kathmandu have often taken up their own solid waste collection and disposal programs. However, in the absence of proper landfill facilities, the debris thus collected eventually ends up on urban river banks and vacant lands, continuing the problems of land pollution for the residents.

Severe lack of greenery and open space⁴ in the urban areas intensify the impact of all these forms of land pollution.

Water Pollution

Surface water in the Kathmandu valley is severely polluted by the industrial effluence, waste dumping, and the discharge of untreated sewage from residential areas. Rivers in the valley including Bagmati, Vishnumati, Manohara, and Hanumante are all seriously fouled for this reason.⁵ Because human and other waste are routinely discarded in the ponds, still water in the valley is even more polluted.

Seepage from septic tanks contaminate ground water in most of the urban area. Virtually all the Kathmandu homeowners build private septic tanks in their generally tiny land plots – often covering just 60 square meters – without sufficient room for soak pits. The still toxic semi-treated effluent from the tanks cannot find adequate area for dissipation and concentrates in the residential yards.

Piped drinking water in Kathmandu is also polluted due to various reasons. Firstly, the water at the intake storage itself is improperly treated. Secondly, the intermittent urban water supply (supplied only a few hours a day) creates

suction in the water supply pipes during the run of water. Waste from ground sources and leakage from adjacent sewage lines, frequently enters the water supply system, contaminating the drinking water.

Empirical studies of drinking water throughout Nepal have found that the fecal coliform contamination in the water consistently exceeds WHO guidelines for water considered fit for human consumption.⁶ A report by an international consultant concludes, "Kathmandu's drinking water is hosting disease causing microbes and hazardous chemicals." According to the same study, the laboratory analysis of tap water from representative locations of the Kathmandu urban area disclosed that almost 90% of the sample was impotable.⁷

Air Pollution

Air pollution has so dramatically upsurged during the last few years that many people in the city areas wear face masks to protect themselves from the smog and dust. Increased levels of particulate matters, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, hydrogen sulfide, nitrous oxide, and lead have drastically reduced the quality of air in the valley. As a result, Kathmandu is now routinely compared to heavily polluted cities such as Calcutta, Santiago, Mexico City, and Bangkok. Some reports have even claimed that Kathmandu is the second most polluted city in the world.⁸ The increased air pollution is a consequence of rapid growth in the number of motor vehicles,⁹ inferior quality of automobile engines, adulterated fuel products, and presence of polluting factories within the valley. The bowl shaped physiography and the resulting inversion effect in the atmosphere amplify the air pollution by trapping the foul air within the valley's immediate atmosphere. Furthermore, lack of dust control mechanisms in construction, industrial and business activities, cumulative dirt in the side walks, and household smoke all contribute to air pollution. Congestion and severe shortage of public open space and greenery in the urban area aggravate the air pollution problems.

Noise Pollution

Outdated vehicular engines, increased air traffic at Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA), and the siting of industries near residential precincts are fast turning noise pollution into a major problem in urban Kathmandu. Weak transportation planning, and virtual lack of traffic discipline on the part of the drivers result in near continuous sounding of horns in the streets of Kathmandu.

There are many reasons for the growth of noise pollution from the aircraft in the Kathmandu valley. First, TIA is located in close proximity to the centres of population. Second, the airport is experiencing a rapid growth in

air traffic,¹⁰ thanks to the increased economic and commercial activities in the valley and the nation. Third, the physiographic configuration of the valley limits choice of flight paths for the aircraft. Outgoing jet planes must circle the valley at least once to gain enough altitude to surpass the surrounding mountains of the Kathmandu valley. Incoming jet planes also circle the valley before landing. Thus the flight paths at take off and landing are located immediately above the dense urban settlements of the valley, exposing the population to aircraft noise.

Effects of Environmental Degradation

Environmental degradation of the urban area engenders the following the significant negative effects on the residents of the Kathmandu valley.

Poor Public Health

The first casualty of the environmental degradation in the city is the health of its residents. Deterioration of public health, especially due to increase in the respiratory and gastro-intestinal diseases, has already become a concern in Kathmandu Valley. A World Bank report confirms that the South Asian countries are facing increased health cost as a result of environmental degradation caused by industrial pollution, atmospheric emissions, land degradation, soil erosion and loss of bio-diversity.¹¹

Regarding solid waste, some reports have dramatically concluded that "the numerous uncontrolled waste heaps developed in close proximity to dwellings... constitute a massive threat to public health."¹²

Although, waterborne and airborne diseases have long been prevalent in Kathmandu, lately they have become widespread. Complaints by the residents of gastro-intestinal problems that are linked to contaminated drinking water are now commonplace in the valley. In addition, growing incidence of typhoid, cholera, diarrhea and hepatitis "A" are attributable to the polluted drinking water.¹³

The severe air pollution in the valley has been reportedly linked to the increased incidence of respiratory diseases such as asthma and chronic bronchitis in Kathmandu. Dust pollution causes frequent throat and bronchial infection, as well as other respiratory and skin allergies.¹⁴ "Smog Ozone" formed by the reaction of ozone and other pollutants in the air irritates lung membranes reducing its ability to resist heart problems.¹⁵

Although frequently accorded lesser significance than other forms of pollution, noise can have severe consequences on the health of the residents. A constant exposure to a high level of noise causes permanent hearing loss. Noise has also been linked to insomnia, ulcers, and hypertension.¹⁶ Increasing levels of noise pollution are already adversely affecting the health of many Kathmandu residents.

Decline in Tourism

Tourism, the major foreign exchange earner for Nepal, has suffered directly as a result of environmental degradation. Whereas Kathmandu was once hailed as enigmatic "Shangri-La," numerous articles and news clips condemning its poor environmental quality now regularly appear in both domestic and foreign press.¹⁷ Such publicity deters potential tourists from visiting Kathmandu, the main tourist destination and the hub of travel activities in Nepal. According to a report, the number of foreign visitors in 1993 was down by 15% compared to 1992, and was further reduced by 30% in 1993/94.¹⁸ Nepal's honorary consul general in Toronto, Dr. Kunjar Sharma, says: "After personally experiencing the filth in Kathmandu during my recent trip, I often feel uncomfortable in issuing visas to Canadian tourists wishing to visit there."¹⁹ If the image of "dirty Kathmandu" continues to grow on the minds of potential tourists, the lucrative tourism industry may suffer a big setback. The loss will directly and adversely impact Kathmandu's economy, reducing jobs and income for its residents.

Decay of cultural heritage

Although the decay of the much cherished cultural heritage of Kathmandu is not the exclusive consequence of environmental degradation, it is accelerated by this phenomenon. Corrosive chemicals in the polluted air attack the surface materials in buildings, consequently disfiguring and sometimes even destroying the facades of historic landmarks. Additionally, water pollution has adversely affected brick and stone paving in the public squares and stone water taps. Uncollected debris and untreated liquid waste taint the visual and olfactory charm of the grand public spaces and palace squares, for which the three towns of the valley have long been famous.

Declining Productivity

Labour productivity also declines as a result of poor environment. Increased absenteeism due to sickness and failing health can significantly cut worker productivity. Residents of Kathmandu already spend more time treating drinking water at home by manually boiling and filtering. Furthermore, agricultural productivity of land deteriorates due to soil contamination caused by chemicals in the fields.

Loss of Amenities

Public amenities such as parks, public baths, and play grounds are already severely limited in urban Kathmandu. When environmental degradation reduces their utility, these amenities are further curtailed for public use. For example, the polluted water in the Rani Pokhari and the Bagmati, waste pile

up in the Ratna Park, and filth in parts of Tundikhel has drastically reduced their public "amenity value". Pollution has also diminished the beauty of the valley's idyllic surroundings and hindered the aesthetic quality of Nepal's famous traditional architecture and design. For instance, the three palace squares of the valley, the Pashupatinath temple area, and old parts of the three major towns clearly exhibit the negative impacts of environmental degradation.

Additional Hardship for the Poor

Rapid urbanization has caused a proliferation in the number of poor residents in the Kathmandu valley towns. Traditionally, poor residents have occupied town fringes, flood-prone lands, and other environmentally fragile areas. The valley's deteriorating environment has worsened the plight of these residents.

A recent World Bank study has found that environmental degradation in a city disproportionately torments poor residents.²⁰ For example, the poor have to pay unduly high prices for water and other basic services, depleting their already meager earnings. Because poor are often forced to live in the hazardous and most polluted areas of city, they are least served by environmental infrastructure and services. Poor residents are also more likely to become routinely sick, as they inhabit hazardous locations in the city.

Reduced Property Values

Parts of city which are polluted or are in close proximity to landfill sites, polluted water and land are perceived by residents as "undesirable." Consequently, environmental degradation of an area causes decline in the property value of houses and land in the immediate vicinity. The perception of "undesirability" of the area for living and pleasure purposes can drastically reduce its commercial and residential potential and hence the real estate values in the surroundings. Some industrial countries have already experienced a dramatic reduction in the value of polluted land sites. Contaminated sites, in fact, can become liabilities to the owners because of their gigantic cleaning costs.²¹

Framework for Environmental Policy

At present, legislation affecting environmental protection in Nepal is limited.²² Appropriate public policies in national, regional and macro-economic levels are required to provide a framework to reduce the environmental degradation of urban Kathmandu. Detailed regulations in the following areas can be devised to alleviate Kathmandu's environmental problems.

- a. Decentralization and regional planning;

- b. Macroeconomic policies, such as privatization, poverty alleviation, and employment generation; and
- c. Comprehensive planning for the valley

Decentralization should be accompanied by proper regional planning to reduce the pressure of the existing uncontrolled urbanization in the Kathmandu valley by creating other centres of attraction for prospective businesses and residences. It should start a process of devolution of real power to centres away from Kathmandu. This could include moving much of the heavy industrial activities, relocating services such as banking, educational institutions, and even the international airport to outside locations. Shifting important activities immediately to potential satellite towns such as Banepa²³, Dhulikhel and Trishuli can help to relieve the current acute pressure in Kathmandu's environment.

Kathmandu's municipalities should undertake comprehensive planning to direct and control growth and development. All components of the plan such as transportation, business development, housing, and urban design should explicitly incorporate environmental concerns. Although many valley-wide urban development and planning studies have been developed in the past, a "planning act" is yet to materialize. Furthermore, until recently, these plans have not been implemented and in all such efforts environmental concerns have remained marginal.

Macroeconomic policies significantly impact the environment. Excessive environmental pollution has been linked to "market failures and policy distortions exacerbated by unemployment, landlessness, and poverty".²⁴ Privatization of certain services such as waste management, public transportation, and operation of public amenities such as parks, picnic spots, and sports facilities will help to maintain the environmental quality in urban area. For example, many residents in urban Kathmandu are capable and willing to pay for waste removal services. Private agencies under a contract from the municipality can profitably undertake such services on the basis of user charges.

Similarly, the few parks and open spaces that exist in the city have presently become the dumping grounds for solid and liquid waste, including animal and human excreta. In order to clean them up, municipalities may draw contracts with private providers for a sufficient period of time, allowing the agencies to charge the users on a commercial basis. International donor agencies such as the World Bank maintain that many municipal services can be efficiently and economically carried out by private contractors under various schemes, such as build-and-operate, long term contract, sub-contract, and concessions. Under such arrangements, private investors can undertake

significant clean up, improvement, and maintenance of the facilities to reverse their environmental degradation. For example, the Ratna Park, the Balaju Park, the Gokarna and Godavari picnic areas, and the sports stadium can be privatized in this manner.

Policy Instruments for Environmental Protection

Three types of policy instruments and tools have been tried internationally to protect urban environment: command and control, economic, and planning instruments. Each instrument has a specific utility, and together they are most effective when applied in a proper combination suitable for Kathmandu's situation.

"Command and Control" Instruments: These instruments attempt to protect the environment by specifying environmental standards and regulations. The government gets more directly involved in the preparation and enforcement of command and control instruments. Effective utilization of these instruments, requires highly skilled and well-trained manpower. Command and control instruments manifest themselves in various forms, most significantly:

Legislation: Legislation can be passed to establish environmental standards. They are enforced through, national and local government regulations.

Permits and Licenses: Permits and licenses are given to industries, businesses, and auto owners when the above standards are complied with. Permits are periodically renewed or revoked on the basis of whether the standards are continually being met by the industry.

Land and water use by-laws: These controls are devised through zoning, subdivision regulations, density controls and other by-laws and regulations.

"Economic" Instruments: These instruments attempt to influence the behaviour of polluters by offering economic incentives and punishments to achieve environmental protection. They can be highly effective in environmental protection if properly designed and implemented. The government is relatively less directly involved in the application of economic instruments. These instruments often manifest in the forms such as follows:

Pollution charges: These are based on "polluter pays" principle, whereby polluters such as carpet industries, and garbage generators pay charges to the

government for each specified amount of pollution generated. Penalties for excessive generation of pollution can be levied to modify the behaviour of such industries.

Deposit refund system: Deposit is collected on items that if disposed can generate garbage. It is refunded when the empty containers are returned to authorized locations. The classic examples are deposits on soft drink and beer bottles and cans and plastic milk containers.

Such deposits already exist in Nepal for soft drink bottles. Residents sell other bottles and containers to recycling vendors. Given the present level of economy, there is little room for expanding the "deposit return" system in the Kathmandu valley towns. But it will have increased applicability as the residents attain higher levels of income.

Taxes and subsidies: Taxes on environmental externalities have been recognized as legitimate intervention by government. Tax increases or rebates can be devised to encourage clean production procedures and discourage polluting technologies. According to a World Bank case study in Mexico and Indonesia, taxes on "dirty" fuels are the least costly instruments for efficiently reducing pollution.²⁵

Marketable permits: In some advanced countries, tradeable permits have been utilized to limit the total amount of pollution in a given geographic area. Each industry is given a permit for a prescribed amount of pollution which can be freely traded in the market. If an industry produces less pollution than is allowed, it can sell the remainder of the permit. Similarly, industries may buy permits for "right to pollute" from the market, making the use of pollution reducing technologies in their own interest.

User Charges: User charges raise revenues for public authorities and also modify people's behaviour to reduce and limit the pollution. For example, charges for sewerage connection and garbage collection can be levied on residents utilizing these services. A well designed charge system can both generate municipal revenue and help reduce the production of waste by the residents. For instance, in some states of the United States, a system of pay-per-bag of residential solid waste has effectively contributed to reducing the garbage generation.²⁶

Planning Tools: Planning tools include regulations, guidelines, negotiation, education, and public participation devised for the protection of

the environment. In Kathmandu, the few planning tools so far available have largely remained ineffective.

Although traditional urban planning, building design, and construction methods in Kathmandu followed environmentally sound practices in the past, they were always tacit. Given the gigantic scale of development in the valley today, explicit planning guidelines promoting environmental conservation are likely to yield desired results.

For example, air pollution can be reduced by restricting the use of automobiles,²⁷ revising the lay-out of residential areas, and expanding the exclusive pedestrian zones. Proper orientation and lay-out of housing, adequate ventilation, solar access, and landscaping in building projects can contain the effects of air pollution.

Education can be a strong tool for environmental conservation, especially in the long run. Environmental education both in public information level and also as a part of school and college curriculum can help the environment. Such educational strategy was experimented in Nepal in the eighties for the conservation of cultural heritage.²⁸

Negotiation with stakeholders in urban development, such as developers, builders, and industrialists, can effectively minimize the negative environmental impacts of growth. For instance, developers may be willing to provide extra open spaces and public amenities in exchange for additional floor space or zoning variance granted by the authorities.

The role of public participation in the process of environmental protection cannot be overemphasized. Traditionally, the decision making process in Nepal's planning arena has been top-down, without hearings, consultations, or negotiation with interested parties and the general public. The resulting decisions have often been unrealistic and ineffective, and as a result, have invited public apathy to the entire process.

If environmental protection is made an explicit agenda for all development and urbanization schemes, and the decision making process is made participatory, Kathmandu's residents are likely to support the environmental protection measures proposed by authorities. They will also become aware of the environmental problems of development and be more likely to take initiatives in protecting the environment.

Comparative Applicability of Policy Instruments

Table 1 provides an overview of the relevance, benefits, problems, and suitability of various regulatory, economic, and planning instruments that may be utilized in Kathmandu to achieve environmental protection.

Table 1

Instruments	Relevance				Advantages	Problems	Suitability and Relative Priority for Kathmandu
	Ground and Surface Water Protection	Air Pollution Control	Solid Waste Management	Noise Pollution Control			
<i>Command and Control</i> Ambient ground and surface water quality standards	x				Defines desired target levels and forms the basis for evaluating implementation	Requires advanced tools and technology for measurement and monitoring	A beginning has to be made to establish these standards; Moderate priority
Standards for the digging of shallow and deep tube wells	x				Provides locational criteria for obtaining safe water and to control depletion of ground water	Difficult to verify compliance	Much needed area of regulation in light of prolific well digging activities; High Priority
Minimum standards for housing plot size and shape	x	x		x	Provide open space, control density, and ground coverage for septic tanks	Inappropriate size will hinder affordability	Important to relieve congestion and control sprawl, Moderate Priority
Effluent standards for sewage	x				Regulates hazardous effluent dumped in drainage system	Expensive to enforce	Regulations desired suggesting a time frame; Moderate priority
Effluent standards for industrial discharge	x				Regulates hazardous effluent in surface water and rivers	Requires equipment and facilities to monitor	Important to reduce dumping by carpet, garment, and tanning factories; High priority

Contd...

Table 1 contd...

Instruments	Relevance				Advantages	Problems	Suitability and Relative Priority for Kathmandu
	Ground and Surface Water Protection	Air Pollution Control	Solid Waste Management	Noise Pollution Control			
Product standards for cleaning chemicals such as detergents and disinfectants	x				Limit and decrease surface and ground water pollution	Safe products are not generally available in the local market	Hazardous products can be banned within a given time frame; Moderate Priority
Emission standards from industries		x			Abundant international experience, proving their effectiveness	Implementation is complex, and monitoring is expensive	Immediately applicable to selected industries viz. cement factories and brick kilns; High priority
Emission standards for vehicles		x			Effective mechanism to control air pollution	High monitoring cost, costly inspection procedure	Already being tested; low enforceability; High priority
Product standards for petroleum fuel, kerosene, and gas		x			Effective means of pollution control, relatively easy to enforce	Expensive for private auto owners and transportation industry	Requires negotiation with foreign suppliers; High priority
Standards for garbage storage, collection and disposal			x	x	Relatively simple procedure	Facilities and equipment are required	Feasible; High priority
Recycling regulations		x	x		Simple regulations, effective in controlling pollution	Facilities and equipment are required	Some mechanisms already exist; Priority

Contd...

Table 1 contd...

Instruments	Relevance				Advantages	Problems	Suitability and Relative Priority for Kathmandu
	Ground and Surface Water Protection	Air Pollution Control	Solid Waste Management	Noise Pollution Control			
Product standards for containers: plastic bags, jugs, metal boxes, etc.			x		Relatively simple, feasible in the given technology	Bio-degradable plastic bags may be expensive	Feasible; Priority
Standards on the burning of refuse		x	x		Effective especially for bio-hazardous materials	Non-polluting technology is expensive	Feasible for selective materials
Noise standards for industries and aircraft				x	Establish targets, and educate industries	Monitoring and testing requires specialized equipment	A good start for the valley, Moderate priority
Economic Deposit return system for bottles, cans, containers			x		Very little government supervision required	Increased transportation cost for users, recycling facilities required	Existing for soft drink bottles, beer bottles and containers indirectly recycled; limited room for expansion
Marketable permits	x	x			Raise public revenue	Complex implementation and administrative system required	Not suitable at present

Contd...

Table 1 contd...

Instruments	Relevance				Advantages	Problems	Suitability and Relative Priority for Kathmandu
	Ground and Surface Water Protection	Air Pollution Control	Solid Waste Management	Noise Pollution Control			
User charges	x		x		Raise revenue, and offset service costs	Charge collection mechanism has to be administered	Feasible for solid waste and liquid waste disposal; Moderate priority
Tax increase and rebate	x	x	x	x	Relatively easy system to devise	Revenue lowered	Feasible; Moderate priority
Subsidies for "clean" products	x	x			Easy to administer	Loss in revenue	Can be tested in selected areas
Penalties and credits	x	x		x	Encourage compliance	Reliable implementation needed	Feasible, especially in case of excessive polluters, and clean industries
Zoning and land use regulations	x	x	x	x	Improve quality of life and control pollution	Standards and regulations should be appropriate for Kathmandu; often difficult to enforce	Existing ones are tenuous; private influence hampers enforcement; High priority
Land use controls for siting of particularly high polluting industries	x	x		x	Provide advance warning to proprietors; effective in mitigating impact on residents	Require expansion of infrastructure and services; additional initial cost	Feasible; High priority

Contd...

Table 1 contd...

Instruments	Relevance				Advantages	Problems	Suitability and Relative Priority for Kathmandu
	Ground and Surface Water Protection	Air Pollution Control	Solid Waste Management	Noise Pollution Control			
Transportation planning, especially exclusive pedestrian zones		x		x	Effective in reducing pollution and mitigating its effects on residents	Open spaces required; difficult to implement in private developments	Desirable tool; Moderate priority
Guidelines for landscaping, open space, density, and layout		x	x	x	Provide prototypes, and encourage desirable development, no public cost	Difficult to regulate	Desirable tool; High priority
Education, participation, and negotiation	x	x	x	x	Effective approaches for environmental protection	Requires skilled, and well trained public administrators and managers	Feasible; High priority

Source: Adapted from Bernstein, J. (1993), *Alternative Approaches to Pollution Control and Waste Management*, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

Notes

The author received a Doctor of Design (urban planning) from Harvard University, and is currently affiliated with Institute of Environmental Research (IER) in Toronto, Canada. Views expressed in this article represent those of the author.

1. Kathmandu Valley includes three major towns: Kathmandu, Lalitpur, Bhaktapur, and other urban settlements such as Kirtipur, Thimi, Sankhu, and Godavari. In this paper "Kathmandu" or "Urban Kathmandu" also denote this geographic constellation.
2. See 7th and 8th Plans, National Planning Commission (NPC), Kathmandu. A "Ministry of Environment" was established by His Majesty's Government of Nepal (HMGN) in the eighties. The Environmental Protection Council (EPC) was set up in 1992 under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. An "Agriculture, Forestry, and Environment Division" is organized within the NPC. HMGN is contemplating an act to mandate EIA studies for selected development projects.
3. The Metropolitan Environmental Improvement Program (MEIP) in Asia, a World Bank-UNDP program, has included Kathmandu valley in 1993 among its six projects. It identifies, haphazard development, traffic congestion, and water, air, and solid waste pollution as priority planning areas for the Kathmandu valley. See MEIP booklet, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1993 (?).
4. WHO recommends 11 square meter per person of green open space in the cities. The city of Kathmandu (pop. 360,000) alone would require about 400 hectares of green open space. Although exact figures are unknown, available open space in Kathmandu is significantly less.
5. For a detailed account of Bagmati's pollution, see A. Dixit in Himal, Jan/Feb 1992, Kathmandu.
6. See HMGN, EPC (1993), Nepal Environmental Policy and Action Plan, p. 51
7. Water samples from five treatment plants revealed that 38% was undrinkable, 22% contained excessive levels of chlorine, and 18% was polluted by pathogens at the source itself. 34 samples of tap water from representative areas of Kathmandu showed that 72% was undrinkable, a further 16% did not meet WHO guidelines, and only 12% was drinkable. See The Independent, Kathmandu, Nov. 3, 1993.
8. These reports are perhaps, technically inaccurate. According to a 1993 study by US scientists, average carbon mono-oxide emissions by vehicles in selected Asian cities were: Kathmandu-3.9%; Taipei-1.49%; Bangkok-2.2%; Seoul-0.84%. (See Himal Sept./Oct. 1993). As Himal

asserts, comparing Kathmandu with more developed cities is unfair. However, Kathmandu's emission level is close to that of Mexico City (4.3%), widely considered the most polluted major city.

9. In 1987, approximately 20,000 tons of pollutant were emitted by Kathmandu's 25,000 vehicles. This increased to 64,000 in 1992. See R. Arya in M. Dahal and D. Dahal ed. (1993), *Environment and Sustainable Development: Issues in Nepalese Perspective*, Kathmandu. For a baseline estimate of vehicular emissions in Kathmandu, see Dhamala B. (1983), *Proceedings of Seminar on Environmental Management*, Environmental Impact Study Project, HMG, Kathmandu
10. According to Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA), the number of flights at TIA will grow at 3.4% per annum. See Halcrow Fox, PPK, Cemat consultants (1991), *Kathmandu Valley Urban Development Plans and Programs*, Kathmandu, p. 39
11. The World Bank (1993), *Annual Report*, Washington D.C. p. 45-46.
12. NPC/IUCN (1992), *Solid Waste Management in Urban Nepal*, Kathmandu, p. 7.
13. Conversation with Dr. Prativa Pandey, practicing internist in Kathmandu.
14. Conversation with Dr. B. N. Adhikari, physician at Tribhuvan University Teaching Hospital in Kathmandu.
15. Gay K. (1991), *Air Pollution*, Franklin Watts, New York, p. 18.
16. See Finney S. (1984), *Noise Pollution*, Franklin Watts, New York; and Stephen R., in Hartshorn T. (1992), *Interpreting the City: an Urban Geography*, John Wiley and sons, New York
17. For example, Kathmandu's dailies and weeklies frequently cover air pollution. Reputed magazines like Himal routinely carry articles about Kathmandu's increased filth, pollution, and environmental decay. Similar articles and news clips have appeared in the international press, including the Far Eastern Economic Review, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Washington Post, and Toronto Sun.
18. 1993 data from news item from Oxford Analytica Pacific Daily Brief, Nov. 25, 1994. It states that tourism has been badly hit by "pollution in Kathmandu." 1993/94 figures according to The Independent, Kathmandu, Jan. 12, 1994.
19. Personal conversation. Dr. Sharma made this comment specifically about Kathmandu, as a constructive suggestion for concerned planners. He strongly encourages tourists to see Nepal, especially beyond Kathmandu.
20. See Leitmann, J. (1994), *Rapid Urban Environmental Assessment*, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

21. For instance, cost of clean up for some building sites owned by the City of Toronto in Canada exceeded their land value, making them effective liabilities. (Author's personal experience while working for WoodGreen Community Housing in Toronto, 1992-93.)
22. For a comprehensive account of the existing Nepali environmental legislation and regulations and their inadequacy for a sustainable development, see Adhikari R. (1994), *Sustainable Development Through Environmental Regulation in Nepal: With Special Reference to Ecotourism*", Ph. D. Dissertation, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona
23. See Bajracharya B., in *Himal*, Jan/Feb, 1992, Kathmandu, for arguments to develop Banepa to counteract Kathmandu's growth.
24. See Munasinghe M. (1993), *Environmental Economics and Sustainable Development*, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
25. The World Bank (1993), *Annual Report*, p. 91
26. Bernstein J. (1993), *Alternative Approaches to Pollution Control and Waste Management*, p. 55
27. In Santiago, Chile, personal use of vehicles in the city is restricted by allowing odd or even numbered plate, on alternate days of the week.
28. In 1985-86, Nepal Heritage Society, a local NGO conducted a national essay competition for high school students in order to arouse awareness about heritage conservation. With attractive prizes, it was successful in drawing numerous entries from across the country.

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CLASSICAL NEWARI VERBAL MORPHOLOGY A PRELIMINARY REPORT¹

Tej R. Kansakar
Tribhuvan University
Kathmandu, Nepal

Introduction

The label "Classical Newari" was first used by the Danish scholar Hans Jorgensen to refer to a collection of late 17th century manuscripts consisting mainly of narrative texts. Jorgensen made a thorough study and analysis of these manuscripts, resulting in two significant publications, *A Dictionary of the Classical Newari* (1936) and *A Grammar of the Classical Newari* (1941) which are pioneer works on the subject. For the purpose of the present paper, Classical Newari (CN) can be defined as the language which appears in inscriptions, manuscripts and legal or land grant documents known as *tamsuk-s*, usually written on palm leaves, and these cover a period of over 600 years (i.e. 1114-1770 A.D.). The ongoing project on the CN Dictionary, now in its final stage of editing, has compiled a large database using 38 different manuscripts and old written documents as source materials. This paper seeks to provide a preliminary analysis of the CN verbal morphology based on the lexical and syntactic data drawn from these historical texts and documents. The materials that have been used obviously represent various stages in the evolution of the language, and this paper attempts to trace the morpho-phonemic developments in the CN verb roots and the inflectional/derivational morphology over a period of over six centuries of attested data.

Evolution of CN verb systems

Historically, the CN as recorded in the old chronicles and various documents differs from contemporary Newari in syllable structure, morphology and syntax. But the study of CN however has not received much attention although it may be the key area not only in understanding the earliest known Newari forms and the stages of their evolution but also in several fields of Nepalese and Asian studies. The morphological and syntactic data of CN have largely been inaccessible to most scholars, either native or foreign, and the major constructions in this important Himalayan language have so far been described inadequately. Apart from Jorgensen (1936, 1941), Kölver and Kölver (1978), Genetti (1990), Tamot (1990) and Kansakar (1992), there have not been any in-depth diachronic studies of CN. It is difficult to decide, for

instance, on the structure of verb roots or verb classes nor to make judgements on the phonological/morphological changes that have taken place in the language. Since we are dealing with a purely documented form of the language, it is often unreliable and arbitrary to deduce the morphological structure of words as this is by no means transparent in the original script. The first problem is the closely packed writing system without word breaks. Secondly, there are a large number of inconsistent orthographic variants which may not correctly reflect the phonological or morphological changes in the language. In our present total corpus of over 30,000 words we have several thousand verb forms recorded, but so far identified less than 500 attested native verb roots. We have also reconstructed some 150 infinitives on the basis of inflected and derived verb forms attested in the various manuscripts. Among these, there are about 180 Sanskrit loan verb roots attached to Newari inflectional suffixes. The verb data thus are not only important for the study of CN diachronic morphology but also provide evidence of the history of Indic influences on the language.

In an earlier paper on Verb Citation in the CN Dictionary (Kansakar 1992), I focussed on three basic problems in representing verb citation: one, the morphological composition of verb roots; two, the development in infinitive verbs; and three, a need for a diachronic perspective in formulating a system of verb classes. In any case, the system of verb classes as proposed by Jorgensen (1941) onward is still problematic in some respects and will remain so till all the facts of diachronic phonology and morphology of Newari are fully explored. We may begin by looking at the multitude of infinitival forms of CN compared to Modern Newari (MN) as can be seen in Table 1.

Table 1. CN and MN Infinitive forms

	CN	MN	
(a)	khañ-da	khan-e	to open
	puñ-da/puṃ-da	pun-e	to dress
		bhun-e	to wrap round
	syān-da	sen-e	to destroy
		sen-ke	to cause to destroy
(b)	cin-ja	cin-e	to tie, to compose
	tām-ja	tā-ye	to feel
	ḍam-jo	dan-e	to erect/to build
	bya-jo	byan-e	to purify ritually
(c)	di-ca	di-ye	to stop
	lhā-ca	lhā-ye	to speak
	syā-ca	syā-ye	to kill
	hva-ca ²	hon-e	to make treaty
	gā-ca-kam	gā-ye	to suffice
	dumbi-ca	dubi-ye	to enter

(d)	kā-sana ³ dhā-sana ha-sana	kā-ye dhā-ye ha-ye	to take to say, to tell to bring
(e)	kāta-ke cita-ke hāta-ke/hāra-ke tyā-ca-ke si-ca-ke/si-ta-ke yā-sa-ke	kā-ke ci-ke hā-ye-ke tyā-ke si-ke yā-ke	to cause to be pressed to cause to bind to cause to announce to get victory to cause to wash to cause to do

It is difficult to account for so many varieties of infinitive forms (-*da*, -*ja*, -*ca*, -*sa*, -*ke*) and to make definitive statements on whether these forms were in free variation at a particular point in history or *when* one form evolved into another. A plausible development in verb morphology can be seen in Table 2.

Table 2. Development in CN verb morphology

	MN	Finite
Past		
Class 1. /phoṇda/ > phom-ja > phoṇ-ya > phon-ye 'to beg'		phon-a
Class 2. /syāta/ > syā-ca > syā-ya > syā-ye 'to kill'		syāt-a
Class 3. /thvale/ > thul-e > thu-ya > thu-ye 'to cook'		thul-a
Class 4. */-ta/ > si-ca > *si-sa/-ra > sil-ye 'to wash'		sil-a

The earlier words in the four classes of verbs such as *phom-ja*, *syā-ca* or *si-ca* have *phom-* and *syā-* as distinct roots, and *-ja/-ca* can be interpreted as infinitive suffixes which later developed into *-n-ya/-n-ye* (from *-ja*) and *-ya/-ye/-e* (from *-ca*). The ancient infinitival forms seen in this light can be interpreted as having CV- roots which later acquired final consonants by a process of sandhi/assimilation rule ($j > ṇ > ñ > n$) and a rhotocism rule ($c/s > r > l$; or to palatal -y). The rules which cover Class 3 and Class 4 indicate a common historical origin but probably split into two classes at a later stage, although the earlier **/-ta/* postulated here is hypothetical and is not attested in our present corpus. Table 2 also includes a column of finite past forms to show that the finals *-n*, *-t* and *-l* of earlier words reappear as regular stem-final

C's in certain inflected forms. It is therefore evident from Table 2 that the development of *-ca* to *-yal/-yel/-e* or *-sa* to *-r/-l* is plausible in historical phonology, but that of *-ca* to *-la* (as in *si-ca > sil-e*) has remained a problem as the two consonants differ in articulatory and voicing features. Obviously there is a gap in our data and we need more evidence before we can establish a possible line of development (e.g. *-ca > -sa > -ra > -la*).

The CN data show that the *-n* final (class 1), *-t* final (Class 2) and *-l* final (classes 3 & 4) are all regular and comparable to the cognate languages such as Tibetan, Burmese and Bahing, as shown in Table 3, i.e. nasal-final root in Cl. 1, *-t/-d* final in Cl. 2 and unstable/stable *-l* final in Classes 3 and 4.

Table 3. Verb class distinctions in cognate languages.

	Newari	Tibetan	Burmese	Bahing	
1.	won-	on-ba	wañ-		to go
	ñan-	mñan-pa	(tu)		to be alike
	twon-	hthuñ-ba	(sok)	tũño	to drink
	khan-		khrañ-/mrañ-		to see
	phon-	hphons-ba	pan-/ton:	punno	to beg
	hlam-	sloñ-ba	hlām		to stretch out/to raise
2.	pyāt-	pad-ma	krwat		to be wet
	mvāt-	mod-pa	(ne/niy)		to live
	sit-	ši-ba	se-/siy-		to die
	syāt-	gsod-pa	sat-		to kill
	hlāt-	zla-ba	(praw/hcui)		to speak
3.	khu (l-)	rku-ba	hkui:		to steal
	ña (l-)	dmyal-ba	(kuik)		to bite
4.	bi (l-)	hbul-ba	pe:		to give
	bul-	hphur-ba	sut-		to rub
	sil-	sel-ba	(hkru:)		to wash
	sel-	šes-pa	si?		to know

A logical follow-up to this analysis is to pose a question that has proved to be controversial in Classical Newari studies, i.e. Can we establish a chronological stratification of CN data into earlier and later periods of morphological development? Tamot (1990) believes such a classification is entirely possible on the basis of attested data, while Malla (1990) argues that variant roots and suffixes have been found in the same text, the same folio and at times on the same page, and therefore the etymological claim (that *-cal/-ja* was the etymon of *-yal/-yel/-e* or *-ne, -le* etc) is untenable. Malla also claims that labels such as ECN or LCN cannot be meaningful unless supported by definite laws of phonological and morpho-syntactic changes based on verifiable features. While this is a valid observation, we have

adequate evidence to provide comparative data as shown in Table 4. Further, most of the source manuscripts are authentically dated, and if we can work out the relevant timings in relation to attested lexical data it does not seem to me to be impossible to arrive at roughly accurate historical stages in the development of CN verb systems.

Table 4. Earlier and Later CN verb classes, after Tamot (1990).

		ECN		LCN		
1.	root	phoñ-	phom-	phoñ-	phoñ-	(stable -n)
	inf.	phoñ-da	phom-ja	phoñ-ya	phoñ-ya	
		'to beg'				
2.	root	syāt-	syā-	syā-		(unstable -t)
	inf.	syāt-a	syā-ca	syā-ya		
		'to kill'				
3.	root	bil-	bi-	bi-		(unstable -l)
	inf.	bil-a	bi-ca	bi-ya		
		'to give'				
4.	root	sil-	si-	sil-		(stable -l)
	inf.	sil-a	si-ca	sil-ya		
		'to wash'				
5.	root	nakal-		naka-		(unstable -l)
	inf.	nakal-a		naka-ya		
		'to feed'				

The presentation of data in Table 4 serves to indicate a historical development in the form of root verbs and infinitive suffixes in the five verb classes. The Earlier and Later periods in question are distinguished by the earlier infinitival suffixes *-ja* and *-ca* which later changed to final C's *-n -l* (stable for Classes 1 and 4), and *-t -l* (unstable for Classes 2, 3 and 5). We can also see that *syā-* can be derived from *syāt-*, *bi-* from *bil-*, and *naka-* from *nakal-*. These changes are obviously important for morphological segmentation of word boundary and the development of verb classes, the two other problems which I will not elaborate here. But what needs to be pointed out is that the developments shown in Table 4 most probably did not take place in distinct/discrete stages. There were obviously overlaps in the concurrent uses of variant forms in relation to the development of stem-final consonants, as can be seen in Table 5.

Table 5. Concurrent uses of variant forms in the development of stem-final consonants.

Class 1.	ñ	↔	m	↔	ñ	↔	n
Class 2.	t	↔	c	↔	s	↔	y
Cl's 3 & 4	l	↔	c	↔	s	↔	r ↔ l

We can make some tentative observations on the probabilities presented in Table 5:

1. There is some evidence to show that the earliest attested ECN finals *-ni*, *-t*, *-l* existed as independent forms in the early manuscripts.
2. Later these stem-final consonants came to be used concurrently with finals *-m* and *-c*, i.e. *-ni* with *-m*, *-t* with *-c*, *-l* with *-c*.
3. The loss of the ECN stem-finals may have coincided with further changes in the LCN period. i.e. *-m* now paired with *-n*, and *-c* with *-s* as concurrent forms.
4. These alternate forms continued to co-exist till *-n*, *-s* and *-s/-r* finally changed to modern *-n*, *-y* and *-l*.

Finally, the representation of inflected/derived forms too has its own problems. For example, *dhā-ya* can be glossed as 'will say', 'may say', something to be said' or 'is-to be said' thus carrying future, optative, relative participle, or verbal participle functions, and it is difficult to establish the syntactic environments which signal the change in meaning. It is therefore a sensible idea to summarize the inflectional morphology of CN verbs in conjugation tables in the manner of Jorgensen (1941) or Kölver and Kölver (1978) for all classes of verbs. Following Jorgensen we can divide CN verbs into three categories, A, B and C forms with allomorphic verbal suffixes. The conjugation of Class 1 verbs, for example, can be seen in Table 6. The A forms are what Jorgensen calls the short base/root, B forms derived from the longer base, and C forms are the compound verbs. All the attested inflectional suffixes have been listed under the three categories of verbs along with their grammatical functions.

Table 6. *Inflectional and derivational morphology of CN verbs.*

Root: kan- 'to tell'	Grammatical function
A. kam -ja/kan-ya/-e	Infinitive
kan -am/-o/-a	Finite past
-o/-wo	Imperative
-i/-yu -nayu/niwo	Future (stative)
-an/-ā/-kwo	Relative participle
-nam/-lam	Adverbial participle
-syam/-sem	Adverbial participle
-le/-len	Conjunctive participle (as, when)
-kam/-nam	Conjunctive participle (after, while) (Reduplicative)
B. kana -sā	Conditional (if)
-sā-nwom/-sā-nam/-sām	Concessive (even if, even though)
-nā-sem	Adverbial (when, at the time)
-nā-sa/-nā-wo	Conjunctive participle (when, as, since, if only)
-nā-nān	Causal (because)

C. kana	-hune/-hñān/-ñān	Imperative
	-sane	Polite imperative
	-tole/-tale/-tolen/-talen	Adverbial (until, as long as, while)
	-tolem/-tolenom/-toleyā	
	-tunum/-tunam	Adverbial (as soon as, immediately after)
	-kāle	Adverbial (when, if)
	-wola/-vala	Adverbial (while, as long as)
	-tu/-tum	Intensives

Implications for further research

In conclusion, I would like to make brief references to the theoretical significance of this line of research on the languages of Nepal:

- (1) Any research on the diachronic morphology of CN can help to understand the history of the Newari language as recorded in ancient manuscripts, and this can throw light on several problem areas of Newari grammar, e.g. the early person agreement system of CN and the historical development of the conjunct-disjunct system.
- (2) Such research could be highly relevant for historical/comparative studies on Tibeto-Burman languages. For this purpose, a proper understanding of the oldest available Newari material is absolutely essential.
- (3) This could also lead to more reliable criteria for reconstruction of certain crucial morpho-syntactic features of Proto-Newari, and a less ambiguous placement of Newari within the genetic classification of T-B languages.
- (4) A compatible model of morphological analysis can be evolved to explain whether the morphological characteristics in Newari and other cognate languages of Nepal provide evidence for sub-grouping of languages and if these are the products of area pressure (i.e. Indo-spheric influences) or that of genetic inheritance. We all know that T-B languages of Nepal share many features with Indo-Aryan and Dravidian families.

Finally, our efforts should be towards documentation and codification of Nepalese languages through adequate lexical and grammatical descriptions. Such descriptions could contribute to area surveys similar to the Linguistic Survey of the Rai languages of Eastern Nepal (Hanson 1991), the proposed Sociolinguistic Survey of Nepal (Hale 1993), and also help to define Nepal as a subarea in South-Asian linguistics. The works of Emeneau (1956, 1974), Masica (1976), Southworth (1974) and Verma and Hill (1979) are interesting steps in this direction, but more work is obviously needed on the diachronic phonology and morphology of CN and other cognate languages (and dialects) before we can make conclusive statements on the proto-forms of the parent language.

Notes

1. This is slightly revised version of the paper presented to the 27th International Conference on Sino-Tibetan Languages and linguistics, Paris, France, October 12-16, 1994. The paper has benefitted from comments made by various scholars including Austin Hale, James Matisoff, David Hargreaves and David Bradley. I am also grateful to Dr Bradley for supplying some of the cognate words in Burmese, listed in Table 3.
2. The evolution of the word *hva-ca* to a Class I verb form *hon-e* is highly irregular and cannot be explained in terms of the present verb class system where the suffix *-ca* is not associated with Class I verb. Historically, it is not likely that *c-* changed to *n-* and so remains an oddity in the attested data.
3. The suffix *sana* is actually a polite imperative form with an infinitival meaning where *kA- sana*, for example, can be glossed as "may you be pleased to take".

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MYTHS OF ORIGIN: THE JANAJATI MOVEMENT, LOCAL TRADITIONS, NATIONALISM AND IDENTITIES IN NEPAL

Harald O. Skar
NUPI, Oslo, Norway

This contribution is about myths of origin among the Tharu peoples of Nepal. The title indicates that such myths relate to the Janajati movement and nationalism. What do have such myths to do with the emerging new state and national identities?

A short answer would be that such myths are but one small element in a complex picture of relationships between indigenous peoples, ethnic categories and nation-building. Nevertheless, I feel that this small part may symbolically indicate a larger issue, one of origin, of self definition and of the way one looks at oneself in relation to the surroundings and ongoing process of change. The different myths represent Buddhist and Hindu constructions of reality. The problem illustrated here with reference to the Rana Tharu thus has a wider relevance to many ethnic groups in Nepal. As expressed by Prithvi Narayan Shah, the state is squeezed in the nutcracker between the Buddhist high mountains and the predominantly Hindu gangetic plains. This reality is also reflected in the choices of identities now prevalently made. Such elements are today made into important parts of the Janajati movement's ideology and contribute towards identity formation for the many groups of inhabitants in Nepal.

Background Information on the Janajati Movement and Democracy in Nepal

Before 1990, during the Panchayat system, ethnic associations were forbidden as public entities in Nepal, as were political parties. Ethnic associations were considered to be "communal" and a hindrance to the process of national unity and integration. At this time, the king was an absolute ruler and considered to be the incarnation of the Hindu god Vishnu. The country had a formal, democratically elected government in which representatives were elected on individual merit, but the elected ministers had less real power than the royally nominated state secretaries of each ministry. Political agitation ("Democracy Movement") in 1990 allowed rural power-elites (any from east Nepal and basically of Brahmins and Chetri background) to claim a share in Kathmandu's decision-making process.

After the overthrow of the Partyless Panchayat System (1990), most of the ethnic associations have now been formally recognized as they were allowed to register in the district administration offices of His Majesty's Government. A few of the associations, mainly of Tharus (1952), Magars, Gurungs (1954) and Tamangs, have existed underground since the early 1950s (the first democratic period in Nepal), whereas other associations have come about only recently after the restoration of democracy. Along with the emergence of the various ethnic associations, a bigger association known as Janajati Mahasangha (Federation of Nationalities) has been formed as a joint effort of the ethnic associations mentioned below. This Federation can be said to function as an *umbrella association*. The Federation of Nationalities has representation from the following ethnic associations:

- Nepal Magar Sangh (Magars)
- Kirant Yakthung Chumlung (Limbus)
- Kirant Yayokkha (Rais)
- Tamu Bandda Sewasamiti (Gurungs)
- Thakali Sewasamiti (Thakali)
- Tharu Kalyankari Sabha (Tharu)
- Dhimal Jatiya Utthan Kendra (Dhimals)
- Niko-Thami Sewa Samiti (Thami)
- Nepal Tamang Sangh (Tamangs)
- Nepal Bhasha Mankakhala (Newars)
- Nepal Hydmo Samaj Sangh (Hyalmos)
- Hyambu Syarba Chichhog (Sherpas)
- Kirant-Dharma Tatha Sahitya Utthan Sangh (Rai-Limbus)
- Meche Samaj Sibiyari Afat (Meches)
- Rajbanshi Bhasha Prachar Samiti (Rajbanshi)
- Jirel Samudaya Utthan Sangh (Jirel)
- Danwar Jagaran Samiti (Danuwars)
- Chhantyal Pariwar Sangh (Chhantyal) and
- Sunuwar Sewa Sangh (Sunuwar)

The objective of the Federation is threefold (according to Suresh Ale, General Secretary): to have "Nepal declared a secular state in spite of the Hindu Kingdom"; to make provisions for "the imparting of the primary level of education through the medium of their mother tongues; and to make "the constitutional provisions, of both jobs and political representation to all ethnic groups."

Myths of origin

Before relating origin myths to political realities in Nepal, let me say a few words about the way the scholars have tended to perceive such origin myths.

Anthropological studies of myths of origin have generally seen them as a way of looking at society as integrated wholes. Such studies have largely been connected to structural theories in which conceptual wholes (cultures)

are postulated. Secondly, studies of origin myths have also been taken to indicate self identity, or at least attempted to see what the different individuals in a group may have of common ground. Thirdly, besides explaining the content within the whole, origin myths may also define boundaries of the whole, and as such they delineate the "anthropological object of study."

In other fields apart from anthropology, studies of origin myths are tied up with history research and the special political science traditions which we for short can class under the catch phrase of "invention of tradition"¹ (T. Ranger and Hobsbawn 1989). An underlying current in such studies seems to have been that such myths blur history, manufacture "opium for the people" and... ultimately may not really be "true". That is, people use the past (or invent it) in the project of nation building. The past becomes in this sense history *as* myth, (that is, not necessarily reflecting what actually happened). It becomes an oral tradition, or folklore that in essence will be used as a proof that "We... are the People." We may recall the Victorian invention of tradition in India (Cannadine 1989) or according to Hobsbawn, the mass-production of tradition in Europe between 1870-1914. Myths were created in reference to Franks and Saxons of early Europe. We may ponder the meaning that origin myths may have had even for societies as our European ones.

Such stories of nations are stories or narratives which in themselves also may indicate the *beginning* in time (the Stiklestad war in Norway, Birth of Christ, etc; See Bhabha, 1992). But before this time what was there? On the one hand such narratives set the time of civilization off against barbarism; on the other it may portray the peoples whose origin it traces as the indigenous ones, the pagan first and so forth, with legitimist claims both on resources and territory. Such narratives set out a notion of them and us, where the WE may become linked to international treaties as those about indigenous rights set up within the United Nations.

Within this international system, however, one had previously a concern only for the state or the level of the individual, while today (after the migration of Iranian Kurds) there are also treaties for the protection of less advantageous groups between these two levels. Basically, this intermediate level concerns separatists and those who do not claim exclusive territory have status as "suffering and abused as *indigenous*" (See Skar 1994). We shall return to these issues later.

The Imagined Tharu Community:

If we accept Benedict Anderson's recent definition of a nation as "an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Skar 1994:6), it becomes important to look into the collective dreams and desires which we may actually encounter. Such dreams are made both by Kathmandu politicians and by local leaders, as the young and ambitious ones in the rural areas in today's Nepal. Let us in the following counterpoise two origin myths and two political dreams which I encountered while working with the Tharu population. These myths tell of different

political aspirations, of a country with a centre and a periphery, and indeed also of a country in which identity at a deeper level is at stake in the new process of democratization.

The first myth and dream is of Tharu ethnic ancient ancestry in India, and it connects the ethnic group to Hinduism as it sets out a way in which the Tharu may attempt a "caste climbing" strategy. The other myth and dream is of making the Tharu the most original or aboriginal or indigenous people of Nepal, claiming ancestry back to the Lord Buddha, who was born in the lowland or Nepali Tarai, the Tharu ancestral land. The first myth relates to local power-structures and daily life, while the second relates to the present day fight for political power at high levels in the Janajati National movement in the capital of Kathmandu.

When I first began to work among the Tharu some years ago, they would tell me their origin myth² as follows:

Once, long time ago the sun became so hot that all men and women died. The sun was so big that the land dried up and no agriculture was any longer possible. Two people, a man and a woman, had survived, and they walked through the desolate landscape until they came to the Chittol-gar (gar=home), a place in India where all our forefathers later would come from. In Chittol-gar the people multiplied and they became a large tribe. They lived happily until one day they were attacked by an enemy, the Mongols. Then the king Rana Pratap Singh (or Thaku Rana) (Thaku=original) led them in war, but as they understood that they were losing, the noble and royal women were sent to safety in the forest with the male slaves/attendants. From that day our tribe has been condemned to moving about in the Thar desert (thus Tharu), always going from one place to another, until finally we could settle where we live today. Later the royal women married the slave men, and this is why the women today do not work in the fields and serve their men outside the house, pushing the food-plate with their foot.

This myth has many interesting characteristics as it sets out rules about such important institutions as slavery (still practised; see Skar 1995) and of women-men relations. What is important in this context is, however, that, firstly the mythical and mystical place of Chittol-gar is commonly known to be in Rajistan in India, and that by placing themselves as descendants of Rajput Indians, the Rana Tharu are sending a clear message to all other groups they relate to in their near environment. The myth indicates: "We are not as the Muluki Ain (the caste law of Nepal) indicates as alcohol-drinkers and close to the bottom of the ranking scale, but close to Chetri status, as warriors and state makers."

According to Allen (1972), similar myths indicating higher than actual status are to be found among many of the Nepal Tarai groups. But this myth

has had a most interesting affect among the Rana Tharu unlike that of the other cases. The people of Kailali, in the Far West are today *reenacting the myth*, but in reverse. In 1994 for the first time, a large group of Rana Tharu led by the charismatic leader XX planned to go to India to reunite with a Rana group who XX has located in Rajasthan. If received by these as "lost brothers", a claim to equal status could be made, according to the "rules of the game" as laid down in Hindu tradition and customs.

One problem remained, however. Nepal today is in the process of de-Hinduizing the kingdom, and thus the "rules of the game" are changing. This is a point which so far has seemed of little importance to *local* political actors, but of great importance to the leaders of the Janajati Movement in Kathmandu. Their strategy has thus been to renounce the above version of the "Indian"-origin-myth and exchange it for the following one.

The Tharu originated in Nepal as remnants of the Sakya's and Koliya's the two branches of the descendants of Okaka and Okamukha, the king of Banares. During the time of sage Kapil who had his Ashram in the area which later became known as Kapilvastu, King Okaka had married a second wife in his old age and was forced by the younger queen to promise to make her son the next king. The king, Okamukha was very pious minded and, therefore, informed his three sons from his elder wife of his predicament and advised them not to revolt in his life time, but to recapture their kingdom after his death from their step brother. The four sons left the kingdom instead, thinking that there were no dearth of land and they could found a new kingdom. The five sisters, the eldest's name was Priya, also joined their brothers left the country of Kosala, came to Kapil's Ashram and sought his permission to settle in the region by clearing the jungle and cultivating the forest land. Kapil readily agreed, but requested them to name their state as Kapilvastu after his name. So the new name came to be known as Kapilvastu.³

At first, this seems an origin myth similar in vein but different in content with the first. But its significance may be glimpsed when we are told that "these facts are writ-large in the Buddhist literature – Lalit Bistar and "jatak" tales. Furthermore, according to the story pamphlet the author Mr. Singh, "the birth stories as narrated by Buddha support it" (Ibid.: 2). Thus the Hindu paradigm is exchanged for a Buddhist one, and the Hindu caste ideology is, according to Singh denounced, because "Buddha created a revolution in the then deteriorating Hindu society... and Buddha's proposition that all men are born equal and are the architect of their own life was very painful to the Brahmins and the people supporting Brahminism" (Ibid.: 3).

To further such a mythical view, this exegesis continue by disclaiming any high caste ranking, or caste climbing. This is done as follows: "Again, it is well known to the Buddhist historians that the Buddha's ancestors, when they

came to resettle in the woods of Kapilvastu, the brothers married their own sisters, while the eldest sister Priya ran the household and remained unmarried. Now if the Buddha's ancestors had been Kshatriyas (Chetri) of Hindu concept, they could not have married their own sisters. It would have been sacrilegious, abhorring to the caste Hindu" (Ibid.: 3).

Having established a different mythical origin, of a people which cleared primordial forests in the ancient time, (i.e. a non-Hindu group), the author goes on to establish a link between this group and the Tharu. This is done in a very sophisticated way, in which the Tharu are not only seen as the "original people," but also descendants of Buddha himself. Firstly, let me explain that the primordial jungle area at this time was intact from Delhi to the foothills of the Himalayas (see Skar 1995). And that within this region, close to the hills and now within the Nepali Tarai, we find Buddha's birthplace (date approx. 563 B.C.) at Lumbini. According to the story of Buddha, the original carrier of this faith was a group known as Therabadins, who were descendants of the Sakya and Kolian peoples living in Kapilvastu (the new jungle-kingdom described in the story above). These followers of the Therabada Buddhism came to be called "Sthavir." "It is from this word that Singh (Op. cit) and other leaders of the Janajati movement claim that the name "Tharu" derives from "sthavir" to "thavir". and from Thavir to Tharu is an easy and logical transition," we are told (Ibid.: 4).

Following the logic of the Janajati followers, the Tarai was inhabited by a malaria resistant people, and no one but the Tharu lived there in the olden days. If Buddha was born in this area then he had to be "Tharu," and thus *they* would be the original tribe in the Nepali lowland. If thus the Tharu were in Nepal from approximately the eighth century B.C. onwards, why should the later Tharu groups arriving from India marry their slaves as in the other myth? Mr. Singh asked during my interview (Des. 1993).

If some groups in the Far West were forced to go north during the time of the Mongols (thirteen hundreds), the other groups would have been here to welcome them, as we are all descendants of Buddha.
(From interview with Mr. Singh)

Interpretation and discussion

Let me now attempt some words of interpretation and an explanation of the context in which the different claims are made, and also add a few words on the texts themselves.

The first version of the origin myth, the Hindi version, is locally shared by all in the Far West and of long standing. It has been reported by anthropologists and travellers from the time of the British East India Company (1757-1857) up to the present (see Shrivastava 1958: 14-5, and my own fieldnotes).

The myth reflects traditions (caste, slavery, women's place etc.). It is an *oral* tradition, and it is not national but *bi-national* in that the Tharu groups in India (who marry across the borders to Nepal) share the myth, and lastly, it

is *continental* in that it reflects values and beliefs predominantly found on the Indian subcontinent and within the Hindu tradition. From the local community, we see connections first with the Hindu God State of the Panchayat period (up to 1990) and associations with the symbols of this nation state, in which nationalism was built on the three pillars of Hinduism, kingship and Nepali language. We see further connections, emanating from the local contexts and blending with Brahminic traditions all over the Hindu world.

However, on a visit to Rajasthan in 1993, we met with local leaders in the town of Chittorgar. They could tell us that the Rana Tharu were a part of their own Rajasthani claim to sovereignty within the state of India. Every year, according to Mr. YY, there was in chittorgar a celebration of the battles of Rana Pratap Singh. Last year even state ministers of India flew in with helicopters to attend it. We had the feeling that a claim of relationship to ethnic groups in Nepal as very welcome, as this furthered the nearness of the peoples in the two countries and could thus be used politically. However, we were told that the Rana Tharu had to be real Rana, and thus there would be no acceptance into the Rajasthani movement if they continued to maintain that the women had married slaves.

Another origin myth of origin told among the eight Deuba Rana families of Urma may satisfy this purist Hindu requirement, while loosing the Indian connection. Here the mythical father is a local Nepali (paharia) hill king of Chetri origin.

Today we are living in an area previously called Parivar Thapa. The Thapas were areas from hill to lowland, and they were ruled by kings. In Parivar Thapa was the kingdom of the Paral ethnic group, as Boktan Thapa was ruled by the Bogati Chetri, and Reikavar was ruled by the Raul.

The Paral Raja (king), had however begun to sacrifice human beings. At every Dasai (Hindu festival in November, he would sacrifice (cut is the word used) young men. Only men were slaughtered, not women. Then Prahal man Deuba arrived. He had arrived from Ruakhola in the Dandeldhura hill district. He settled with a woman who previously had one son, and when the old Paral king said it was this son's time to be slaughtered, Deuba told the young man to be brave and not afraid of him. "If you are brave we shall go against him," he was told...As the old king Paral Raja was holding up the boy's head so as to cut it (here we were showed how the jaw was kept open as the chin (was pushed forward), Deuba arrived and cut off the king's head instead. After that day, all descendants of Paral Raja were killed as well. Deuba Rana ruled from that day on, but left this area, Parivar Thapa to be administered by his younger brother while he himself went to Singhai in India. He became a king there, and no one

has ever been there, nor do we know where it is. The Deubas were Chetri, and now the younger brother wanted to return to Pahar (mountain) for a wife. However, the natives said: "You cannot go. You must be the king of your petty state and rule here. Then he was compelled to take a Tharu wife." Even the barbarians (Muslims) would not at that time stay in this area as it was so hot, but Deuba stayed and his descendants reckon themselves as Chetri today.

Deuba brought with him one goddess-guntidevi. Even today this goddess receives sacrifice of a male buffalo during Dasai. She has her own little shrine at the end of the forest closest to the village. Otherwise the Deuba Rana have the same gods as the Rana Tharu (Niradar, Durga, Nangarihei, and Hanuman). The Guntidevi is now in Gasita. This was the village in which they all lived before. Later, the eight families of Urma moved here. The goddess is worshipped by all the villagers of Gasita, but only here in Urma do they cut buffalo. The meat, head, hoof and all, they give to the untouchable.

The informant added that as other Tharu's are Rajputs, they are Chetris, as the Deuba in the hills marries the Bom Thakuri.

In this myth, we see that mythical "fathers" can be made Rana, and thereby give identity to whole groups of descendants. The Indian connection is weakened, but it is still there reminding us that the Tharu nation is divided by state borders (India-Nepal), while the connection to the upperclass Hindus of the Nepali hills is made pervasive. Indeed, this myth presents an ideal notion for Hindu caste climbing in a local context.

The Buddhist version of the origin myths presented earlier counter the Hindu mythical framework. Furthermore, it functions exterior to the local narrative context. Nepali Hinduism is in itself a mix. This clear-cut juxtaposition between Hindu and Buddhist is known to be hard to make in practice at the village level, but easy in the abstract. Such opposing views are thus generally made in Kathmandu, especially as laying claims in opposition to the government, which is accused favoring Brahmins and Chetris in its policies.

As an example of the difficulty in differentiating between Hindu and Buddhists, the Dasain festival is frequently used. The festival of Dasain (in October), originally a Hindu festival, is today celebrated by most religious groups in Nepal as Christmas is also celebrated by believers and non-believers in Europe. For some this represents the essence of Hinduism, for others a prolonged party and a vacation. The difference is not always readily observed in the field (Janajati have voted to abolish this festival as a national holiday, see text at the end of essay).

Another example frequently used when denying religious separateness between Hindu and Buddhist is as follows: If the criteria to establish who is a

Buddhist is to be "anyone believing in Buddha," (as suggested by Buddhists, during the planning of new national statistics), most villagers in Nepal would doubtlessly be Buddhist. This is so because even the most devoted Hindu would believe in Buddha as a sacred man.

Without going into more detail concerning the way to classify Nepali citizens, we see that the framework used by the Janajatis is found among the intellectuals and often exterior to the village context. It reflects rather a growing consciousness of a group within a larger society, and especially the way they are perceived by the leaders. (Some of its leaders come from very Hinduised villages, and thus they reclaim their lost past, hoping for a new present.) The Buddhist origin myth is considered as "truth" to these leaders. They thoroughly believe in their version of history, and as such, it is not questioned but postulated and used in the modern political dialogue.

Today the Buddhist origin myth is part of a national discourse, having to do with political motivation the changing relationships between the 36 flowers (ethnic groups) in the garden of Nepal, to paraphrase Prithvi Narayan, the founding father-king of Nepal. It has to do with who is to weed the garden and who is to water and be watered; and ultimately, in what soil one is to grow the flowers. Ultimately for the Tharu, the myth is a claim to be part of the modern vision of Nepal – a non Hindu mosaic with equal rights to all, to quote the Janajati leader Suresh Ale Magar. (The smiling man which the press often today like to call the "angry man", a derogatory term as anger is not supposed to be shown in this society). However, before one enters the garden path of Prithvi Narayan, a strong Tharu nation in its own right is seen as necessary, a Tharu nation capable of protecting rights and positions beside the other ethnic groups. To acquire such rights, internal differences between different Tharu sub-groups (i.e., as between the Dangora Tharu and the Rana Tharu who generally do not understand each other's language) are overlooked. Furthermore, an affiliation is made with the international movement of indigenous peoples.

As the U.N. year of the indigenous peoples was declared and the Guatemalan human rights activist, the indigenous Mrs. Menchu, was given the peace prize, the Tharu and other Janajati leaders were requesting the government to have a Nepali indigenous rights committee formed. This request was declined, and it led the government later to set up its own non-ethnic committee to represent the multiethnic nation in the World Human rights Conference in Vienna in June, 1994. I shall not go into detail about the events which led to Nepal having two committees present at that conference, but only note, for the sake of this article, that the subcontinental Indian framework of bi-nationalism is replaced by the Janajati politicians invoking international frameworks and also in parenthesis the support of international NGOs.

Conclusions

To conclude this article, I shall briefly restate the two model in which the people of Nepal today are "imagining their community" to use Benedict Anderson's term. These visions are reflected in the origin myths, but they go much further as Nepal is squeezed between the two great traditions, one in the north and the other in the south. One predominant model is of the Hindu state, and the other, most frequently opposed, is of a multiethnic democracy, favouring Buddhism. So far no ethnic group seems to want to set up a pure one-ethnic state within Nepali territory as each of Nepal's 36 ethnic groups is seen as too small to withstand either of the two large neighbours, China or India. However, although there seems to be a tacit agreement on the preservation of the state as such, there is no agreement on what type of state it is to be.

The Hindu version is of a melting pot where all become more or less like each other, as in the idealized "America." I shall not at present go into detail as to its foundation in the Panchayat period, its link to the royal family, and to various Brahminic fundamentalist groups. We shall, however, note that a Nepal Sadbhana (Goodwill) Party was formed in 1990, and that one of its claims is to have Hindi recognized as a national language in Nepal at a par with Nepali. A special Hindu (Sanskrit) University is currently also running in Dang, Nepal (although there are few students). (During the 1994 election, it was interesting to note the simultaneous timing of a large seminar on the Hindi language going on at this university). Close to the University grounds the massacre of UML party workers also took place, which again affected Kathmandu as the dead were buried there making martyrs for the new regime. In opposition to this Hindu nationalism, we note that few tribal individuals (non-Brahmin/Chettri) have today been appointed judges, that neither high-ranking military nor police officers seem to be in view, and that few tribals are members of the National Academy of Science. Today many are of the opinion that the situation is worse than before the revolution and that previously the king, by privately appointing individuals to the upper house, at least maintained some future for non-Hindu citizens. In 1993, many frustrated citizens flocked to the Janajati movement, and even the traditional political parties saw themselves forced to view for the ethnic vote, previously controlled by the Janajati Federation of nationalities.

Definitely Nepal is changing. During the last census only 53% (down 5% since 1991) claimed to speak Nepali, and Hinduism as a religion was so much in decline that the government, according to some, decided not to publish the figures. Meanwhile, the janajati is growing. But will it reach the villages? And how will it interact with local perceptions of self and local ambitions to caste climbing and individual status?

During the election campaign of 1994, all political parties declared that they were furthering nationalism and everyone's well-being in Nepal. (The use of the term 'nationalism' has only positive connotations here so far, and it refers to the nation state only). Now we may ask who are the nationalists

in the making of the Nepal of the future: the janajati or the Hindu? The ones believing in the old rule and order, or the ones with the new vision of change? Who will draw the longest straw as times go by will at least partly depend on the support available at the local level. Thus the parties may now need to confront the way people think of their origin, not only in Kathmandu but also in the predominantly rural "majority Nepal," that is, at the "gaun" level. Thus it may depend on which of the political parties first wakes up to the real importance of the ethnic vote in general, and how they will interweave this aspect with local practices and international traditions. During the 1994 election, the CPN/UML, and RPP seemed to have done a slightly better job than the NC, as they had included more "ethnic candidates" than the Nepali Congress (rough personal estimates from party name lists). Voting behaviour is, as I have noted elsewhere, dependent not only on party policy but also on tradition and the way people will want to perceive of the political messages (see Skar 1994).

As politics is rapidly changing the Nepalese reality, I shall end this article without a firm conclusion. We see that myths are made relevant in present day politics, but present day realities in the capital of Kathmandu may differ from those of the local caste village setting. The multiethnic nation of Nepal poses local and national problems addressed by some but not others. However, it has been noted that the parties under the 1994 election so far have been able to absorb much of the momentum of the Janajati movement. However, this may only be so at the present time. In an interview with Ganesh Man Singh on November (two days before the election), he stated that if Congress lost at the elections, one reason would be their failure to include the Janajati. As Congress had established itself in the early 1950s, it had been dependent on the support of the Rai and the Limbu, Mr. Singh maintained. But this, according to him, seems only to be history. Thus an understanding of history and one's place in it, both in relation to the mythical past and the rather more recent present, may be of importance for future policy makers and peace in this country.

Notes

1. "Invented tradition is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition; which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past". (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1989:1)
 "We should expect it (the invention of tradition) to occur more frequently when a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the social patterns..." (Ibid.: 4)
2. Told by the Balemansa (leader) of Urma village (1992).
3. Excerpted from the pamphlet "The Real Story of the Tharus" by Ramanand Prasad Singh, p. 2

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THE MANJANI SYSTEM OF THE DANUWAR STATE OF THE KAMALA VALLEY: A BRIEF STUDY OF AN EGALITARIAN JUDICIARY

Prem Khatry

Introduction

The term 'Manjan' refers to a person or group of persons, clan and dynasty hereditarily enjoying special, respected status and powers invested to that status in a given community or social system. In the present context, the term is a corrupt and localized version of Sanskrit 'manyajanah' (the person/s to be respected). For the purpose of this paper, the term refers to a traditionally maintained Danuwar office with judiciary powers, functions and responsibilities associated with the status and prestige thereof. Similarly, the terms 'Danuwar State' loosely define the traditional system of political-judicial structure and institutions remaining in operation in the Danuwar community of the Kamala Valley (*khoj*), and other areas of Chure in Sindhuli district also known as the inner Terai plains (*bhitri madhesh*) of central east and eastern Nepal, until the recent past.

The Danuwar constitute one of the many indigenous tribal groups of Nepal. They have a supposedly long but an unrecorded and unresearched history in the country. The inner terai and river valleys of the Chure region and parts of the lower Terai are known as the traditional homelands of the Danuwar people. Today, the Danuwar people are dispersed over several districts of east and central east Nepal – from the Narayani zone in the west to Mechi in the east and Trisuli river valleys are in the Kathmandu, Kavre and Nuwakot districts also. Interestingly, Danuwar settlements are found almost always near small or big water systems. The popular legend behind such preference is that long ago the Danuwar left their homeland after suffering defeat in the hands of their enemy. They entered the Chure Valley and settled across the river. The enemy chased them but could not cross the river, so the Danuwar managed to stay safe. When the enemy force approached them, it is said, they hid themselves beneath the water. They had mastered the waters of the region. Their deep rooted attachment with water and the traditionally long association with the river valley systems are still facts of their life. The Chure Valley irrigated by the river Kamala in Sindhuli District of east Nepal could be rightly called the home of the Danuwar people, although there are offshoot Danuwar concentrations in the western Sindhuli region and northern Sarlahi districts inside the Chure system.

The *Manjan* in the Danuwar Judicial/Administrative Organization

An authentic Danuwar history throwing clear light on their origin, migration and social evolution is unavailable. This is the case with many other indigenous tribes of Nepal. As the Gorkha polity and culture consolidated itself under the Shah regime, the constituent jati and ethnic groups of the new nation state began to go through a strenuous process anthropologists call acculturation. The civil Code of Sri Panch Surendra Bikram Shah promulgated in 1854 a.d. during the prime ministership of Jung Bahadur Kunwar Rana made a loose attempt to reorganize the different jati groups and provide them jati status and jati specific occupations as well as rules regarding social-ritual mobility. As a process of acculturation, the Danuwar reorganized their judicial administration in the pattern followed by the Ranas as part of their polity. The judicial terms and terminologies used by the Danuwar show that the different offices created and maintained by the Jati Assembly of the Danuwar were in common with the Rana offices, especially at the village level.

The Danuwar judicial system was organized under its presiding authority, the *manjan*, or the Chief judicial-administrative head. The *manjan* wielded judiciary power equal to that of today's judge of a court higher than the district. But, whereas the modern court, or for that matter the Rana court, functioned mainly under the guidance of the written code of the country and created as well as left behind the edicts of its deliberations, the Danuwar court presided over by the *manjan* followed unwritten, customary laws handed down by tradition.

The current *manjan* of the Sindhuli region now resides in a village called Patringa in the Kamalakhoj area in the Kamal river basin. The *manjan* family holds the title of dhami. In the Danuwar cultural tradition, this would mean that the *manjan* had to perform the duty of a ritual leader also. The last *manjan*, Jitnarayan Dhami, is today an ordinary citizen without a visible trace of the power of status his forefathers and he himself held for a long time. Yet Jitnarayan Dhami was able to facilitate the information needed during different phases of the current research.

During the present research, knowledgeable informants informed the writer that there was also a *manjan* in the village of Baltiya (Chisapani). Further information about this section of the parallel judicial structure of the Danuwar state of Kamalakhoj was unavailable. It appears that it existed briefly in the nearby settlements, but due to the comparatively wider popularity of the Patringa state the Baltiya *manjan* ship seems to have phased out gradually to no longer command the respect and attention of the Danuwar of the district.

As stated, the last *manjan* of the Sindhuli area was Jitnarayan Dhami of Patringa, Kamalakhoj, Sindhuli. Jitnarayan is 46 years old and comes from Birju Dhami's line as mentioned below:




Table 1: Descent of the dharmi

According to Jitnarayan, his family came from Chitwan as requested by the Danuwar of the Kamalakhaj area. Out of respect the Danuwar of Kamalakhaj even carried the first guest Chief on their backs. They had heard that this man could control even a tiger, and because of this power the simple Danuwar people brought him as a protector. In the beginning, the Danuwar of Sindhuli and Ramechhap paid Rs. 0.50 per household as fee for the *manjan* for the services he offered the people.

In a recognition of the service, Jit Narayan's ancestor received a *lalmohar* (royal 'red seal') during the time of King Surendra Bikram Shah authorizing them to serve as *manjan*. It was later renewed also as late as 2024 B.S. After 2028-29, when Panchayat became strong, the job of *manjan* slowly phased out and ultimately became defunct. Although his traditional status is no longer officially recognized and honored, Jitnarayan often receives invitation from the Danuwar people living in different parts of the valley and the *terai*. This happens when they have problems. In other words, the Danuwar as one cultural group have not forgotten his status and responsibility as their *manjan*.

Jitnarayan often reflects on his past and remembers that during the heyday of his grandfather his family raised two elephants as befitting the status of their family. After the death of his father, he succeeded as the *manjan* of Kalamalkhoj. He also remembers sitting in some of these judicial proceedings early in his life. He served for about a decade until the office and the entire customary Danuwar judicial structure suffered greatly once local Panchayats were constituted in 1962.

Most Danuwars of Kamala (*khoj*) basin opine that their *parbate* neighbors, most of them from high *jatis*, have always discouraged them from the *jati* administrative-judicial system from functioning effectively. But the observation indicates that it is the rich Parbate as well as the rich and modernizing Danuwar themselves who have actually substituted the traditional office with modern ones.

Main aspects of the Danuwar Judicial System

A system survives, thrives and functions if the people constituting it follow its basic rules and continue to play the game according to the prescribed rules. Its continuously felt need by the people also keeps the system going. In this perspective, it is obvious that, primarily based on feudal polity, the *Manjani* system stood and survived on the Danuwar feeling and attitude regarding the need of *jati* solidarity and purity, integrity, cultural affluence as well as cultural relativity.

The Danuwar society is organized on the principles of *jati* or clan solidarity and purity of blood. The *jati sabha*, or meeting, could be convened annually on the recommendation of the members to solve some problems. The system, for instance, kept some issues such as listed below in order of priority.

1. Illegal marriage especially with low, untouchable *jati*.
2. Physical attack, fighting, with serious injuries.
3. Adultery, (*jari*) marriage.
4. Other legal problem.

Besides these occasions, the *sabha* could also be called by *saurath*, the *Jati* Assembly.

Main Functionaries of the Judicial System

The Danuwar settlements of Kamala used to have certain important functionaries such as the *pagari*, *jaybar*, *gorait*, *sabhapati*, *bichari*, *jamadar*, *gauro*, *guruwa*, and so forth, depending on the strength of the Danuwar population and the needs of the society.

***Sabhapati* or the Chairman**

As the name implies, the *sabhapati* or chairman was the presiding authority of the organization. Although the *manjan* was the real head of the Danuwar State, he was the final judge and thus only the de jure head of the judicial system. The *sabhapati* was then the "Speaking Chief". The last *sabhapati*, Parva Kunwar, a resident of Sirthouli Village of Kamala River, was interviewed during the research. Parva threw light on the functions and the responsibilities of the post. Now aged 60 yrs and member of Sirthouli VDC Ward 8, he served as *sabhapati* of the Danuwar Judicial Assembly for several years. Parva functioned effectively as the president of the assembly during that period. The post and the responsibilities came to him through his father.

Before him his grandfather and father also served as president of the *sabha*. The *jati* assembly of the Danuwar gave important status to the president's position. The Rana regime also kept the system in operation. Parva said he was president of the assembly for a decade, from 2011 to 2020 B.S. As stated earlier, the *sabhapati* was actually the speaking chief of the assembly, for the *manjan* would mostly listen to the deliberations and not speak unless the case could not be settled by the assembly functionaries.

As mentioned, the Danuwar *jati* assembly remained active during the Rana regime but slowly died out after the advent of the Panchayat system in 1960.

Duties of the *sabhapati*

When the judicial assembly met to deliberate the issues of the day, its members would request the *sabhapati* to chair the deliberation. He would conduct the deliberation and help reach a conclusion. He also had authority to decide cases such as *jari*, *khat*, and other crimes. His most important job was to decide cases in the absence of the *manjan* (Banskota 1993:122)

The president functioned virtually under the shadow of the *manjan*, but as stated, he himself was responsible for most of the cases under discussion. He and the *manjan* would always receive cash fees, but the other functionaries would mostly receive food and feast only. So serving the people in the assembly was only a matter of prestige.

Normally a *mauja* (geographical/political unit such as a village) would have an administrative-judicial unit that functioned as the permanent body and consisted of the following authorities.

- manjan* – the high leader
- sabhapati* (i) – president
- gumasta* – the advisor to President
- pagari* – Secretary

Gumasta

The *gumasta* was an advisor to the president or *sabhapati*. Traditionally each *mauja* had one *gumasta*, and small-scale problems were taken to him for decision (Banskota 1993:128). Only the cases beyond his control were taken to the president and the *manjan*. Any new construction in the village required his final approval. The new harvest was first given to him as a token of respect. Several village level pujas were to be officiated by him. Non-Danuwar people also paid similar respect to the *gumasta*. But the more common and full-fledged body consisted of several other functionaries under the *manjan* and the *sabhapati*.

The judicial structure was organized to complete the process from the beginning to the end. It consisted of several authorities structured under the *sabhapati* (table 2).




Table 2. *Danuwar Judicial Structure*

As is clear from the chart, the Danuwar borrowed these terms from the contemporary judicial/administrative system. It is interesting to note here that some of these titles are used by some Danuwars as their family surname or *thar* even today.

It would be relevant here to describe the function of some of the important officials under the system.

Bicari: This term was borrowed from the old judicial system prevalent during the Shah-Rana period. Like the Gorkha system, the Danuwar *bicari* would make a case against the convict and put him forward for judgement.

Jamadar: *Jamadar* is an intermediary military rank in Nepal. Often this term also received an extended meaning. In the Danuwar system, this official functioned to arrest the convicted person as instructed by the *manjan* or the *sabhapati*.

Gorait: He is also known as “*godair*”. People often define this term in terms of movement, walking (using “god” or feet in Maithili). This means that he would go around the village arresting people wanted by the judicial system.

Pagari: The *pagari* was assistant as well as the secretary to the *sabhapati*.

Bhandari: The *bhandari* was responsible for the food grain and other materials in the collection of the assembly.

Other Functionaries

Adhikari: The post of *adhikari* continues to function in village. He is also known as *jamindar*. He is supposed to take care of the *pitri* of the village, kinfolds, and he stops the evil spirits from coming to the village. His house was *mukam* for the discussion. This title was given to an influential person who could maintain peace in the village, function as the village judge to

settle minor disputes, and function as ritual head of the village unit. In the context of the *jati* assembly the *adhikari* functioned under the *manjan* and represented his village in occasions. In other words, because of their descent from the family of Adhikari or headmen of the village, many Danuwars have now adopted the title of Adhikari as their family title or *thar*.

The *adhikari* was and still is the headman of the village. Besides being the guardian, he was also the main ritual head of the village. Normally, the *adhikari* provided place for the *jati* assembly as he was the guardian of the village. In the beginning, the assembly would lay some rules for deliberation, for examples a layman could speak only by the command of the leader or the *manjan*.

As the chief ritual authority of the village, the *adhikari* would do all he could to keep the village safe from evil forces. He would bind the village by his spiritual power (fig. 1).




Fig 1. The binding of the village from evil forces by the *adhikari*.

Gauro: He followed the instruction of the *Adhikari*, shouted the summons (*urdi*) to the villagers.

Dhami: Like in the past the *dhami*'s duty is to perform rites and so forth for the families and clan community. A *dhami*, along with the *adhikari*, binds the village to keep evil spirits out of the human settlement. His expected and recognized duty thus follows the concept of the village security system.

The pyramidal structure of the last judicial organization of the Danuwars of Kamala khòj stood according to table 3.




Table 3. Judicial Structure of the Danuwars of Kamala Khoj

Some other important Danuwar settlements that fell under the broad judicial umbrella are reported as follows:

Morang
Chandrapur
Padam
Juri
Kharibas
Jagichour
Mechi

Note: This is the version provided by the Danuwar authorities of the Kamala khoj where the field work was carried out. Establishment of the truth of this statement requires more work in outer regions with Danuwar settlements.

The Punishment Pattern

One common Manjani pattern of punishment is known as *thadi* or 'standing'. The *thadi*, also known as *supari* (betel nut) punishment, was most common. It was considered an important and effective method to force the criminal to confess. According to this method, the convict who failed to confess the crime was placed before the assembly and a pitcher full of cold water was put on his head. A hard nut (*supari*) was placed between the head and the pitcher thus generating continuous pain. He was sprinkled with cowdung all over the body and fanned strongly thus causing more pain and cold at the same time. It is said that most convicts could not stand *thadi* for long and would soon confess.

If a person lost caste status because of a grave crime, the *saurathi* or special Danuwar *pancha* assembly could bring the lost *jati* status back after deliberation on the issue.

Cash fines were also very common. These were done in the phrase of 36, that is, for every crime and denial of payment of the fine would be punishable by Rs 36. Instead of saying Rs 72 for two counts of 36 they would say two thirty-six, three thirty-six and so forth. The Danuwar people made the number 36 a catch phrase.

Punishment Related to Marriage

The Danuwar *jati* assembly controlled and regulated marriage rules among the Danuwar population of the region. A marriage was a strong bond, not to be broken easily. Certain punishments regarding the breach of marriage custom were as follows:

- a) If a marriage failed and the concerned person could not present valid explanation, then 2 to 3 instalments of 'thirty-six' punishment were inflicted on the person. On most occasions no explanation was sought.
- b) In cases such as marriage in bone relationship (*hadnata*), a person lost the Danuwar *jati* status also. For example, a cross cousin – or Mother's brother's daughter (MBD) and Father's sister's daughter (FSD) marriages – was not tolerated and could bring extreme punishment, including loss of status in the *jati* group. It meant that the person or family could not cook food for the Danuwar, but water was not polluted from their hands. This rule followed the traditional Hindu code on marriage as opposed to simple marriage rules prevalent in several ethnic groups of the hills and plains of Nepal.
- c) If a Danuwar married outside the tribe, for example, with Tharu, Sunuwar, and so forth then the marrying Danuwar party would pay a goat to the *manjan* as a tax or gift. Most often the animal was slaughtered to make a feast for the assembly members.

It could be said that the main idea behind the punishment was to settle the *jati* cases in the village and prevent their people to go to the Rana court. It was an indigenous cultural-political method to solve the problems arising in the Danuwar federation.

***Jati* Integrity: the Idea of the Assembly**

The main philosophy behind the Danuwar political-judicial structure seems to be to keep *jati* unity, integrity, and solidarity. The tough rules and severe punishment pattern were made and executed with a view to minimizing deviant behavior.

Our informant and the last notable Danuwar *manjan* Jit Narayan Dhami explains that the introduction of the Panchayat system and the judicial-administrative role given to the popularly elected chief or the *pradhan pancha* heralded the demise of an old cultural tradition. The danuwar of the Chure-Kamala Valley and the Terai region are till aware of the fact that their administrative-cultural structure is the rightful as well as the appropriate *jati* institution to deal with Danuwar affairs. Therefore even today they sit as *samaj* to discuss important issues among themselves, and when the elders make some decisions in the absence of their traditional chief of *manjan*, they separate certain portion of the income as is *bhag* (share as fine, tax, etc.) and hang it on their roof. The defunct *manjan*, Jitnarayan, is often invited to come and collect those shares. Often such invitations come from long distances, so it is not always easy or worthwhile to make the trip, he says.

According to Basudev Adhikari of Harsai, the Manjan had received the *lalmohar* (royal seal) from King Surendra Bikram Shah. But the document could not be made available for study during the field work.

Basudev says that the *manjan* was the final authority as far as the judicial deliberation was concerned. His decision was the final one. Similarly, the *sabhapati* was to make the first step in making the decision in a case. As indicated elsewhere, the *gorait* and *jamdar* arrested the criminal, and if the criminal didn't confess, then the *gorait* would whip him.

The Danuwar also had a title called *guruwa* or priest. It was a title common to the Tharus of Terai.

As stated earlier, at the present time the title of *manjan* has lost its value or status. The assembly was devised in the old times to maintain Danuwar solidarity and *jati* integrity. Marriage rules, for example, were strictly and forcibly followed so that the members of the Danuwar tribe would not face extermination, impurity of blood, and other problems. The assembly survived on the premises of cultural integrity and continuity.


On certain occasions, five villages from Jagari to Daman in the southern Kamala basin sit together to discuss the issue.

On the occasion of a feast, the *gorati* used to receive the goat's sex organ. The *jamadar* was considered slightly up from *gorait*.

The Saurath Assembly

The Saurath was an All Danuwar Conference (ADC) which sat for special cases. It imposed strict sanctions on those who violated basic codes of the tribe. Violators of the existing Danuwar customary rules were often made to leave the village. Such person would also face loss of their *jati* status.

Sukra Dhami of lower Daman is an influential chief of the village. Sukra's family has functioned as the *dhami/adhikari* or chief of Daman village from the Rana period (table 4). Their job was to worship Dihibar and Dihibarni on several occasions. Dihibar and Dihibarni are the guardian spirits of the Danuwar village, who live in the east part of the country. Therefore, the Danuwar keep the Dihibar and his spouse on the east side of the village.



A father of ten children, Sukra thinks the *dhami/chief* has a very important role to play in order to preserve the Danuwar culture and tradition from modernization and imitation of the other cultures now encroaching the region. But can he hope that his sons and nephews will follow the *dhami* way of life as he and his predecessors did? Sukra is unsure about it. He feels the process of change is already underway.

According to Sukra, the *gauro* is like the peon today. He receives some land for his house and a garden because of his service to the nation. It is the *adhikari* who usually gives a piece of land as the *gauro* helps the *adhikari* to perform duties in the villages. The *gauro* is busy for twelve months of the year.

Sukra's family did the *adhikari* job for several generations. He is also the *dhami* for the Daman village community and does *phukpak* for the victims of *lagu*, and so forth with the help of his power. His clients are from different *jati* groups. In the past, other *jatis* living in the village had to respect him as chief like other Danuwar, but today other *jatis* do not follow this rule though they regard him as a 'janne' (a person with magical healing power).

Meeting of the Jati Council

Normally the council sat once a year. It was called in the night and all the Danuwar people attended it. Asked as to why they met at night, Danuwar elders reply that they had to work in the farm during the day, and the night was the only time when they could sit and relax a little and/or think of problems and solutions. By deliberating at night they could avoid disturbances from other, non-Danuwar people, who would not know what was discussed or decided there in the middle of night. In order to have the attention of the council a person had to file a formal petition.

The main function of the Danuwar *jati* judicial-political structure seems to be to maintain the *jati* unity, integrity, and solidarity. The tough rules are mainly aimed at keeping deviant behavior to a minimum.

Despite the introduction of Panchayat and election of the chief having caused the death of the indigenous social-cultural tradition, the Danuwar of the inner Terai are still aware that their administrative-cultural structure is the rightful institution to deal with Danuwar affairs. So, they sit as *samaj* to discuss important issues, and when the elders make some decisions in the absence of the chief or *manjan*, they separate a certain portion of the income (fine, tax, etc.) and hang it on the roof. Jitnarayan is often invited to visit them and collect those shares but he does not go. It is not worth making such long trips, he thinks.

Conclusion

The traditional Danuwar political structure of the Sindhuli basin maintained an administrative/judicial system that was based on a loose, egalitarian hierarchy of functionaries. The system evolved out of the need of the

Danuwar population which spread across the Chure hills and lower Terai. The judicial system attempted to maintain a social system within the framework of customary laws. Breach of marriage rules met severe punishment. Other crimes were also dealt with, often severely. The main functionaries such as the *manjan*, *sabhapati*, *gumasta* and so forth commanded respect from the Danuwar in general, although none of them actually made their life out of the services they offered the society.

Recent changes observed nationwide in socio-economic and political arena have hit the Danuwar society and culture of the Sindhuli region. One major factor of change in the Danuwar culture could be regarded the influx of the many hill people of Hindu origin to the region. The main flow came from 1930s and later, according to the senior Hindu and the Danuwar informants. Once in the region, the new comers would establish fictive kinship (*mit* etc.) with the Danuwar. In the beginning, the shy and highly introvert Danuwar found reliable, educated and patron-like friends in the new comers. In many cases, the hill people gradually bought, exchanged and captured the most fertile lands by means of mortgage or even as gifts associated with the *mit* relation. During the Panchayat regime, most middle and upper class *parbate* immigrants captured the influential political positions through the Danuwar votes and firmly established their supremacy, thus further reconfirming their power to run the local administration including Danuwar affairs. Thus the rise of the *parbate* economic and political power rendered the Danuwar political administrative system virtually ineffective and the Danuwar themselves began to see their economically prosperous Parbate neighbors politically powerful and judicially effective as well. The Danuwar prosperity on the other hand was already marred by their tacit willingness to accept external cultural pressure and reservation as well as indifference to internal reform and sociopolitical consolidation.

Note

This article is based mainly on my field work among the Danuwar in the Kamalakhaj (Kamala Valley) area in the Fall of 1994 and Winter of 1995. Part of the funding for the field work was made available through T.U. – Bergen Human Ecology Program. I thank Prof. Gunnar Haaland for this arrangement and also for his comment on the first draft of this article.

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POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN NEPAL

Dev Raj Dahal

Introduction

The study of political perspective on social development in Nepal assumes the fundamental laws of the land that govern and determine the behaviour of social forces, processes, and institutions and shapes the strategies that define the dynamics of society in desirable direction. Unlike other development visions postulating the growth of parts, such as, economy or politics, social development vision embodies the evolution of society as a whole for policy attention. This development vision delegitimises the hereditary inequality of rights characteristic of feudalism as well as fundamentalism irrationally rooted either in class, state, market or religion. Deducing power from society and deriving human rights from the rational nature of human beings, social development vision presupposes that citizens have the right to participate in every decision that affects their lives. This, in brief, involves the democratic exercise of political and economic power and the creation of a system that provides sufficient choice for ordering their meaningful life and liberty. Social development determines the shift of development paradigm from the state and market to civil society, from the individual to community and from the bureaucratic representation of policy-making to the direct legislative power of people in the formulation and implementation of decisions. This means social development emphasises the broad representation of social interest in the functioning of the political system, state, and market, and the democratic control over the policies made for them.

Although it is too early to presume that human beings will live without states, the increasing globalization of political economy has marked the beginning of a crisis on the historical role of the state as an organizing device of society as well as an engine of human development. Proliferation in the forces of civil society and the increasing cuts in public expenditure have minimized the state's autonomous capacity for action. The conditionalities of the global capital markets imposed on state have further put critical constraints on its political and economic effectiveness as well as added loss to the legitimacy and support. The process of globalization has, however, yet to give productive solutions to the problems faced by human beings. It merely sparked off a crisis on the legitimacy of the ideological positions taken by the developmentalists, a crisis created by the primacy of market.

It was natural because the logic of the hitherto development itself is less the control of social evolution, such as equality, justice, solidarity and regional balance, and the consolidation of social and economic democracy in society. The long transition of the market too neither proved to be a legitimizing philosophy nor transformed the growing reality of underdevelopment. It did not even solve the conflicts at society levels: subnational, national, state, and international. In several cases, it even started the process of unemployment, inequality, poverty and deprivation. What led to the crisis in developmentalism – market or state? If both, can the non-state actors do better in the Nepalese context? How long can Nepal as a nation-state sustain the process of economic transnationalization in a stable equilibrium where social forces will not sharply react? And how long will it take to offer benefits to the larger sections of society? These are the key questions to understanding the dilemma of social development in Nepal.

The Political Context

Research in social development is urgent needed to understand whether the integration of the national economy in the world system would preserve democratic control over political and economic processes such as labour employment, provide access to and control of natural resources, develop the capacity of internal market integration, control the financial resources, and maintain access to technology transfer without undermining national cohesion, identity and the freedom of choice. The present crisis in Nepal's development is neither the product of the decline of global communism nor the triumph of capitalism. It is the failure of successive Nepalese governments to serve basic human needs for benefit of these whom they have been created. Conceptually, too, the hitherto crisis in development is, therefore, not global; it is specific to the Third World and decommunized states where governments failed to mediate the ties between civil society and global regimes, between the goals of development and the limitations imposed on it by internal and external forces, and between the process of extraction and distribution.

Nepalese context bears the symptoms of such crisis as democratic processes established after the *Jana Andolan of 1990*, which unravelled several forces beyond the capacity of the Nepali state to control and govern. The convergence between domestic political and social forces and the international civil society movements, and between the liberal economic policies of trade and investment, privatization of the state-owned enterprises and denationalization, and globalization have weakened the socially distributive and statist mode of development. The role of the Nepali state has been historically, and to a considerable extent even today, hyperactive and hypertrophic in the sphere of *production* (land, forest, mines, capital goods, industrial units, and labour in the organized sector), *regulation* (financial, capital, and technological policies), *circulation* (foreign trade, foreign policy, transport, credit, banking, planning and distribution), and *control* (bureaucracy,

army, police and civilian forces). The state's ownership of these resources has been presumed to be a vital ingredient of its sovereignty. Because of the limited private ownership and individual freedom, for a long time the role of the Nepali state has remained largely extractive serving the interests of the aristocracy and bureaucracy rather than traders and producers – the two locomotives of economic development.

Even today delinking with the past is difficult, but the concepts of popular sovereignty; multiparty democracy and social justice underlined in the *Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990* (HMG 1990), manifestoes of the major political parties and the plan document (NPC 1992 a) are essential conditions to set an environment conducive for social development in Nepal. Political rules of the game and the institutional structures define how citizens' participation is structured in the governance and development processes, who should stay in power, and how the use of power becomes legitimate. Partly because of these and partly because of the *right to know* (transparency) and accountability in the decision-making underlined in the constitution, politics of consensus have emerged now among the political parties of various spectrum on core values of democracy, critical element for social development in Nepal.

In this context, whether the three broad themes poverty alleviation, productive employment, and social integration underlined by the United Nations in organizing the World Summit for Social Development on March 6-12 of this year will concretise the specific points for this new development is still lingering in the attitude of 'wait and see'. A similar attitude prevails over Nepal's report prepared by the National Committee on World Summit for Social Development (1994). What is less traditional in the report is that it reflects a slight departure from the classical economic reasoning where the primacy of economics dominates all other social values, disciplines, and institutions. Still, the crucial questions that are almost missed in the report are: Which social forces are capable of becoming the driving forces of social development in Nepal? What are the social interests in generating that social development? And, how certainly and with what means is this goal achieved?

As social development springs from a complexity of factors, its causal explanation requires both primary and secondary data and thinking in concrete and analytic terms that might cut across ideologies, fixed periods, and processes involving many explanatory variables. Concrete factors are associated with the problems of Nepal's political culture; and analytic factors are mental and conceptual, an abstraction applied to grasp the political perspective. The fragmentation of data and the paucity of interpretation, however, make this game plan of study flexible and its method of analysis descriptive. This flexibility is justified in the sense that very little research have been done in Nepal on this theme to formulate a meaningful hypothesis in advance. Yet, as unlimited rationale spells trouble and risks paralyse the study, it might be useful to define the topic within the framework of democratic Nepal following the *Jana Andolan of 1990*.

The *Jana Andolan* brought a cataclysmic change in the politics of Nepal. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal promulgated in November of the same year promised to guarantee the basic human rights of Nepalese citizens and consolidate the parliamentary system of governance, constitutional monarchy, popular sovereignty, independent judiciary and freedom of press – all considered to be the cardinal features of multiparty democracy. The constitution has explicitly recognized the multilingual and multiethnic basis of the Nepali state and pledged to structure opportunities for various forces of civil society to participate in the democratic and development processes on the basis of equality irrespective of caste, creed, sex, religion and region. All the native languages of Nepal have been accorded national status. On the basis of the recommendation of the National Language Policy Recommendation Commission (1994) the government started radio programmes and news broadcasts in some major languages, and steps are expected to be taken for the promotion of national languages as medium of teaching at primary schools.

Since the political change, three elections were held: national elections in 1991 and 1994, and local bodies elections in 1993 to institutionalize democracy at the grassroots level and involve people's representatives in the governance and development processes. The political change itself was triggered off by the emergence of middle classes (doctors, teachers, engineers, lawyers, businessmen, politicians, etc.). Yet, their role as a change agent, for better or worse, is less researched. What is obvious is that their relatively better standard of living, inclination to take part in public affairs, and greater influence on the underclass – which is powerless but in majority – and their acceptability to the upperclass – which is powerful but in minority and almost isolated from the masses, – have made them critical in the national political economy. The culture of these classes is not as well defined in Nepal as in America, Japan, India, and some Southeast Asian countries. But this growth can be regarded as important for the stability of democracy as it has facilitated the upward mobility of citizens which otherwise would have been difficult because of fixed social position in both spatial and hierarchic sense. In the absence of diverse middle classes, the disparity in social position had provided political space only to the traditional elite class for recognition on a national scale for purposeful action.

The role of these middle classes has been proved essential, because without radically breaking the tradition, the new positive social and political values and institutions of democracy and human rights were introduced toward building a just and egalitarian society. The manifestation of political contract among the United Left Front, Nepali Congress and monarchy is clearly discernible in the current constitution. The subsequent political processes it evolved so far have encouraged a moderately secular trend in Nepali politics. As a result, ethnoregional, radical and conservative forces have paled into insignificance in the electoral game. Class and market fundamentalists, too, have to take the back seat as their failure in placing social priorities and

creating a social economy based on the strengthening of family, community and society and weaving them in the web of a long-term cooperative is clearly reflected. As social economies are, by nature, local, non-waged, non-monetized and non-market (Korten 1994:8), their regeneration is fundamental in addressing the proliferating social crises springing from either the transnationalization of economy where Nepalese labourers have less chance of participation; or the marginalization of social forces owing to the lack of a strong social security system. From the political perspective, the assessment of the good performance of the political system is derived from how the infrastructures of democracy develop the mechanism to reduce the cleavages among the political and social forces and mobilize the citizens' loyalty to the goal of social development.

The central concern of political perspective is policy-orientation, that is, to relate means to ends and to create political harmony for social development (Bonveniste 1977:78). The three political transitions-sustained by the interim, Nepali Congress and UML governments now have consistently raised the possibility of democratizing the political structures and culture, perhaps through trial and error, and ultimately evolving consensus on the process of governance. In Nepal, this is partly facilitated by popular verdict, partly by legislative composition, and partly by the constitutional requirement of two-thirds majority while taking initiative on matters of vital national interest. The democratic control over policy process in the identification of goals, mobilization of resources, planning, and anticipation of constraints might bolster people's legislative power and make the power devolution operational. This is important in the Nepalese context characterized by the growth of bureaucracy, lack of transparency in functioning and upward accountability of elected and social leaders. That tradition still continues even today as the Local Government Institutions Acts of 1991¹ and the Eighth Five Years Plan (1992-97) have also subjected the legislative power of citizens to *national policy guidelines*, of NPC and HMG, a clear reflection to sell the trickle-down theory rather than evolve participant political culture.

The political implication of this policy is that the "free choice" of the citizens is being scuttled by the planners and the marcoeconomists who are in the forefront with the claims that the adoption of market mechanism will result in Nepal's overnight transformation from one of the world's poorest countries to a relatively prosperous nation. The grim reality is that subjecting the policy-making responsibility of the democratic government to transnational institutions rendered the Nepalese democracy and development controlled from outside rather than from below, and inclined the state policies to anti-democratic direction. The enabling environment for citizen participation has been confined to elections only. This is the reason Nepalese democracy has yet to take the strong social roots and political culture is oriented to the sharing of power rather than the process of politics. The current UML government's budgetary policy to power devolution though promises of something to everybody, has been criticized by the

marcoeconomists blaming it as populist and difficult to implement as it is alleged to carry no long-term policies except certain welfarist measures for the short-run. Others, however, are inclined to wait.

The basic components of social development underlined in the Nepalese report and the UN document embrace mainly three elements, and the rest of the components revolve around these.

Poverty Alleviation

More than half of Nepal's 19 million population is below poverty line. With a low per capita income of \$202 it is one of the poorest countries of the world ranking to the fifth position. The Human Development Index value for Nepal is 0.289 ranking in the 25th position from below among the 173 countries. That 95 percent of the poor live in rural areas and 82 percent of the rural poor are agriculture-based², testifies that the task of making the poor participants in the national political economy is monumental in scope unless this sector is modernized. But this does not mean that poverty can be ignored as a historical reality or merely as a moral concern of developmentalist. In fact, it can not be delinked from the structural conditions of society that let certain groups stagnate historically and even now. This means poverty alleviation strategy must be linked to the social transformation of the *context* of poverty itself, rather than its *content* only. It is because the underlying causes of poverty – both absolute and relative – are located partly in a set of laws and conditions that prevail over our socioeconomic system and partly the structural defects of world political economy that has excluded Nepal in the decision-making, even if it affected the Nepalese. Since negotiated reform in the world political economy is incremental and beyond our ability to affect other than the wishful articulation, it would be pertinent to argue over *what* causes the poverty to persist; *what* has Nepal done to reduce it; and *what* ought to be done in the foreseeable future.

The Nepalese report on social development cogently states that for centuries Hindu caste hierarchy dominated the social and cultural evolution of Nepal (National Committee on World Summit for Social Development 1995:4). Though this hierarchy provided functional specialization and social stability in society for several centuries, it also fostered an unjust foundation of inequality. A sense of fatalism without any solution to spiritually ordained status structured an attitude that power is delegated from the higher to lower bodies rather than shared to overcome powerlessness in the decision-making process, and therefore it can be used to remove the structural deformities of society. Economically, a sort of feudalism – the characteristic of agrarian economy – continued to persist. In a country where nearly 82 percent of the population are employed in the agriculture sector and the overall performance of this sector is declining as a result of fertile top soil erosion, environmental degradation, poor irrigation, inadequate infrastructure, and improper management, the magnitude of poverty would further surge if this sector is left in backwater. Associated with this factor is anti-democratic control over

the productive resources, such as land, and monopolization of wages. More than 10 percent of the people in Terai are landless. Over 50 percent of the households possess only 6.6 percent of the cultivatable lands. The top 9 percent of the households controls 47 percent of the agriculture land. The unjust control over the land resources, dual ownership, and no access to alternative mechanism have made the Nepalese poor vulnerable, insecure, and low in human development index (149).³

Aside from the four critical factors, limited resource base, its physical location between two large countries – both of which are also poor, and experiencing rapid population growth and poor economic performance (World Bank 1990) – the low level of political awareness fostered a sense of further powerlessness as far as active participation in the political economy is concerned. The calculation of poverty in the country is mainly economic. Therefore, poverty alleviation strategies also involved economic variables in the past: subsidy and transfer programs, integrated rural development projects; food and feeding programs, targeted credit programs, employment programs, and skill-generating programs (Gurugharana 1993). Currently, however, for institutional credit for the poor, training, education, health, and poverty-related activities have been undertaken under different projects. Small Farmers' Development Program (SFDP), Production Credit for Rural Women (PCFR), Grameen Bank, Banking for the Poor, Basic and Primary Education Project (BPEP), and so forth have been launched. In order to enlarge options for the poor (Upadhyay 1994), 1743 Sajha Societies (cooperatives) and more than 5,000 NGOs have been created to make the poor participant rather than just a recipient in the process of sustainable development. Political will for poverty alleviation is well reflected in the manifestoes of major political parties as each of them includes poor's access to credit, basic needs, land reforms, employment and participation. The only difference is: how to do it?

Despite these efforts, the incidence of poverty continues to grow as concrete implementation hits critical snags. The web of bureaucratic and political power, poor coordination between the different layers of institutions and lack of the devolution of political power at the grassroots hindered the effective implementation of policies. Making the institutional structures closer to the people requires popular participation and accountability. In this context, the Eight Five Year Plan's goals of poverty alleviation, regional balance, and sustainable development are set in motion. Yet, the *modus operandi* for this through the creation of productive assets, generation of additional employment opportunities, and better emphasis on integrated and sectoral programs are attenuated by the structural adjustment to international funding conditionalities rather than offering choices to the people. The ensuing political uncertainty and the problem of governance that cropped up until 1994 further undermined the overall effectiveness of many development programs, including poverty alleviation.

The change in the discriminatory economic and social structures and practices and the creative participation of the poor in the democratic and the

development process require the solidarity and cooperation of national and international agencies in poverty alleviation programs and their access to productive opportunities, public services, education and health, and social protection mechanism. In this context, it is not just the economic power of the consumers or political power of citizens but the human potential to enhance security – *freedom from want and freedom from fear* – that is crucial for poverty alleviation. Human empowerment is, therefore, a key to legislative participation. The social mobilization of the Nepalese poor toward the core public issues is a precondition to the creation of a just society where power is diffused and decentralized, solidarity is maintained through shared economic and political dispensation, and society is run through the institutions of representative bodies. A decentralized democracy cannot thrive on the poverty of citizens, either at the intellectual and material levels, but on prosperity, social justice, equality and solidarity.

Productive Employment

Creation of jobs and work opportunities are essential preconditions for poverty alleviation and social integration in Nepal. In the context of social development employment is, therefore, not only important for utilizing the nation's vast untapped productive potential but also for enthusing a sense of identity, self-confidence and recognition in society and economic security of citizens. Finding work for young people entering the labour market is fundamental for preventing radicalism and alienation, and for promoting social peace and stability. It is the most important issue leading to a more equitable distribution of income. This means job-creation and facilitation to the labourer's skill-improvement, mobility, and personal enhancement are the social responsibility of the government, private sector, and NGOs, because these elements are attached to the overall design of development strategies of the nation. The constitutional reference to the notions of *right to work* and *increasing participation of the labour force in the management of enterprise and the socioeconomic progress of the country* imply the creation of a welfare state accountable to the people rather than reverting to a kind of Social Darwinism. Unemployment and poverty induce social crisis, erode the vitality of civil society, and degenerate the development potential of the nation.

If productive employment includes both the reduction of unemployment and underemployment, the official statistics, however, point to a grim reality: the level of unemployment in the country is 3.1 percent. The share of females in it is 3.6 percent against 2.6 percent for male. The underemployment percentages are: 41.8 percent for males and 51.1 percent for females. The household underemployment proportion by net work days is estimated at 46.4 percent for urban and 33.3 percent for rural areas. The educated unemployment rate for males and females is estimated at about 4 and 3 percent respectively. Underemployment too is acute: 16 percent of those are working only 6-7 months in a year; 5 percent of them are working for 3-5

months; and 2 percent of about 3 months a year (National Committee on World Summit for Social Development 1994:6). The massive waste of labour is an obvious fact of the Nepalese political economy. Yet, the problems can be simplified if skill and efficiency is counted for. As most of the Nepalese labourers are unskilled or semi-skilled, the employment policy and structural policy accompanying it cannot be left solely to the oft-invoked invisible hand of the market economy (Panday 1995). In the context of globalization, the responsibility for employment must be rooted in the social solidarity of the public sector and private enterprises, a view also reflected in last year's verdict of the Supreme Court on Work-permit for non-Nepalese, the Citizenship Act, and the Labour Act.

For a vastly an agrarian country like Nepal, diversification of crop production, access to productive assets, labour-intensive technologies, and non-farm activities can provide jobs for the rural labour force, while in urban areas small-scale and medium industries, construction and maintenance provide skill-intensive jobs in the service sectors. Additionally, self-employment, employment through enterprises, and cooperatives can be efficient institutional resources expected to enhance equality of opportunity and economic status of the poor, women and marginalized sections of society. A socially acceptable and ecologically sustainable foreign investment and international institutions' employment policies can also meaningfully contribute in this scheme. To compete in the changing global political economy, huge investment in social sectors – especially education, skills, and information – is imperative. Stimulation of international bilateral and multilateral cooperation is no less salient, as the *Economic Survey of Nepal 1992-93* indicates their substantial contribution: 29 percent in social services, nearly 43 percent in transport, power and communication, 21 percent in agriculture, irrigation, and forest activities, and 8 percent in industrial activities. This means solidarity should be the norm between Nepal and the international regime so as to sustain the flow of critical resources to social development. High level of economic activities means more people employed and less dependency and far less social decay.

Social Integration

Social integration is the process of including diverse social forces (ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious, family, tribe, community, etc.) in the national society through the recognition of their identity and enabling them to exercise their civil and political rights in cooperative harmony. An integrated society legitimately accommodates the differences through collective action, an action based on consensual values and mutually-accepted behaviour. If social integration is taken as a precondition of social development, the policy of Sanskritisation obfuscates the sense of democratic equality as it purports to incline to a hierarchic 'status quo' that primarily relies on governance rather than secular social transformation.

The dominant cultural-religious identity of the Hindu state embedded in the current constitution reflects a theocratic tinge, yet by no means as fundamentalist as practiced in the other South Asian states. The dominant language (Nepali), religion (Hindu), place (Kathmandu), communities (Bahuns, Chhetris, and Newars) and values (nationalism) are beyond doubt asserting on behalf of state and evoking reactions from the regional and ethnic parties.⁴ But this dominance is not based on the melting pot strategy commonly adopted for national cohesion by most of the Western countries. This is the reason the allegiance of historically marginalized, minority and isolated communities is not parochial. The hierarchical integration of Bahuns, Chhetris, and other commercial and artisan classes has provided a kind of social stability, but it has also undermined social mobility and the equality of opportunity because those at the bottom of the social and economic pyramid remain incapable of participating fully in defining the public policies affecting their lives.

The notion of social integration in a democratic polity assumes the character of productive solidarity of peoples within the framework of nation-states that define their opportunities and, at the national and global civil society levels, that delegitimize all kinds of discrimination and injustices against women who are socially subordinated to men, against deprived ethnic groups, and against the poorer strata of society. Any development that is unequal, unjust and polarizing is simply unsustainable. Higher and lower caste values mirror the complexity of different degrees of development and imbalanced social relations. An equal access to educational opportunities that respects the diverse cultures and traditions should be the primary framework of integration process. From a gender perspective, despite more than half of the nation's 19 million population, women's participation or representation in the nation's bodypolitik is grossly unequal. Out of the 205-member *Pratinidhi Sabha*, the Lower House of Parliament, only seven women are currently represented one seat less than the previous parliament. The underrepresentation of women in the local government institutions is even more glaring. Their right to property inheritance, land, credit and ownership should define the linkages to social development. Adequate representation of various social groups in the governance is a functional prerequisite of democratic pluralism because this representation expands the social power of state. Democracy also presupposes the choice for participation of all the social forces and generation of works to realize their basic needs and their intellectual, moral and material well-being, make them capable of playing the rules of political game.

Social integration becomes inseparable from political participation, not just in elections but also in economic, political, social and development frontiers. This is important to reflect the social interest and exploit the institutional resources of the state. The voting turnout in elections is a good index of civic sense. Although voting turnout declined from 65.15 percent in the 1991 elections to 61.83 percent now, it cannot be outrightly labelled as

disgusting given the nation's poverty, illiteracy, and topographical diversity. Due to the better socialization process in elections last year, there was a decline in invalid voting turnout from 4.7 percent to 3.7 percent. More important is the citizens' full participation in the ward assemblies of village and municipalities so that their needs and creativity are clearly manifested and autonomy is maintained before the state and market. The spread of powerlessness, inequality and ecological decline in Nepal so far suggests that statist and free-market development strategies alone are no longer sufficient for empowering citizens and realizing the goals of poverty alleviation and sustainable development unless the community participates creatively on those strategies.

In terms of citizens' confidence in influencing the decision-making process of local and national governments, several surveys point out the opposite of what is being professed in the plan documents and manifestoes of the major political parties. Nearly 45 percent of the voters under study said that they lack the power to influence the decisions of local government (NOSC 1993:45). The sense of this powerlessness is acutely reflected in another survey where nearly 47 percent of the voters revealed politics is too complicated for them to understand. This is further confirmed by nearly 65 percent of the voters who said politicians care too little about what the voters think (POLSAN 1991:97; Khatri 1992). This feeling marks the poor penetration of democratic rights. The integrative functions among several social and political groups and between leaders and the citizens are prerequisite to acquire the resources located in other systems. The political perspective on social integration involves three powerful considerations:

Developing Popular Access to the Institutional Resources of State

In general, the "Directive Principles and Policies of the state" underlined in the constitution reflects the primary responsibility of the state to *maintain conditions suitable to the enjoyment of the fruits of democracy through wider participation of the people in the governance of the country and the promotion of human rights*. Specifically, however, the state policies promise to pursue a strategy for *promoting the interests of the economically and socially backward groups and communities by making special provisions with regard to their education, health and employment*. One such policy is the integration of women in the social welfare mechanism by legitimizing domestic work as a production of wealth and maternity as a social function. Another social policy would be the elimination of oppressive social relations by women empowerment and discrimination in favour of the poor, children, and disabled through affirmative actions. This is important in Nepal because despite the proliferation of women's organizations the implementation of several recommendations hit critical obstacles, and powerlessness stands in the way of their ability to fulfil social expectations (NPC 1994).

Getting the Government Closer to the People

Since people, their values, economy, ecology, and institutions are the primary concern of social development, the fulfillment of basic needs should be the social interest of the government. This social interest of the government provides the motive force to come closer to the people. Democracy, to function, needs constant interaction of the government with the people, their organizations like political parties, professional bodies, consumer groups, NGOs, and other components of civil society that articulate popular needs and put social control over governance (UN 1994:28-48). The key to improving public services is the devolution of power to the local self-government institutions, consisting of 3,995 Village Development Committees and 36 municipalities, and increasing their efficiency and accountability to the people. This process can also be expected to expand the space of civil society and generate resources for social integration. Democratic civil society is a recruiting base for political leaders and it trains them for the service of the government and party politics. These leaders learn how to organize and motivate people, debate issues, raise and account for funds, craft budgets, publicize programs, administer staffs, canvass for support, negotiate for agreements and build coalition (Diamond 1994:9). A legitimate social order, conducive to social development, designed to give the people more self-determination and thus change their lives cannot be imposed from above; it is built from below through their solidarity (Meyer 1992:100).

Building Coalitions for Social Policy Formulation

Social policy formulation is a complex process of building social contract among the diverse forces of society for concertation. In a pluralist society like Nepal where sixty different ethnic and caste groups exist, building coalition is essential to prevent polarization in the perception of governance and development process; if actual implementation of those policies too involves a number of actors, states, and contexts. Since social policy debates also embody the beneficiaries' perception, this entails the coalition partners evolving a down-to-earth approach to make those policies realistic for social development. Involvement of NGOs, private and governmental efforts in the planning process specific to national policies pertaining to children, women, population (NPC 1992 b; NPC 1994), and education have been recognized by various reports. The role of coalition partners such as NGOs, INGOs, self-help organizations, private sectors, Consumer groups, international development agencies, and governmental departments have been underlined in each of the reports owing to their role in grassroots concerns, peoples' participation, concern towards the disadvantaged sections of society, and sustainable development.

Expanding the policy-making space based on social impact assessments similar to environmental impact assessments is imperative in decision-making (Jain and Bongartz 1994:26). In the real world, as people are the real bearers of consequences, all the forces of social development must concert

their actions to poverty alleviation, employment generation, prosperity of communities, protection of environment, and the eventual empowerment of the populace. The organization of the majority of poor and their representatives' involvement in the policy process can create an enabling environment to fertilize human energy for social development in Nepal.

Conclusion

The political perspective on social development in Nepal has so far focused on how the laws of the land, political institutions, and processes have facilitated or hindered the social development vision and why a political perspective is important for generating an enabling environment for good governance and participatory development. The social interest underlying the integration of society's diverse group – minorities, indigenous, poor, women, children, disabled and marginalized – are important to link them to struggle against poverty, unemployment, underemployment, inequality, social disintegration and deprivation. The process of struggle taking place in Nepal involves first, an understanding of the strength of civil society forces before the state and market, their internal solidarity, and their ability to resist the harmful policies of transnational forces that are not subjected to the social control of the majority. For their solidarity to succeed, the civil society bodies must be institutionalized, expressed through their regular meetings and conferences, and involved in all the decisions that affect them. The strengthening of civil society organizations not only help create an "enabling environment" but can also be expected to generate opportunities to cement their connections nationally, and globally, reconcile differences and develop a collective stand to common problems faced by the people.

The approach to their institutionalization requires steady efforts of already existing groups, such as poor, women, NGOs, consumer groups, labourers, professional bodies, and so forth in structuring their agendas democratically in a decentralized and integrated manner. This process fosters democracy at the civil society level which can be capable of defending peoples' rights and their rightful place in society. The vision of social development embodies economic, cultural, political and ecological sustainability while its process and actions are participatory and ultimately transformative. What is significant is the political will for massive investments in the social sectors, maybe twenty-twenty, conducive to generate economic and social equality. The nation-building process in Nepal rests more on the broad-based active support of all social forces. The monopoly of power by a few undermines the whole system. Since poverty implies powerlessness, the empowerment process underlined by a political perspective is crucial for redefining the power relationship in society and recognizing the legitimacy of social development in Nepal.

Notes

Opinions expressed in this paper are the author's own and do not reflect the opinion of any organization he is affiliated with.

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1. *Local Administration Third Amendment Acts. 2048 B.S.*
2. The data used in this article are taken from various sources, such as *World Development Report 1994*, *Human Development Report 1994*, *Draft of the Country Paper: Nepal*.
3. *Human Development Report 1994* indicates that up to 1992 life expectancy of the Nepalese people at birth is 42.7 years, adult literacy 27 percent, access to safe drinking water 42 percent and sanitation 8 percent. The total expenditure on health as percentage of GDP in 1990 is 4.5 percent.
4. Nepal Sadbhawana Party, Rastriya Jana Mukti Morcha, Mongol National Organisation, and some other minor parties, therefore, openly articulate for a federalised Nepal on regional and ethnic lines and proportional representation system.

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EDUCATION IN THE MOTHER TONGUE: THE CASE OF NEPĀLBHĀSĀ (NEWARI)

Bal Gopal Shrestha and Bert Van den Hoek

Nepālbhāṣā (Newari) is a rich and highly developed language with a vast literature both in ancient and in modern times (see Malla 1984, 1982 and 1978). Numerous literary organisations exist in different towns and villages of the Kathmandu valley and outside the valley. To top it all, a Nepālbhāṣā Academy was established in 1992 in Kathmandu. The Newars have also been in the forefront of the campaign for education in the mother tongue, long before the new constitution of 1990 granted that right. That itself is not a matter of great surprise, because Newari, once the state language of Nepal had been suppressed since Rāṇā reign (1847-1951).

When HMG planed to make Sanskrit an obligatory school subject in 1992, the outburst was predictable. After more than a century of neglect and suppression of Nepal's living languages, including Newari, HMG decided to promote a classical language instead.

The protests and demonstrations against Sanskrit soon turned into a struggle for education in the mother tongues of Nepal. The government's only gesture towards Nepal's other languages had been in the morning radio news: 10 minutes news in Hindi and 5 minutes news in Newari (however, in 1994 it started to broadcast news in a few more languages of Nepal: Maithilī, Rāī, Tāmāṅg, Limbu, Gurung, Thāru, Abadhī, Bhojpurī, etc). The campaign against Sanskrit thus took a turn; it became a movement against the imposition of Nepali (khas) as National Language. Nepālī had become the target (Van den Hoek 1992:2) and education in the mother tongues, foremost Newari, but also Tāmāṅg, Gurung, Rāī, Limbu, Magar, and other languages, had become the political demand of the day. Speakers in the open theater drew large crowds.

Nepālbhāṣā (Newari) Past and Present

Newari is an aboriginal language of Nepal. The present-day Kathmandu Valley, which was once known as Nepal itself, was the place where Nepālbhāṣā, that is, the Newari language, originated. Siegfried Lienhard observes it in the following sentences:

"The term Nevārī, which is too common in western philology and linguistics, has never been current in Nepal. Even today Nevārī-speakers call their language Nepālbhāṣā, i. e., language of Nepal. Indeed, before the final conquest of Kathmandu by Prithivi Nārāyaṇa in A. D. 1768, Nevārī was the state language in the whole of the valley, which, by many of its inhabitants was considered as being Nepal in the true sense of the words." (1992:3)

The written use of the Newari language began in the early Malla period (1200-1482 A.D.). However, the earliest evidence of Newari is found in a palmleaf of Pāṭan Ukū Bāhāl dated 1114 A.D. (Malla 1990). The next one is an epigraph of Sankhu Vajrayoginī dated 1172 A.D. which was believed to be the first before the Pāṭan palmleaf was found (Tulādhār 1990:120).

Newari became the language of literature only in the second half of the fourteenth century. Haraṃekhalā (1374), Nāradaśmṛti (1380), Amarkośa (1381) were translated in to Newari during this period. The oldest known chronicle of Nepal, the Gopālarājavaṃśāvalī, was compiled in Sanskrit and Newari in the 1380s (Vajrācārya and Malla 1985). The earliest dated poem in classical Newari goes back to A.D. 1573, the earliest extant drama to A.D. 1673, the earliest narrative text go back to 1374 A.D. (Malla 1989:446-7). Only in the two hundreds years of the later Malla period Newari was recognised by the court (Shrestha 1990:19). After the conquest of the Gorkhālī King Prithivi Nārāyaṇa Śāh in 1768, the Newari language had to undergo vicissitudes. At the beginning of the Śāh time it could retain its prestige and importance. Kings like Ranabahādur Śāh and Rājendra Vikram Śāh still functioned as patrons of the Newari language and themselves wrote Newari literature, but gradually Gorkhālī, the mother tongue of the new rulers, succeeded in displacing Newari (Lienhard 1992). Especially with the rise of Rāṇā Prime Minister Chandra Śumser Newari was banned from the court (Malla 1978:5). His successor Juddha Śamser turned more bitter towards the Newari language. "Anyone daring to use Newari either for business or literary purposes was found guilty of committing an illegal, even a revolutionary act" (Lienhard; Ibid:4). A considerable number of writers were given admonitions and fines, sent to prison or forced into exile.

But the suppression of the Rāṇā reign somehow turned out fruitful to Newari. Legends of the Newari renaissance like Siddhidās Amātya, Nisthānanda Vajrācārya, Yogvīr Singh, Jagat Sundar Malla, martyr Śukrarāj Śāstrī, Dharmāditya Dharmācārya all were products of that period. Jagat Sundar Malla (1882-1952) was the first person advocate the need to use the mother tongue in education (see Adams: 1992:11).

With the change of politics in 1951, the language policy of HMG became liberal, but not for long. Just before the fall of the Rāṇā reign in 1951 'Democracy Nepāl Radio' was established against the Rāṇā reign and started broadcasting news in Nepālī, Newari and Hindī. Later it was renamed 'Radio Nepal' as a government medium and in April 1965 it stopped broadcasting Newari news and programmes.

Likewise, in the educational field, the Nepāl Rāṣṭriya Vidyāpīṭha was established in Birgunj in 1951, and Newari was recognised as an alternative medium in education. The Nepal Education Council adopted Newari as an optional subject. HMG also recognised Newari as a spoken language subject and oriental language subject in 1953. (In Nepal, about 40 to 45 minutes of teaching in a day are given to a particular subject. Seven to nine subjects are taught in a school; usually each subject carries 100 full marks in the yearly examination.) Newari was never recognised as a medium of instruction in education; on the contrary, Nepālī was made the only medium of instruction in schools to the detriment of all other languages of Nepal (Shrestha 1987: Ka-kha; Gellner 1986:120). This discriminative measure in education made it impossible for other languages including Newari to compete with Nepālī.

In 1971, the introduction of a New Education Policy pushed Newari further back to an optional subject by forcing children to make a choice between Newari or other languages, science, vocational subjects, mathematics and so forth. This policy meant the final suppression of the education of the Newari language and literature at the school level.

In higher education, the only University of Nepal, Tribhuvan University, accepted Newari as a subject and as part of the spoken language (vernacular) subject (Nepālī, Hindī, Maithili and Newari) from 1959. But in 1971 vernacular subjects were removed from the curriculum of the University and Newari remained only as an optional subject to be chosen among several other subjects. Like in the schools Newari is not supposed to be the medium of instruction. In 1977, Newari was introduced at the Master's Degree level and a Ph. D. Degree was also made possible. Moreover, a degree in Newari from the university is not highly valued since it does not give access to employment in administrative posts of HMG and is not counted in promotion.

The Royal Academy of Nepal never recognised any prominent literary figures in Newari language. It published no books written in Newari. Also the government owned Sājhā Publication, which was originally called Gorkhā Bhāṣā Prakāśana Samiti (Gorkhā Language Publication Committee) but later renamed Nepālī Bhāṣā Prakāśana Samiti (Nepali Language Publication Committee) and in 1965 converted into Sājhā Prakāśana (Co-operative Publication), never published any text books or literature in Newari

while it continued to publish textbooks and readers as well as literary texts in Nepālī. The curriculum development centre of Tribhuvan University and the Educational Materials production centre are producing Nepālī text books for higher education and schools, but they never published books in any of the other languages of Nepal (Malla 1989:459).

Like Radio Nepal, Nepal Television is also reserved for Nepālī. It is giving regular programmes in Hindi, Urdu and English, but one of the native languages of Nepal rarely receives a chance in those electronic media.

From the time of Rāṇā repression till today Newars have been trying to revive their language. In this period, several literary organisations appeared, and numerous books were published by cultural societies and by individual efforts of Newar people. In 1979 with the establishment of Nepālbhāṣā Mamkāḥ Khalah, the Newar elite could manage to combine the language movement in a forum, whose chairman is a prominent politician of Nepal, Mr. Padma Ratna Tulādhara. Beside several literary magazines and journals, two weeklies and two dailies are regularly published in Newari nowadays.

In the latest central Bureau of statistics 1991 census the Newar population amounts to 1,041,090 (5.6%) out of a total population of 18,491,092 of Nepal, but Newari speakers comprise only 3.7% of the total population of Nepal (Dahal, 1995:152). According to the census report of 1961 "As a language spoken in every district of the kingdom Newari occupies the second place (p.44)" (Malla, 1989: 454). According to the 1971 census Newars are spread in 64 out of the 75 districts of the kingdom; surprisingly enough the number of Newari speakers is counted low in CBS reports each time: 383, 184 in 1952/54, 377,727 in 1961, 459,979 in 1971 and 448,746 in 1981; (Kansakar 1989:43) which always remained a matter of doubt and debate for Newar scholars (Joṣī 1991: 61-72, Malla 1991; 73-79, see *Nepāl* 39:58, 1991).

The new constitution of 1990 which introduces again a multiparty system, also appeared to have a multilingual nature. Although Nepālī was to remain the National language, in article 6 (1) all other languages were recognised as "languages of the nation" 6(2). Article 18 (1) states that all communities living in the kingdom have the right to preserve and promote their language, script and culture. And article 18(2) gives the right to primary schools to educate children in their mother tongue (Shrestha 1991).

But none of the Nepal's living languages were in the position to start primary education on their own. So far only a first Newari school in Kathmandu in 1991 and one Magar School in Kāskī have come into existence.

The First Newari School

After the heavy campaign for education in the mother tongue one would expect Kathmandu to be mushrooming with primary schools. But on the contrary, in the whole valley only one school has been established, on the outskirts of Kathmandu, across the Viṣṇumatī (Before it was shifted to the present location it was at Cāgal Chāunī). Instead of Newari Schools, English Boarding Schools are booming. A great difference appears to exist between political demands and popular practice. With that question in mind we made a case study of the only Newari Primary school in the valley, the "Jagat Sundar Bvane Kuthi". The school was given this name because Jagat Sundar was an activist for education in the mother tongue during the repressive Rāṇā rule. Young Newar activists like Mr. Visnu Citrakār, Anār Vajracarya, Sorad Kasāh, Manudās Shrestha, Ames Vajrācārya and Rājbhāi Jakahmi are the founder members of the school.

The school was established in 1991 after the new constitution provided the right for it by abolishing the "One language, one nation" policy. In contrast to the commercial boarding schools, the one Newari school is heavily dependent on donations. Mr. Rājbhāi Jakahmi provided the house for school freely for one year, and Mr. Lakṣmīdās Mānandhar and other people supported it financially. Dr. Cunda Vajrācārya and her colleagues of Nepālḥāṣā Miṣā Khalah assisted in running the school. The teachers started to work as volunteers. It is impossible to mention all the benefactors here, except for the Japanese organisation Hirākātā Khātāno (for detail see *Souvenir* published by the School 1993) which supports the poor pupils and supplied Rs. 1,200,000 for a new school building, which was inaugurated by veteran politician Ganesh Man Singh in December 1993 just across the Viṣṇumatī at Kamkeśvarī unfortunately next to the cremation ground (ghāt). In an inaugural ceremony of the building in 1993, the Japanese organisation again supplied some more money, and recently an auditorium hall of the school has been built. The location is as yet disfavoured and hard to reach, but the school has plans to establish other branches.

The Jagat Sundar School has an impressive executive as well as curriculum committee, all full of idealism, as becomes clear from the aims of the school.

1. To teach pre-primary (Nursery) to primary education on health, literacy, and other subjects in the mother tongue for the development of not only knowledge but also a sound psychology, patriotism and love for Newari language.
2. To support the protection and development of Nepālḥāṣā literature and culture.
3. To give economic support to those children who want to be taught in their mother tongue.

4. To make educational materials for all subjects in Nepālbhāṣā, possibly with the support of HMG.
5. To open schools in other Newar communities.

The Pupils and Their Parents

Given the dedication of the committees and the teachers, how is the situation on the ground? Who are the pupils?

Although an advertisement campaign was launched in several journals, most of the children were Jyāpu (farmers caste of Newar society) living around the area of the school in the year 1993. However; in 1994 the situation has changed a little bit; about half of the pupils are coming from various places around the city of Kathmandu. The main motive to attend this school is that it is cheaper than other boarding schools because of the lavish donations it receives. Castes like Poḍe (sweepers) and Nāy (butchers), if they are poor families, receive extra support through Japanese foster parents. In 1993, 36 out of a total of 123 pupils were sponsored. In 1994, 25 students were sponsored and another 11 were subsidized by the school itself.

Most children attend the school because it is cheap or nearby. Remarkably enough, in 1993 one third of the children attending the school were not Newar, but Brahmin, Kṣetṛī, Tāmāṅg, Gurung, Chaudharī, Ghale, Rāī, Magar, and Pariyār. But in 1994 the number of non-Newar decreased to 11.07%. They are handled with care by the teachers and if necessary, with Nepālī as well. Generally the school is also considered to be good, and parents are also content with the teaching of English from the nursery level onwards. But it is certainly not an elite school. The contrast with the various cultural organisations, the Nepālbhāṣā Academy, and the big political demonstrations for education in the mother tongue is striking. Facing various financial risks and saved by the generosity of donors, the three nursery classes and the two primary school classes had 123 pupils, 52 male and 71 female in 1993, increasing from 26 pupils in 1991 and 71 in 1992. But in 1994, in spite of the expansion by one more primary class 3, the number of students remained 123, 55 male and 68 female. Every year the number of pupils coming from downtown Kathmandu is increasing: in 1993 it was 41 and in 1994 it was 60. Meanwhile, however, the school shifted its location and drew its students from other quarters of Kathmandu, because the newly built school is somewhat closer to town than the previous location. A few parents whom we interviewed expressed their dissatisfaction with the new location. They said that the new location is not only very close to the cremation ground but too close to the heavily polluted Viṣṇumatī River. But other parents were not so critical about the new location; they said they will send their children to the same school though it is not at the best location.

One remarkable thing is that in 1994, in spite of the addition of one more class (class 3), the number of students did not increase. The possible cause behind this may be the unfavourable location of the school.

From a sample of fifteen parents from different castes, most people (including Parbate speaking Newars, Tāmāṅg and Rāī) appreciated learning Newari as an additional language, but only two people out of the sample were idealistically speaking in favour of education in the mother tongue.

Most of the parents do not know what to do after primary education in the Jagat Sundar School. Some of them are confident that the school will introduce higher classes. They are in favour of upgrading classes in the school up to the School Leaving Certificate. Some said that it is a half hearted act of the government just to allow primary classes in Newari. They think the government must give permission to study in Newari from the lower level to the higher level classes in the school. A few of them also suggested that Newari be introduced as a medium in the public schools as well. At the same time they felt the necessity to open schools like the Jagat Sundar, which has no less quality than other commercial English Boarding Schools, in the other areas of Newar settlement.

In an interview the chairman of the executive committee of the school Mr. Lakṣmīdās Mānandhar, who is also one of the financial supporters of the school, said that schools like the Jagat Sundar must be made commercial in order to compete with other commercial English Boarding Schools. He thinks that, together with Newari, children must learn Nepālī and English side by side. In a city like Kathmandu where a large number of Newars are living, it is possible to run more than 25 schools like the Jagat Sundar. He said that on the one hand they are trying to open such schools themselves and on the other hand they are instigating others to open such schools. He said that they are trying to introduce Newari in public and private boarding schools of Kathmandu Valley. He thinks this will be the best way to achieve education in the mother tongue. A private initiative like the Jagat Sundar School is insufficient. He thinks that the permission to run only primary schools is also insufficient; HMG must give permission to teach Newari in higher classes of the schools, otherwise what children can do after their primary grades remains uncertain.

He also contributed financially to produce books in Newari for the school children in the Jagat Sundar School. He is hopeful of raising necessary funds from Newar businessmen. To build the present school he was active in raising funds from various Newar businessmen.

Mr. Padma Ratna Tulādhar, the chairman of the Nepābhāṣā Maṃkā Khalah from the beginning (1979) ... in the forefront of the language movement, is also an executive member of the Jagat Sundar School. In an interview he

said that Jagat Sundar School is an example of group initiative and individual effort. He thinks that HMG must take the responsibility to educate people. In a country like Nepal where several languages are spoken it is a violation of human rights to impose one language upon the others. The international declaration of human rights and organisations like UNESCO always emphasized the importance of education in the mother tongue, but the constitution of Nepal is unclear and nothing is said about the government's responsibility. Independent establishment of schools and production of a curriculum has proved almost impossible even for a community like the Newars, supposedly one of the richest ethnic groups of Nepal. It is impossible for other ethnic groups of Nepal. He thinks that public schools should be changed into mother tongue medium schools. Schools where the majority of students are Newars, like in the schools of Kathmandu City, must be changed into Newari medium schools. In the hills where Tāmāng or other language groups are in the majority, the schools must also be changed into mother tongue medium ones. He said that the government is not serious about different language groups of Nepal and their problems. Though it is said that a democratic system exists in Nepal since 1990, there is no democracy at all when we talk about the language problem.

Mr. Hitkar Vīr Sing Kaṃsākār is an experienced headmaster, an education expert, a social worker as well as a member in the curriculum committee of the Jagat Sundar School. From a practical point of view, opening a school and producing necessary books is an extremely difficult task by itself, he said, very expensive. To make it practical, he thinks that present public schools as well as boarding schools must gradually introduce subjects in the mother tongue. The first step should be to make one subject in the mother tongue available in all public and private boarding schools. In this way, the mother tongue medium schools will be practical and inexpensive.

Regarding the curriculum, he said that though Newari is a rich language in its literary tradition there are insufficient suitable materials to make it a medium of instruction in schools. Books must be made in various subjects, and he thinks the government must subsidise the production of educational materials in Newari, as it is doing now for Nepālī.

He said the government must not close the door after having allowed primary education to be given in the mother tongue, but should also give permission to open lower secondary and secondary schools in the mother tongue. Unless HMG assures higher education in the mother tongue up to the School Leaving Certificate, uncertainty remains for those children who are going to a mother tongue medium school. Government-aided public schools like his own Paropakār High School still teach in Nepālī medium, although 50 percent of the students are Newars, for whom it is very difficult.

In this case the difficulty could be solved by introducing Newari as a medium of instruction for approximately half of the classes.

HMG Policy on Mother Tongue Education

Though the new constitution of 1990 granted limited rights to various language groups of Nepal to start mother tongue medium schools by themselves, HMG is unprepared to take any burden. As in the Panchayat time, HMG ignores the public voice: Despite heavy demonstrations demanding education in the mother tongue and against the imposition of Sanskrit in 1992, HMG introduced a new curriculum in September 1993 which made Sanskrit obligatory in grades 6,7 and 8, whereas it fully ignored the issue of the mother tongue medium education.

At the primary level from grade one to five, one optional subject is suggested under which a school can introduce any local language for which the school itself has to arrange everything including a teacher. For the School Leaving Certificate students in grades 9 and 10, one optional subject is suggested under which Newari or Maithili as languages of the nation can be taught. But it is made vague; one has to choose Newari or Maithili from among not only twenty other international and classical languages but also vocational subjects, arts, humanities and social sciences, demography, journalism, computer science, environmental science, mathematics, and so forth (60 subjects in total). In grades 9 and 10 beside this optional subject six other subjects are obligatory: Nepālī, Mathematics, English, Social Studies, Science and Environmental education and one subject up to choice from Health, Computer Science and Demography. Each subject is taught 40 to 45 minutes daily and carries 100 marks in the final examinations. For all subjects the instruction medium is Nepālī. No words are spent on the role of the other languages of Nepal in education.

Why Education in the Mother Tongue and How?

The popular demand for education in the mother tongue is low. It is the so-called English Boarding Schools which are flourishing among the Newars of Kathmandu. The sense for the children's career easily supersedes language idealism. Not all Newars, however, belong to the high and educated class.

The poorer section of society (still the greatest part) cannot gain command of a language English or Nepālī, which are foreign to them, and in which they have to learn other subjects. They are bound, however, to public schools in which Nepālī is the only medium of instruction and are therefore likely to drop out.

A recent study done by the research centre for Educational Innovation and Development of Tribhuvan University has shown that

The non-use of the mother tongue of the non-Nepali speaking pupil as a medium of instruction is known to be one of the conclusive contributing factors to the high rate of attrition in primary education in Nepal [Yadav 1992:179].

Nepal is a multi-lingual, multinational country (see Tāmāṅg 1987) where 32 language are spoken, as the CBS reports for 1992. But Ramawatar Yadav observes in the same article that the linguistic and demographic data reported by CBS are inaccurate: there are at least 70 languages belonging to four language families in Nepal (Ibid. 183, see also Toba 1992:23-24). To enforce one language upon others in such a country is to eliminate the others together with their culture and identity.

Knowledge is best achieved through the mother tongue. International organisations like UNESCO have recommended using the mother tongue in education as early as 1951, because it is culturally, psychologically and pedagogically more appropriate to do so. (Yadav, Ibid.) There is no scientific ground to impose a language upon others.

On the other hand, preservation and to promotion of a language is not only for the sake of the language but also for the culture, tradition and indigenous originality carried by that language.

"Language is at the core of each culture, and it is only by language that culture can be transmitted and communicated [Van den Hoek 1988:8].

Language is an emotionally charged issue. Once a language or ethnic sentiment grows in a certain community, it does not die until it achieves its goal. In South Asian countries language has always been a vital issue. The imposition of Hindi as a national language in India remains a matter of debate, with all non-Hindi speaking people of India against it. The Gorkhāland movement, Jhārkhand movement all are in one way or another related to language sentiments in India. Because of language discrimination, Srilanka has been experiencing great violence for decades. Nepal has to learn lessons in a positive and constructive way from these examples.

For a long time mostly Newars were in front in, advocating their language and culture, but since the Federation of the Nationalities of Nepal (Nepal Janajāti Mahāsangha) took shape in 1991, already twentytwo ethnic groups have shown their solidarity to achieve equal rights for their languages and cultures. In an interview the general Secretary of the federation clearly said that

... as long as discrimination is there, there is no question of unity
... (we) object to the imposition of Nepali language on us [Magar 1992:6].

Gentlemanly speaking ethnic groups of today can easily turn violent if their demands continue to be ignored. Some intellectuals like Dilli R. Dahal (1995) suggest that, "There is no base for ethnic politics at the grass root level or the rural society of Nepal in general." Other intellectuals like Krishna B. Bhattachan suggest that "Caste and ethnicity being important components of Nepalese social structure, denial of ethnopolitics and ethnodevelopment has done more harm than good for various castes and ethnic groups. Diversity is the beauty of Nepalese social structure. Therefore 'legalization of ethnopolitics' is crucial for ethnodevelopment (1995:144)."

The world history of ethnic violence and uprising can hardly support Dahal's assurance, and it may prove to be a great mistake to ignore the problem.

Prof. Prayag Raj Sharma has emphasised the need of education in the mother tongue as far back as 1974:

The right to learn a minority language in primary or secondary grades or even higher up in school should not be denied to those for whom it is a mother tongue and a chance should be given to the more developed languages to play a creative role in our society (1976:171).

Education in mother tongues can be a first step towards developing mutual understanding among various language groups of Nepal; in that regard the Federation of the Nationalities of Nepal (Nepal Janajāti Mahāsangh) is most vocal.

From the case of the Newari Jagat Sundar School, it has become clear that to establish a school and produce educational materials on one's own is more idealistic than practical. Even for Newars, one of the richest communities of Nepal, it proved rather fanciful. For most other language groups of Nepal it will certainly be impossible.

Since the one nation, one language policy was dropped in the new constitution (HMG 1990:2), there is every opportunity for HMG to adopt a progressive policy to supply necessary educational materials and to appoint teachers for mother tongue instruction in schools. This would in addition provide the necessary employment for teachers in the towns and in the villages all over Nepal. It is recommendable that HMG appoints Newar teachers to public schools in the cities and especially in the smaller towns of the valley. Likewise, Tāmāng, Gurung, Rāi, Limbu, Magar, and Thāru teachers should be appointed in other areas, to overcome the first barrier of primary education. Gradually other national, international and classical languages may be introduced in upper classes. It will be unnecessary to open

separate schools if HMG adopts this policy. Introduction of the mother tongue medium into the present schools will certainly not cost much more than to open new schools for each language group of Nepal.

The government must also make necessary regulations to introduce mother tongues in the so called English Boarding Schools currently mushrooming in the Kathmandu valley and other main cities of Nepal. This will certainly be one of the most effective ways towards education in the mother tongue.

After primary education in the mother tongue, the question remains what will be the next step. Therefore the mother tongue as the medium of instruction should gradually be introduced in to the upper classes too. At present the medium of examinations for the School Leaving Certificate (S.L.C.) is only in Nepālī and English. Once mother tongues are introduced in schools this restriction should be lifted and students must be allowed to give the S.L.C. exam in their own mother tongue. Only then will education in the mother tongue be senseful.

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कैलाली र कञ्चनपुर: एक ऐतिहासिक सर्वेक्षण

राजाराम सुवेदी

कैलाली र कञ्चनपुरको प्राचीन इतिहास हालसम्म पनि स्पष्ट हुन सकेको छैन। त्यहाँ कुनै छुट्टै राज्य रहेको वा नरहेको छुट्याउने आधारहरू हालसम्म उपलब्ध भएका छैनन्। कैलाली र कञ्चनपुर क्षेत्रमा अवस्थित पुरातात्विक क्षेत्रहरूको खोजी गर्दै गए, स्थिति बढि स्पष्ट हुन सक्ने थियो।

कञ्चनपुर जिल्लाको दक्षिणपश्चिम सिमानामा शुक्लाफाँटा शाहीवन्यजन्तु आरक्षण केन्द्र (सेञ्चुरी) रहको छ। त्यही आरक्ष भित्र एउटा पुरातात्विक स्थल छ, जसलाई सिंहपालको मन्दिर, रानीताल र सिंहपुर राज्य भनिन्छ। कञ्चनपुर जिल्लाको सदरमुकाम महेन्द्रनगरबाट दक्षिणपश्चिमतिर पर्ने अण्डैया गा.वि.सं., वार्ड नं. ३ को आरक्षण जंगलको बीचमा सिंहपुर रहेको छ। त्यो ठाउँ पहिले रौतौली प्रगन्ना (गाउँ) अन्तर्गत पर्दथ्यो। सिंहपुर अन्तर्गत भारतको ठूलो भू-भाग पर्थ्यो, जुन भूभागलाई आजकल सिंघाई वा सिंहाई भनिन्छ।^३ प्राचीनकालमा सिंहपुर एउटा शक्तिशाली राज्य थियो। त्यो राज्यमा पालवंशीय राजाहरू राज्य गर्दथे। त्यो राज्यको नाउँ नै सिंहपुर थियो वा अर्कै थियो त्यसबारे केही भन्न सकिने स्थिति हालसम्म छैन। सिंहपुरको नामकरण राजा सिंहपालका राज्यकालमा भएको थियो भने राजा कञ्चनपालका राज्य कालसम्म त्यो राज्यको राजधानी सिंहपुरमा नै थियो पछि भएका राजाले दूधौली भन्ने ठाउँमा राजधानी सारेका थिए। राजा कञ्चनपालको नामबाट कञ्चनपुर भएको कुरा त्यहाँको स्थलगत सर्वेक्षणबाट थाहा हुन्छ। कञ्चनपुरको इतिहासभन्दा सिंहपालको इतिहास प्राचीन र महत्त्वपूर्ण छ। तर सिंहपाल राजा भएका हुँदा सिंहपुर नामाकरण गरिएको सिंहपुरको पूर्वनाम के थियो त्यो पनि जानकारी भएको छैन। सिंहपुर तथा सिंहपाल मन्दिर हाल घना जंगलका बीचमा आरक्षण क्षेत्र भित्र रहेका छन्।

हालसम्म सिंहपुरको पुष्टी अभिलेख सामग्रीले गरेका छैनन्। स्थानीय लोक इतिहासका आधारमा सिंहपाल भन्ने ब्यक्ति डोटीका राजा नागपाल (नागीमल्ल) का क्षेत्रीय शासक रहेको कुरा सुनिन्छ। तर त्यो कुरालाई पनि अभिलेखका आधारमा प्रष्ट गर्न सकिएको छैन। सिंहपुर एक ऐतिहासिक स्थान रहेको कुरा हालै त्यहाँ उत्खनन् गर्दा प्राप्त भएका वस्तुहरूबाट थाहा हुन्छ। २०५० माघ २१ देखि ३० सम्म सिंहपालको मन्दिर वरिपरि पर्खालको जगखन्ने काम भएको थियो। शुक्लाफाँट शाही वन्यजन्तु आरक्षण केन्द्रका वार्डेन

श्री पूर्ण बहादुर थापा तथा रेञ्जर श्री गोपालबहादुरको रेखदेखमा सो उत्खनन् कार्य भएको थियो। शुक्लाफाँट शाही वन्यजन्तु आरक्षण भित्र परेको हुनाले त्यसरी उत्खनन् गर्नु सजिलो कुरा थिएन। त्यसको मूल हेतु सिंहपाल मन्दिर भत्कन गई धराशायी भएको र भेटिने स्थितिमा पुगेकोले मन्दिर यहीनेर पर्छ भन्ने संकेत तथा संरक्षणको निम्ति नै थियो। तसर्थ मन्दिर वरिपरि ३ फिट गहिरो ३ फिट चौडा जग खनेर ईटाको पर्खाल लगाउने योजना थियो। अग्लो पर्खाल तथा भन्ज्य मन्दिर निर्माण गर्दा हात्तीले कन्याउँदा भत्काइदिने र तोडफोड हुने डरले ३ फिटमात्र अग्लो परखाल लगाउने बन्दोबस्त भएको थियो। सोही परखालको जग खन्ने सिलसिलामा महत्त्वपूर्ण पुरातात्विक वस्तुहरू प्राप्त भएका छन्। (यस पंक्तिका लेखकलाई सो उत्खनन्कार्यको जानकारीका साथै त्यस ठाउँमा पुग्न सहयोग पुऱ्याउने कञ्चनपुर जिल्ला कार्यालयका प्रशासकीय अधिकृत श्री रामराज सुवेदीको सराहना गर्नु पर्ने, धन्यवाद दिनु पर्ने भएको छ।)

सिंहपालका विषयमा सिंघाई (सिंहाई) क्षेत्रको पनि भ्रमण सर्भेक्षण गर्नु पर्ने आवश्यकता देखिन्छ। तापनि यसपटक कञ्चनपुरको रमणीय सिंहपुर क्षेत्र सिंहपाल मन्दिरवरिपरिको उत्खनन् कार्यका सिलसिलामा भएका केही महत्त्वपूर्ण उपलब्धिहरूलाई यहाँ चर्चा गर्नु पर्ने भएको छ। सिंहपाल मन्दिरको वरिपरि उत्खनन् गर्दा ठूला-ठूला ईटहरू पाइएका छन्। ती ईटको लम्बाई ११" चौडाई ९" देखि ७" र मोटाई ३" छ। त्यसरी हेर्दा त्यहाँका ईटहरू लुम्बिनी, कपिलवस्तु, तिलौराकोट र सिम्रौनगढका प्राचीन ईटासंग मिल्दाजुल्दा छन्। ठूला ईटको बीचमा स-सना ईटको पनि त्यहाँ प्रयोग भएको पाईन्छ। त्यहाँ प्रयोग गरिएका ईटको बनोट, आकार तथा प्राचीनता हेर्दा सिंहपुर क्षेत्रको सभ्यता डोटीका राजा नागपाल (नागमल्ल) को समयभन्दा पनि अगाडिको हुनु पर्ने देखिन्छ। सिंहपुरस्थित सिंहपाल मन्दिर वरपर उत्खनन् कार्यमा प्राप्त भएका ठूलासाना ईटका साथै ३ वटा माटाका घोडाहरू पनि पाइएका छन्। लगाम र काठीले सजाइएका ती माटाका घोडाको तौल ३००-४०० ग्राम, उचाई ४" लम्बाई ४-५" छ। पाको चिम्टे माटोबाट बनाइएका ती घोडा अझभझ भएका छन् वा तीमध्ये कुनैका खुट्टा, कुनैका पुच्छर र कुनैका कान टुटेका छन्।^४ ती घोडाहरू के प्रयोजनका लागि त्यहाँ रहेका होलान् भन्ने विचार पनि गर्नु पर्ने भएको छ। सिंहपालको मन्दिरमा निम्न कारणले माटाका घोडा रहेको विचार गर्न सकिन्छ:

- १) सिंहपुर मन्दिर प्राङ्गणमा सिंहपाल राजाको विशाल राजप्रासाद (दरबार) थियो। दरबारमा केटाकेटी खेल्ने कुद्ने व्यवस्था हुनु स्वभाविकै हुन्थ्यो। केटाकेटीका खेलौनाको निम्ति कुम्हालेहरूले माटाका स-साना घोडाका आकृति बनाएर दरबारमा पुऱ्याउँथे। केटाकेटीले ती घोडाहरू खेलाउँदा फ्याँक्ता टुट्ने, फुट्ने र भाँचिने गर्थे। त्यसैले भग्न घोडा पाइएको हुन सक्छ।
- २) सिंहपुरमा रहेको सिंहपालको मन्दिरमा अद्यापि पार्विक पूजा हुँदै छ। त्यस मन्दिरलाई सिंहपाल भने पनि त्यहाँ सिंहपालको पूजा हुँदैन। सो ठाउँमा भगवान शंकरको पूजा

हुन्छ। त्यसकारण सिंहपुरस्थित सिंहपाल मन्दिरको निर्माण सिंहपाल राजाले गरेका हुनाले त्यो मन्दिरलाई उनैका नामले चिनारी गर्न थालियो। सो मन्दिर पहिले सानो र मेटिन लागेको हुनाले पुनर्निर्माण गरेको हुनसक्छ। त्यस मन्दिरमा पूजा गर्ने सामग्रीहरूमा घोडाको आकृति पनि राख्नु पर्ने हुन्थ्यो। आजकल पनि मष्टा, महाबौ, महालिङ्ग, मल्लिकार्जुन जस्ता देवतालाई घोडा चढाउने परम्परा कायम रहेबाट त्यो कुरालाई पुष्टि मिलेको छ।^५

- ३) शक राजाहरू आफ्नो उद्गमस्थलबाट मध्यएशिया हुँदै भारतमा प्रवेश गर्दा अश्वसेनाले सुसज्जित थिए। उनै शकहरूसँग सम्बन्धित राजा सिंहपाल पनि भएको हुनाले त्यहाँ भगवान शंकरको स्थापना गरी उनीहरूले घोडालाई आफ्नो प्रियवस्तु मानेर अर्पण गर्ने गर्दथे। उनीहरूले नै शक्तिको मापलाई अश्वशक्तिसँग तुलना गर्ने चलन बसालेका हुन्। त्यसको संझनास्वरूप मन्दिरहरूमा माटाका घोडाका नमूना समर्पण गर्दथे।
- ४) सिंहपाल राजाको वंश घोडाको नश्लवृद्धि गर्ने परिवारसँग सम्बन्धित हुन सक्तछ। त्यो सामरिक शक्ति आर्जन गर्नका लागि बेग्ला बेग्लै नश्लका घोडा फिकाउने चलन पनि थियो। ती घोडालाई युद्ध को तालिम दिइन्थ्यो। परिणामस्वरूप घोडा र घोडीलाई श्रद्धा एवं पूजा गर्ने परम्परा पनि बस्न थाल्यो। जातजातका घोडा बेचबिखन गर्ने केन्द्रहरू बने। त्यसैबेला कुनै अवतारी, चमत्कारी घोडाको चर्चा हुन थाल्यो। त्यही घोडाको पूजा, क्रय, विक्रय, परीक्षण गर्ने ठाउँलाई लोक भाषामा घोडाही-घोराही (दाङ), घोडागाउँ (रोल्पा) घोडाघोडीताल (कैलाली), घोडेपानी, घोरेपानी (म्याग्दी) घोडाबेगाउने (बझाङ) र घोडाशयनी (थर) आदि भन्न थालियो। दडौरा थारूहरूले अवतारी घोडालाई अद्यापि मन्दिर स्थापना गरी विधिपूर्वक पूजा गर्दै छन्। त्यसरी विचार गर्दा कञ्चनपुरको सभ्यता दाङ, प्यूठान, बझाङ, म्याग्दीसम्म फैलिएको कुरास्वतः अनुमान गर्न सकिन्छ।
- ५) सिंहपाल राजाको अश्वारोही सेनाले चौतर्फी विजय गर्दै गएको खुसियालीमा त्यसरी नै अश्वसेना मौलाएर दिगिदगन्त विजयीहुन चाहन्थ्यो। त्यस्तो कामना गरी साम्राज्य वृद्धिका हेतुले सिंहपालले शिव तथा सिद्ध मन्दिरमा घोडाका पुत्ता चढाउने परम्परा चलाएका थिए।

सिंहपाल मन्दिर जीणोद्वार गर्ने कार्य हाललाई होचो पर्खाल मात्र लगाउने योजना थियो। त्यहाँ शिवपञ्चायतन स्थापनागर्ने भनी ५ ठाउँमा पर्खालको तोष पनि खनिएको थियो। मूलसिंहपालको मन्दिरलाई बीचमापारेर चारैतिर चारवटा मन्दिर निर्माण हुँदै थिए। सिंहपालको मूल मन्दिरमा ४ वटा कलापूर्ण तर खण्डित शिलास्तम्भहरू यथावतै छन्। ती ४ मध्ये २ वटा खम्बा जमीनमाथि ३'१" अग्ला र २'१" मोटा, अन्य २ वटा खम्बाको उचाई ११.५" चौडाई ११" रहेको छ। हालै निर्माण हुनलागेको सिंहपाल मन्दिरलाई बीचमा पारी

पूर्वोत्तरकोण (आग्नेय) पट्टि श्रीगणेशको, दक्षिणपश्चिमीकोण (नैऋत्य) पट्टि सूर्यको, पश्चिमोत्तरकोण (वायव्य) पट्टि देवीको र उत्तरपूर्वकोण (ईशान्य) तर्फ सिद्धनाथ विष्णुको मन्दिर निर्माण गर्ने योजना पनि थियो। सिंहपालका मन्दिरमा उभिएका ती ४ वटा शिलामा कुँदिएको कला पाल शैलीको छ। त्यो शैली त्यहाँ मात्र नभई द्वारहाट, डोगडा, बद्रीनाथ, केदारनाथ, बोधगया, बालेश्वर, उकू, अजयमेर, दुम्राकोट, दुल्लू, सिजा, सुर्खेत, ढँडारमष्ट तथा देवलहाटमा पनि पाइन्छ। 'पालहरूको' कलाले सम्पूर्ण हिमाली भेकमा गहिरो प्रभाव छोडेको कुरामा विद्वानहरू सहमत छन्।^६ आश्चर्यको कुरा यो पनि छ कि त्यो मध्यदेश तराई जहाँ ढुंगाको सर्वथा अभाव छ, त्यस्तो ठाउँमा ४ वटा मात्र कलात्मक भग्न शिलास्तंभ कसरी पुगे। त्यस कुरामाथि विचार गर्दा त्यहाँ अरूपनि शिलाहरू जमीनमुनि पुरिएका हुनुपर्छ, जहाँ प्राचीन सभ्यताको अवस्थल रहेको थियो। उत्तरपूर्वी कोणतिर रहेको सिद्धबाबाको स्थानले अर्को आधार दिएको छ। त्यहाँ एउटा तामाको घाँडो भुण्डयाइएको छ, जो १३" लामो २३" मोटो १" बाक्लो छ। त्यो घाँडोको रालो खसेकोले बूचो देखिन्छ र बजाउन मिल्दैन तापनि यो सहजै अनुमान हुन्छ कि त्यहाँ घण्टाका साथै घाँडाहरू पनि चढाइन्थे।

सिंहपाल मन्दिरले सिद्धबाबाको भक्तिपरंपरालाई प्रकट गर्नुका साथै राजा सिंहपालको राज्य अस्तित्वलाई पनि प्रकट गर्दछ। त्यो कुरालाई सिंहपुरको घनाबस्ती, प्राचीन भग्न दरबार, रानीताल, गढी तथा बाटामा विछाएर छोडेका ईटाले अझ पुष्टि गर्दछन्। सिंहपालको मन्दिरदेखि १०० मिटर पश्चिम भाडीमा राजा सिंहपालको दरबार थियो। त्यो दरबार अचेल ढिस्कोमा परिणत भएको छ। त्यहाँका ईटा रानीताल भन्ने ठाउँको माटो पकाएर बनाएको थियो। रानीताल १५०० मिटर लम्बाई, ९०० मिटर चौडाई, २०० मिटर गहिराईको छ र आजकल त्यहाँ गोहीपालन हुन्छ। तालको दृश्य हेर्न १५ मिटर अग्लो मचान बनाइएको छ, पश्चिमपट्टि ढिस्कोमा। सिंहपालराजाको भग्न दरबारलाई अजयपालमहल पनि भन्ने चलन रहेछ। त्यो कुरालाई पनि अभिलेख्य पुष्टि गर्न सकिएको छैन।

सिंहपाल मन्दिर तथा अजयपाल महल देखि ५०० मिटर पश्चिमपट्टिबाट आरंभ भई सोभै दक्षिणतिर लमतन्न परेको ७' चौडा, १-१ किलोमिटर चौतर्फी लामो, ७' अग्लो पर्खाल भग्नावस्थामा छ। पर्खालसंगै बाहिरपट्टि ७' गहिरो नहरजस्तो चौतर्फी खाडल पनि छ। त्यो पर्खालमा सिंहपाल मन्दिरमा प्रयोग गरिएका नापका ठूला, साना ईटहरू प्रयोग गरिएका छन्। पर्खालले दक्षिणतिर बाउन्ने खोलालाई छोएको छ। बाउन्ने खोलाको पानी गढीवरिपरि फन्को माथ्यो। गढीका ढोकाहरू कति र कतापट्टि थिए, पर्खाल भत्केकोले अनुमान गर्न सकिएन। बाक्लो जंगल हुँदा विदेशी शिकारीको गास पर्ने त्रासले पनि खोजी गर्न भ्याइएन।

सिंहपुरको निर्माण गर्ने सिंहपाल राजा र उनका उत्तराधिकारीहरूले आफ्ना गुरुपुरोहितहरूलाई बेलाबेलामा अभिलेखहरू प्रदान गरेको कुरा सूचना मिलेको छ, तापनि अभिलेखहरू भेटेरपढ्न पाइएको छैन।^७ सिंहपाल मन्दिरमा आरक्षण घोषणा गर्नु पूर्व, नित्य एवं पार्विक पूजा हुन्थ्यो। सिंहपुरको गाउँ वस्ती हाल अन्यत्रै सारिएको छ। त्यसैले अब

सिंहपुर साधारण नेपालीका लागि अपायक र विरानो हुँदै गएको हुँदा सिंहपालको मन्दिर पनि जंगलमै लोप हुने भय रहेको छ।^{१८}

सिंहपाल र अजयपाल वंशको खोजी गर्दा पालहरूको वंशावली संकलन र विवेचना गर्नु पर्ने हुन्छ। कर्णाली प्रदेशलाई एकै शब्दमा खसान पनि भनिन्छ। त्यहाँका राजालाई खसमल्ल भनिन्थ्यो। पश्चिम तिब्बतबाट खसमल्ल राज्यको विस्तारपूर्व कर्णाली प्रदेशभर पालवंशीय राजाहरूले शासन गरेको कुरा दुल्लूस्थित कीर्तिस्तंभको अभिलेखले प्रकट गरेको छ। त्यो वंशावली यस प्रकार छ: आदिपालवंशका पहिला राजा आदिपाल, अमरपाल, जयपाल, विजयपाल, वीरपाल, विक्रमपाल, श्रीपाल, धीरपाल, सोमपाल, सूर्यपाल, समुद्रपाल, सुखपाल, गृहपाल, महिपाल, विश्वपाल, जीवपाल गरी १६ वटा राजा भए।^{१९} सो वंशावलीमा राजा सिंहपाल र अजयपालको नाउँ नभए पनि जयपाल र विजयपालको नाउँ छ। पन्ध्रौं शताब्दीको पहिलो दशकमा तयार गरिएको दुल्लूस्थित शिलास्तंभमा उल्लिखित ती पालहरू विक्रमको पाँचौं शताब्दीबाटै शासक रहेको थाहा हुन्छ। पालहरूको शासन पछि खसमल्ल र मल्लहरूको शासन आरंभ भयो। खस मल्लहरूको शासन बाइसी, चौबीसीहरूको उदय कालसम्म कायमै थियो।

पालवंशका विभिन्न ठाउँमा प्राप्त पुराना वंशावलीहरू हेर्दा कार्तिकेयपुर (कत्यू = हाल भारत)बाट पूर्वतिर सदैँ बढ्दै डोटीको लेकम गर्खा, उकू, देथला र अस्कोट (हाल भारतको कुमाउँ क्षेत्रको एक रजौटा) जस्ता ठाउँमा राजा भएर बसेका प्रमाणहरू पनि भेटिएका छन्।^{१०} तर ती सब वंशावलीमा सिंहपाल र अजयपालको नाउँ उल्लेख नहुँदा सिंहपुर र सिंघाइको पालवंशावली छुट्टै रहेको बुझिन्छ। सिंहपुर र सिंहाई (सिंघाई)को पालवंशावली हालसम्म पाइएको छैन। तर अर्को आश्चर्यको कुरा के छ भने उकूस्थित भताभुङ्ग महलको ढुंगे थुप्रोमा प्राप्त शिलालेखमा अजयपालको नाउँ उत्कीर्ण गरिएको भेटिन्छ।^{११} शिलालेखमा उत्कीर्ण गरिएका उकू महलका राजा अजयपाल (अजैपाल) र सिंहपुरका अजयपाल एउटै व्यक्ति होलान् त? यसमा विचारणीय कुरा के छ भने सिंहपाल मन्दिरमा रहेको ढुंगाको कला (पाषाणकला) अजयमेरूसंग मिल्ने मात्र होइन कि अजयपालको नाउँबाट त्यो किल्लालाई अजय + मेरू भनिनुमा धेरै सत्य लाग्दछ तर के गर्ने त्यसको पुष्टि गर्ने बाँकी छ। त्यसकारण सिंहपालको अस्तित्व खसमल्लराजाका पुर्खा अशोक चल्लकालिन रहेको कुरा पत्थारिलो लाग्दछ।

कैलाली र कञ्चनपुर विक्रमको दशौं शताब्दीतिर सवा लाख पर्वत साम्राज्य अन्तर्गत पर्दथ्यो। किनभने त्यो क्षेत्र डोटी र जुम्लाको तराई खण्डमा पर्दथ्यो। खस भनिने शक राजाहरूको सवा लाख पर्वत साम्राज्य पूर्वमा काठमाडौं अरूण नदी, पश्चिममा लुम्बिनी उत्तरमा दक्षिण-पश्चिम तिब्बत र दक्षिणमा भागीरथी गंगासम्म फैलिएको थियो।^{१२} त्यो साम्राज्य आरम्भ हुनुभन्दा पहिले पालहरूको राज्य रहेको कुरा माथि पनि उल्लेख गरिसकियो। खस मल्लहरूको साम्राज्य स्थापना भएपछि कार्तिकेयपुरबाट डोटी क्षेत्रमा

प्रवेश गरी पालहरूले शासन चलाए। पछि ती पालहरू मल्ल भए अनि शाही। तर उकू, देथला, अस्कोट जस्ता ठाउँका शासक पाल नै रहि रहे। डोटीको राजवंशावलीमा त्रिलोकीपाल, निरञ्जनपाल र नागपालको नाउँ भेटिन्छ। त्यसैले कैलाली र कञ्चनपुर डोटीका पाल मल्ल र शाहीहरूको अधीनमा थियो। कैलालीको सदरमुकाम धनगढीदेखि पूर्वपट्टि मल्लवारा र अतरियादेखि दक्षिणपश्चिमपट्टि मल्लखेती भन्ने ठाउँ छ। ती ठाउँहरूले मल्लराजाहरूको अस्तित्वलाई संकेत गर्दछ। कुमाउँको सीराकोटमा पनि मल्लहरूको प्राचीन राज्य थियो।^{१३}

उत्तरमध्यकालमा अछाम राज्य अन्तर्गत मल्लवारा क्षेत्र पथ्र्यो। देवचन्द्र समाल (हमाल) हारमाताका छोरा थिए, ती हारमाता समुद्रवंशी राजाकी छोरी थिइन्। आफ्नी छोरीलाई नातिभएमा अछाम राज्य बक्स (बकस) दिने कबोल भए बमोजिम दिँदा त्यसको चारकिल्ला तोक्दा दक्षिणपट्टिको सीमाना मल्लवारा थियो। त्योबेला मल्लवारा ५२ गाउँ थिए।^{१४} प्रारम्भमा यस क्षेत्रमा औलोको त्यति धेरै प्रकोप रहेको जानकारी पाइँदैन। तर पछि औलो प्रशस्त बढेर गयो। त्यो क्रम वि.सं. २०२० सालसम्म रही रह्यो। त्यसपछि औलो उन्मूलन भयो। डोटीका राजाले चर्चेको समयबाटै कैलाली कञ्चनपुरमा घना जंगल हुन थालेको हुँदा त्यो क्षेत्र शिकारको लागि उपयोगी सिद्ध भएको थियो।

डोटी राज्य स्वतन्त्र भएपछि पूर्व र पश्चिमतिर विस्तृत हुन थाल्यो। पूर्वमा त्रिशुली र पश्चिम गढवालसम्म फैलिएको डोटी राज्य कर्णाली प्रदेशका खसमल्ल जस्तै शक्तिशाली हुने हो कि भन्ने लक्षण देखिएको थियो। खसमल्लहरूले भैं केन्द्रीय शासन अवलम्बन गरेको डोटीका सामन्त राजाले वर्षेनी सित्तो (कर) बुझाउँथे। कुमाउँ क्षेत्रको रेखदेख गर्न डोटीका राजाले चन्दहरूलाई खटाएका थिए। तर कुमाउँका शासक भारतीचन्दले डोटीलाईकर तिर्न छोडे। त्यसको साटो फेर्न डोटीले कुमाउँ माथि वि.सं. १४९४ मा आक्रमण गर्‍यो। पहिले डोटीको सेनाले कुमाउँ जित्दै बढ्यो। भारतीचन्दका छोरा (रतनीचन्द) कटलेहर (कोठेर) राज्यको सैन्य सहयोग लिई डोटीलाई हराई दिए। डोटीको सेना कुमाउँ छोडी महाकाली पश्चिमतिर लाग्यो। त्यही मौकापारी कुमाउँको सेनाले डोटीका दार्चुला, बैतडी र डडेलधूरा क्षेत्रमा घावा गर्‍यो। त्यो क्रम बाह्र वर्षसम्म रह्यो। डोटी पश्चिमसर्दै जानुको सट्टा पूर्व तिर सर्दै डुम्राकोट पुग्यो। चन्दकोसेनाले डोटीराज्यमा ज्यादै अत्याचार ब्यभिचार, हत्या, लूट मच्चाए। महाकाली पश्चिमको राज्य स्वतन्त्र भयो।^{१५}

कुमाउँ र डोटीको युद्धबाट दुवै मुलुकमा प्रशस्त राजनीतिक, सामाजिक र आर्थिक क्षेत्रमा प्रभावहरू परे। यो युद्धले डोटीको एकाधिकारलाई कुण्ठित गर्‍यो। डोटीको समाजमा विकृति आयो। परिणामस्वरूप कटकमा आएका सिपाहीका भोग्याबाट जन्मेका बेवारिस सन्तान कटकावली र नायक भए। डोटी र कुमाउँनी राजा र राजपरिवारले मन्दिरमा कन्याकेटीहरू चढाएर देवदाशी प्रथाको आरंभ गरे। त्यो प्रथा हिमाली भेकको माहिली छोरीलाई भुमा (भोवा) र काठमाडौँको कुमारी बनाउने परम्परासंग तुलना गर्न सकिन्छ।

अछूत जातिबाट व्यभिचारपूर्वक सिर्जित जातिलाई बाधी बधेनी भनियो। आर्थिक क्षेत्रमा पनि बाह्र वर्षे युद्ध डोटीको लागि घातक भयो। डोटीको बाजुरा, थलारा, बझाङ स्वतन्त्र भए। डोटीका तिब्बत जाने लिपु, उराई, तिङ्कर जस्ता बाटाहरू फुट्के। डोटीमा लूट गर्दा कुमाउँले सुन, चाँदी, रेशम, कस्तूरी, युवती र धन हरण गर्‍यो। आर्थिक रूपबाट पनि डोटीलाई धेरै असर पर्‍यो।

कुमाउँले डोटीलाई पराजित गरी प्रशस्त लूटको धन ल्याएको चाल पाएका लखनौस्थित काठगोला (शाहजहाँपुर)का नवाव हुसेना खाँले कुमाउ र डोटीमा सेना पठाएर लुट्ने आदेशदिए। त्यो मुसलमानी सेना लखनौबाट पहाडतिर पस्‍यो। अल्मोडा, अस्कोट, उकू, अजयमेर, जोरायल र गोदावरीमालूट्ता लुट्दै मुसलमानी सेना डोटी दिपायल, डूम्नाकोट सम्म पुग्यो र त्यहाँका मठमन्दिर तोडफोड भत्ताभुङ्ग पार्न थाल्यो। कुमाउबाट ठक्कर खाएको डोटीले मुसलमानीसेनासंग अन्तिम सास सम्म लड्यो। वि.सं. १६२६ र १६३१ गरी दुई पटक भएको युद्धमा दुवैतिर प्रशस्त सिपाही मरे। डोटीले पहाडमा छापामार युद्ध गर्न थाल्यो। मुसलमानी सिपाही भाग्न थालेपछि डोटीले आत्मरक्षा गर्‍यो।^{१६}

प्राचीनकालदेखि डोटी निवासीहरूले कैलाली र कञ्चनपुर बाटोबाट दक्षिण व्यापार गर्दथे। पश्चिमको व्यापारमा महाकाली नदीले बाधा पार्दथ्यो। तत्कालीन वाणिज्य केन्द्रका रूपमा ब्रम्हदेवमण्डी, मल्लवारा, सिद्धकोथान, बेडाबाबा, महेन्द्रनगर, बेलौरी, ज्वालादेवी, सिंहपुर, सिंघाई, कलाडी, धनगढी, लालपुरवाडी, चौमल्ला, हंसुलिया, भजनी, सती, मढा, मल्ला-खेती, बाँसखेडा विकसित भएका थिए। त्यहाँ डोटी, अछाम, बाजुरा, बझाङ, थलारा, जुम्ला, धुलीकोट राज्यका बासिन्दाहरूले सामान किनबेच गर्दथे। उनीहरूले मह, घिउ, आँतर (चरेश), गाँजा, च्याखूरा, बाज, मृग, भेडा, बाख्रा, घोडा, याक, शिलाजीत, फलफूल, जडिबूटीको खेलो गर्दथे।

हाल कैलाली जिल्लाको पूर्वोत्तरतिर कर्णालीनदी, पश्चिमतिर चूरेपहाड, मोहनानदी, मालाखेती पर्दछ भने दक्षिणमा भारतको सीमाना गौरीफाँटा, नानपारा पर्दछ। कञ्चनपुर जिल्लाको पूर्व मोहनानदी, पश्चिममा महाकालीनदी भारतको नैनिताल जिल्ला, बनवासा सीमाक्षेत्र, उत्तरतर्फ मालाबारा डाँडा, डडेलधुरा जिल्ला चूरेफेदी र दक्षिणमा भारत उत्तरप्रदेशको पिलिभित, खिरी लखिमपुरजिल्लापर्दछ। कैलाली र कञ्चनपुरको सबै भू-भागलाई विभिन्न तप्पाहरूमा बाँडिएको थियो। 'तप्पा' भन्नाले जिल्लाभन्दा सानो गाउँ भन्दा ठूलो क्षेत्रलाई बुझाउँथ्यो। प्रशासनिक दृष्टिकोणबाट सजिलो हुने गरी तप्पाहरू छुट्याएको हुन्थ्यो। तप्पाहरू यस प्रकार थिए।

कञ्चनपुर जिल्ला^{१७}

- १) बैतोडा तप्पा (बहितोडूवा तप्पा)
- २) तिलाचौर तप्पा (तीलचौर तप्पा)

कैलाली जिल्ला^{१८}

- १) रैकवार तप्पा (जेठो तप्पा)
- २) परिहार तप्पा (पारिवारिक तप्पा)

- ३) रौतेली तप्पा (राजाको तप्पा) ३) बोगटान तप्पा (बोगटीहरूको तप्पा)
 ४) रैकवार तप्पा (जेठो तप्पा) ४) लिंक तप्पा (तल्लो तप्पा)

नेपालको एकीकरणपूर्व कैलाली र कञ्चनपुर डोटीको एकै छत्रभिन्न पर्ने हुँदा रैकवार तप्पा एकै थियो। ती सबै तप्पामा आठकोशे चौडा जंगल लालभाडी पथ्र्यो। लालभाडी भन्दा दक्षिणतिर रस्तीबस्ती थियो। डोटीको अधीनमा दक्षिणका बस्तीहरू पर्थे। लालभाडीमा साल, शिशौ, साज, सिमल, हल्दू, खयर, विजयसाल, गिठी, टूनी, भोर्ले, बकैनोका बडेबडे रुख थिए। पछिपछि जंगल फडाँनी भएर रस्तीबस्ती बढ्दै गयो।

बडामहाराजधिराज श्री ५ पृथ्वीनारायण शाहले गोरखराज्यघरानाको नेतृत्वमा नेपालको एकीकरण आरम्भ गरे। तर पूर्वतिर विस्तार गर्दा गर्दै उनको मृत्यु भयो। पश्चिम नेपाल एकीकृत गर्न बाँकी नै थियो। त्यो अधूरो काम उनका माहिला छोरा बहादुर शाह (फत्तेबहादुर)ले पूरा गरे। श्री ५ रणबहादुर शाहको नायव भएर बहादुर शाहले वि.सं. १८४९ मा पठाएको अछाम र डोटीको नेपाली सेनाले अधिकार गर्‍यो। त्यो विजयपछि कैलाली र कञ्चनपुर डोटी र अछामको अधिकार क्षेत्रभिन्न हुनाले स्वतः नेपालको सीमाभिन्न प‍यो। वि.सं. १८४९ देखि १८७२ सम्म ती दुवै ठाउँ नेपालले चर्चेको थियो। तर वि.सं. १८७१-७३ को अंग्रेज-नेपाल युद्धमा नेपालको हार भयो। नेपालसंग युद्धगर्दा ब्रिटिश भारत सरकारलाई आर्थिक संकट परेको थियो। त्यो बेला भारतका गभर्नर जनरल लर्ड हेस्टिङ्सले अवधलाई आफ्नो खूबा बनाएकाले त्यहाँका नवाब गाजिउद्दीनसंग आर्थिक सहयोग मागे। नवाब गाजिउद्दीनले लखनौका वजीरको ढुकुटीबाट रु. १ करोड रूपैयाँ दिए र पछि अरु पनि थपिदिए।^{१९} अंग्रेज नेपाल युद्धमा नेपालको हार भएको हुँदा नेपालले महाकालीदेखि मेचीसम्मको सम्पूर्ण तराईभाग गुमाउनु प‍यो। त्यसै क्रममा कैलाली र कञ्चनपुर पनि नेपालको अधिकारबाट छुट्यो।

नेपालबाट छुटेको कैलाली र कञ्चनपुरको भू-भागलाई अवधका नवाबबाट लिएको सापटी नगदको सट्टा भर्ना स्वरूप अंग्रेजहरूले अवधलाई दिए। त्यसरी वि.सं. १८७३ देखि कैलाली र कञ्चनपुर अवधको अधीनमा पुगेकोले मुसलमानी बस्ती कायमगरियो। केही मुसलमानी बस्ती वि.सं. १९१४ सिपाही बिद्रोहका दौरानमा नेपाल पसेका बागी शरणार्थीको बस्तीबाट पनि बसेको हो। वि.सं. १९१२ मा भारतका ब्रिटिश गभर्नर जनरल लर्ड डलहौजीले विलयीकरणको नीतिअनुसार निःसन्तान र पेन्सनमा बस्न चाहने सहायक सन्धि गरेका भारतीय रियासतलाई ब्रिटिश शासनमा मिलाए। अवधका नवाबले पनि आफ्नो भू-भाग छोडी पेन्सन लिनु परेकाले नेपालको कैलाली कञ्चनपुर क्षेत्र ब्रिटिश भारत सरकारको अधीनमा प‍यो।

ब्रिटिश शासकहरूले भारतीय रजौटाहरूको राज्य खोसुवा गरेका हुनाले त्यसको प्रतिक्रियास्वरूप वि.सं. १९१४ मा भारतीय सिपाही विद्रोह भयो। त्यो विद्रोहमा नेपालका

प्रधानमन्त्री जंगबहादुर कुँवरले ब्रिटिश सरकारलाई सहयोग गरी विद्रोहीहरूलाई दमन गर्न सेना लिएर गए। नेपाली सेनाले लखनऊमा लूट गर्‍यो, जसमा बरफबाग, बेगमबाग, मूसाबाग, आलमबाग, केशरबाग, छत्रमञ्जील र ताराकोठी परेको थाहा हुन्छ।^{२०} त्यो बेला ब्रिटिशहरूले नेपालको सहयोग नपाएका भए भारत टुक्रेटुक्रेमा बाँडिन्थ्यो। त्यो बुभेका गभर्नर जनरल लर्ड केनिङले वि.सं. १९१७ मा बाँके, बर्दिया, कैलाली र कञ्चनपुरको तराई भाग (त्यस बेलाको भाउले १० लाख रूपैयाँ मोल पर्ने भू-भागमात्र) नेपाललाई फिर्ता दिने भए। त्यो भू-भागलाई नयाँ नेपाल भन्न थालियो र श्री ३ जङ्गका आफन्तलाई बिर्ता बाँडियो।^{२१}

कञ्चनपुरको पश्चिमी सीमानामा वि.सं. १९७७-७८ मा नेपालका श्री ३ महाराज चन्द्रशम्शेरले ब्रिटिश भारतलाई महाकाली नदीको पानी पठाउने अधिकार पत्रमा सही गरे। तदनुसार महाकालीको पानीमा बाँधबाँधी ठेलहालेर (लोहियाहेट स्थित) विद्युतकेन्द्रसम्म पुर्‍याएर विजुली र सिंचाई समेत गर्ने संभौता गरेका थिए। त्यही संभौतामा बनबासा, बाँध र पुलको निर्माण कार्य आरंभ भएर वि.सं. १९८५ मा सम्पन्न भएको थियो।^{२२} त्यो बाँध निर्माणस्थल नेपालको भू-भागभित्र पर्ने भएको हुँदा अंग्रेजहरूले ठोकरपुरदेखि पूर्वपट्टि रहेको गड्डाचौकी भन्ने ठाउँसम्म र उत्तरतिर जिमुआ सम्मको ४ किलोमिटर भू-भागको सट्टामा नेपाललाई महाकालीपश्चिम तर्फ वनवासादेखि दक्षिणतिरको भू-भाग दोधारा र चाँदनी क्षेत्रको सम्पूर्ण भू-भाग दिएको थियो। त्यो संभौतामा नेपाललाई २५% (१/४) भाग पानी सिंचाई गर्न दिने र विद्युत उत्पादन शुरू भएपछि त्यति नै (२५%) विद्युत नेपाललाई निःशुल्क उपलब्ध गराउने कुरा पनि उल्लेख गरिएको थियो।^{२३}

नयाँ मुलुक वि.सं. १९१७ मा नेपालको अधीनमा आएपछि त्यहाँको प्रशासन सञ्चालन गर्न नयाँ मुलुक बन्दोबस्त अड्डा खडा भयो। त्यो अड्डा बाँके जिल्लाको सदरमुकाम नेपालगञ्जमा रह्यो। वि.सं. १९८७ सम्म नेपालगञ्जबाटै कैलाली र कञ्चनपुरको प्रशासन सञ्चालन भएको थियो। वि.सं. १९८८ मा कैलाली कञ्चनपुर गोश्वाराको स्थापना भयो र यो अड्डा कैलाली जिल्लाको धनगढी बजारमा रह्यो। त्यो अड्डालाई नयाँ मुलुक कैलाली कञ्चनपुर गोश्वारा भनिन्थ्यो। त्यो क्रम २०१८ सम्म यथावतै रह्यो। त्यस पछि कैलाली र कञ्चनपुरमा छुट्टाछुट्टै जिल्लास्तरीय कार्यालयको स्थापना भयो। तराईको भू-भागमा, त्यो बेलासम्म, औलोको प्रकोप भएको हुनाले गर्मीमा पहाड तथा जाडोमा तराईमा बस्ने चलन थियो। नयाँ मुलुक राणा शासकहरूको बिर्ता हुनाले हिउँदमा शिकार क्याम्पहरू बस्तथे। मौसमी बस्ती पहाडका बासिन्दालाई त्यति मन नपर्ने र आर्थिक अवस्था कमजोर हुनाले केही जमीन्दार, कोठारी, चौधरी, कारोबारी, कमैया, हरूवा, चरूवा, अपराधी, विर्तावालका चाक्रीदारहरूमात्र बस्तथे। त्यसैले पहाडी भन्दा तराईका र नेपालीभन्दा विदेशी कामदार, ठेकेदार, काठकटान गर्ने कुल्ली र कर्मीहरू बस्तथे। तर २०१८ सालपछि स्थिति त्यस्तो रहेन। बजारको विकास भएका ठाउँमा पहाडका मानिस आवश्यक सामान लिन जान्थे।

त्यति बेलै औलो उन्मूलनका प्रक्रियाहरू शुरू भए अनि पहाडका बासिन्दाहरू तराईतिर भरे।

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सर्वप्रथम कत्यूरबाट लेकममा आई रजाई गरी बसेका पालहरूको वंशावली:

- १) अम्भोतदेउ (यवनहरूबाट सताइएका हुनाले धर्मरक्षार्थ लेकम आएका)
- २) निर्भयपाल (देउबाट पाल खिताप लिएर पाल कहलाएका)
- ३) मुक्तिपाल ४) भैरंपाल ५) भोपाल ६) रत्नपाल ७) शंखपाल
- ८) श्यामपाल ९) शाहीपाल १०) सूर्यपाल ११) भोजपाल १२) भतृपाल
- १३) सुर्तानपाल १४) अक्षयपाल १५) त्रैलोक्यनाथपाल
- १६) सुण्डपाल (उनका चारछोरा निशिल, लेकम, देथला र अस्कोट गएका)

१) जक्तिपाल	मोहकम्पपाल	श्रीपाल	भैरंपाल
२) शाहीपाल	अक्षयपाल	खड्गपाल	लेखनपाल
३) कर्णपाल	रूद्रपाल	कर्णबहादुरपाल	राइपाल (वि. १६४५)
४) श्रीपाल	मोहकम्पपाल	भैरंपाल	महेन्द्रपाल
५) केशरीपाल	हाँकपाल	शाहीपाल	जयंतुपाल
६) बहादुरपाल	हाँकपाल	शाहीपाल	जयंतुपाल
७) प्रतापपाल	विक्रमपाल	लक्षुपाल	अमरपाल
८) हीरापाल	सिजापाल	सिनपाल	अम्भोतपाल
९) सूर्यपाल	रत्नपाल	विजयसिंहपाल	अक्षयपाल
१०) लालसिंहपाल	मेघपाल	पहाडीपाल	विजयपाल
११) हीरापाल	नाफूपाल	नेफापाल	महेन्द्रपाल
१२) बीरापाल	-	महेन्द्रपाल	हिक्मतपाल
१३) अर्जुनपाल	-	बहादुरपाल	बहादुरपाल
१४) कर्णबहादुरपाल	-	कमानबहादुरपाल	पुष्करसिंहपाल
१५) सुरेन्द्रबहादुरपाल	-	मानबहादुरपाल	गजेन्द्रसिंहपाल
१६) -	-	-	विक्रम व. पाल
१७) -	-	-	टीकेन्द्र ब. पाल

श्रोत: महाकाली अञ्चल दार्चुला जिल्ला लेकम गखाका अटौला (स्वतः स्फूर्त ज्योतिष ज्ञान प्राप्त) श्री जनकराज ज्योतिषराजबाट २०५० मा सारेको वंशावलीका आधारमा।

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BEGINNING TO READ NEPALI: MERO NEPĀLĪ KITĀBA AS A TEXTBOOK

Ramawatar Yadav

Background

mero nepālī kitāba (henceforth MNK) is a textbook for Grade 1 written by Divakar Dhungel and published by MOEC: CTSDC/BPEP Primary Curriculum and Textbook Development Unit in 2049 v.s. Printed at the Janak Educational Materials Centre, Sanothimi, MNK contains a total of 39 lessons and 56 exercises, and it is heavily illustrated. A *Teacher's Guide*, henceforth TG, (MOEC: CTSDC/BPEP Primary Curriculum and Textbook Development Unit, 2049 v.s.) is also prepared to aid the teachers of Nepali to use MNK effectively.

MNK, we are told in the foreword, is prepared after three full years of preparation and extensive consultation with hundreds of teachers, parents, headmasters, educationists, resource persons, linguists, and Nepali experts (p. 3). It is therefore appropriate to look closely into the contents of MNK.

According to the preface, the objective of MNK is to teach such linguistic skills as listening, speaking, reading, and writing to grade 1 learners of Nepali (p. 4). Closer scrutiny reveals that the great majority of lessons are devoted to teaching writing and reading and only a few to listening and speaking.

Imperfections of MNK

MNK is replete with imperfections; only prominent ones will be mentioned here.

Lack of fit between Curriculum and MNK

A grievous imperfection of MNK is the gross lack of fit between the curricular goals set in the Grade 1 Nepali Curriculum (printed on pp. 6-8 in TG) and the MNK as a prescribed textbook. A few examples are cited below for illustration.

The Curriculum states that the case markers ले 'Nominative/Instrumental', लाई 'Accusative-Dative', मा 'Locative' and बाट 'Ablative' will be taught to Grade 1 learners of Nepali. However, Lessons 21 and 22 teach such possessive forms as उसका 'he-Possessive' (p. 64), हाँसका 'duck-Possessive' (p. 64), पाँधेराको 'tap-Possessive' (p. 64), and गङ्गाको 'Ganga-Possessive' (p. 67); Lesson 28 and the accompanying Exercise (pp. 82-83) also teach a

number of pronominal possessive forms such as मेरो/मेरा 'I-Possessive', तिम्रो/तिम्रा 'You (Mid Honorific)-Possessive' and हाम्रा 'We-Possessive'.

The Curriculum states that the personal pronouns म 'I', तिम्री 'You (Mid Honorific)', हामी 'We', तपाईं 'You (Honorific)' and the interrogative pronouns को 'who', कुन 'which', के 'what', and किन 'why' will be taught to Grade 1 Nepali learners. But, the third person pronouns ऊ 'he', उनीहरू 'they' (pp. 84-85) and the second person pronoun तैं 'You (Nonhonorific)' (p. 84); and the interrogative pronouns कसरी 'how' (pp. 92, 94) कति 'how much/how many' (pp. 98, 99), कस्तो 'of what type' (p. 105), and कहाँ 'where' (p. 105) also form the subject matter of *MNK*.

The Curriculum states that under Tense सामान्य वर्तमान 'simple present' and सामान्य भूत 'simple past' tenses will be taught to first graders. On p. 90, however, a complex tense form expressing indefinite mood is introduced, e.g., गन्यो होला 'will/may have done'. The expression is a rather complex conjunct verb construction: विचार गन्यो होला 'will/may have thought over'. Similarly, on p. 96 the present continuous tense verb forms, e.g., फुलि रहेको छ 'is blossoming', किनि रहेको छ 'is buying' etc. are also introduced into the text.

The Curriculum states that the negative marker होइन 'is-Neg' will be taught to Grade 1 pupils of Nepali. On p. 18, however, the stylistically variant negative marker हैन 'is-Neg' is also introduced.

Finally, the Curriculum states that the first grade pupils will be taught to read, write and understand simple sentences in Nepali. However, on p. 80, a number of complex adverbial subordinate clauses using perfective/absolute particles are used, e.g. कट्टु गन्जी लगाई बच्चाले बटुटा गुडाए 'Having worn the shorts and vest, the child rolled the box'; ढक्की बोकी बच्चो गयो 'Having carried the basket, the little child went'; बूढो मान्छेले लट्ठी टेक्दै डाक्टरलाई बोलाए 'Having held a walking stick, the old man called a doctor'. Other examples also exist: मूला खाई मूढामा बस 'Having eaten the radish, sit on the stool' (p. 49); केरा लिई खेतमा जाओ 'Having carried the bananas, go to the field' (p. 52).

Vocabulary

Textbook writing is a difficult job, and it requires professional skill and acumen. Textbook writing also entails a thorough linguistic research in the area of vocabulary frequency count. Without such a count, it may not be easy to specifically determine the exact content of the teaching materials, and the well-known principles of selection, gradation and presentation may not be adhered to. Exactly how important the study of word frequency might turn out to be is evident from a gleaning of Lesson 1 (p. 7) and Exercise 2 (p. 33) of *MNK*. The first lesson of *MNK*, a textbook meant to be used all over the country by non-Nepali speaking children alike, contains such infrequently

used lexical items as अगुल्टो 'burning log', and उछिट्याउँ 'to flick away'. Exercise 2 (p. 33) of *MNK* uses such lexical items as केत्र (whatever it may mean!), पत्र (a *tatsama* word meaning 'letter') and सत्र (since when did number 'seventeen' become a lucky number in Nepal?). As a matter of fact, the very first vocabulary item in Exercise 1 (p. 33) is कर 'hand': are we to assume then that कर is the most frequently used word in the Nepali language?

The quality of *MNK* as a textbook is gravely marred by the use of a number of stylistic and dialectal/sociolectal/idiolectal variants, e.g., आऊ (p. 43), आ (p. 46), and आओ (p. 52) – all meaning 'come-Imperative-Nonhonorific', and जाऊ (p. 52) and, जाओ (p. 52) – meaning 'go-Imperative-Nonhonorific'. A more precocious child, on the basis of analogy, may come up with देओ (for देऊ) 'give-Imperative-Nonhonorific' – a form which is not used in *MNK*. A more confusing example is छन् 'is' which is used both as a third person present tense singular/respectual as well as a third person present tense plural/respectual marker, e.g., राम घरमा छन् (p. 86) 'Ram (Singular-Honorific) is inside the house' and उनीहरू घरमा छन् (p. 84) 'They (Plural-Honorific) are inside the house'. The confusion is further confounded when the young reader is confronted with बकुल्ला and बकुल्लो 'crane' (p. 77) and बिराला and बिरालो 'cat' (p. 110) in the very same lessons. Apparently, there is a linguistic reason for this confusion. In Nepali there is a rule whereby a number of canonical forms ending in -o undergo a morphophonemic alternation of the type *o* → *ā* upon addition of case morphemes and postpositions. For example:

- andho 'blind', but andhā-le 'blind-Nom' (p. 77)
- andho 'blind', but andhā-lāi 'blind-Acc/Dat' (p. 77)
- kamilo 'ant', but kamilā-lāi 'ant-Acc/Dat' (p. 58)
- bakullo 'crane', but bakullā-le 'crane-Nom' (p. 77)
- cucco 'beak', but cuccā-le 'beak-Instr' (pp. 76-77)
- dulo 'hole', but dulā-bhitra 'hole-inside (Loc)' (p. 110)
- bacco 'child', but baccā-kā 'child-Poss' (p. 77)

On the other hand, the canonical form *phucco* 'child' undergoes a morphophonemic alternation of the type *o* → *e* upon addition of case morphemes, e.g.

- phucco, 'child' but phucce-le 'child-Nom' (pp. 76-77)
- phucco 'child', but phucce-lāi 'child-Acc/Dat' (pp. 76-77)
- phucco 'child', but phucce-ko 'child-Poss' (pp. 76-77)

It is unfortunate that *MNK* attempts to teach both types of complex morphophonemic alternation rules to first graders in one and the same lesson

(Lesson 26; pp. 76-77). It would have paid the author had he made a judicious selection of the more frequent and appropriate vocabulary in *MNK* and graded them in such a manner that the stylistically variant as well as complex forms may be introduced in higher grades.

Spelling

A major thrust of *MNK* is to teach the young pupil to write Nepali in a correct manner. Unfortunately, *MNK* tends to employ a rather inconsistent spelling system and causes unwarranted grief and consternation to the first grader. *TG* offers no relief either. For example, in an effort to teach how to write clusters, *MNK* recommends to omit the vertical bar of the first letter of a two-letter cluster, e.g. ऋ + ण् + डा = ऋण्डा (pp. 68, 72) 'flag' (also written as ऋण्डा on p. 11) and ग + न् + जी = गन्जी (p. 66) 'vest'. The letter containing no vertical bar is combined with the following letter to form a two-letter cluster in the following manner:

- ब + ट् + टा = बट्टा 'box' (p. 79)
 क + ट् + टु = कट्टु 'shorts' (p. 79)
 ल + ट् + ठी = लट्ठी 'a walking stick' (p. 79)

Immediately after, on p. 80, the same lesson (i.e., Lesson 27) also teaches to write बट्टा as बट्टा and लट्ठी as लट्टी.

The words containing -kk- and -kṭ- clusters are written in the following manner:

- हु + क् + का = हुक्का 'hookah' (p. 79)
 ढ + क् + की = ढक्की 'basket' (p. 79)
 डा + क् + टर = डाक्टर 'doctor' (p. 79)

However, *TG* teaches to represent these very same clusters as हुक्का and ढक्की (p. 126); both *MNK* and *TG* allow कट्टु to be written as कट्टु. In other words, the second consonant-letter is allowed to be represented underneath the first consonant-letter in the above examples. Under the circumstances, isn't it likely that a more precocious child, upon the basis of analogy, may tend to write डाक्टर 'doctor' as डाक्कुर? I presume that probably only a homorganic consonant-letter is allowed to be represented underneath the preceding consonant-letter in Nepali, but it is not quite clear.

Inconsistencies in the spelling system persists: whereas the -ṅg - cluster is represented as गङ्गा 'Ganga' and चङ्गा 'kite' (p. 67) in *MNK*, both *MNK* and *TG* tend to represent the very same cluster as सँग 'with' (p. 38 and p. 128, respectively) and not as सङ्ग.

A more curious example is the representation of the back rounded vowels following a consonant in Nepali. In sharp contradistinction with the

prevailing practice in other Indo-Aryan Languages using Devanagari, *MNK* observes a peculiar practice of the type shown below:

- कुकुर 'dog' (p. 45)
- कुखुरा 'cock' (p. 45)
- फुल 'egg' (p. 46)
- फूल 'flower' (p. 48)
- पुतली 'butterfly' (p. 45)
- मूला 'radish' (p. 48)
- धूप 'incense' (p. 49)
- बूढा 'old man' (p. 49)
- पूजा 'worship' (p. 49)

The above examples clearly demonstrate that while the back rounded vowels are represented under the vertical bar of the consonant-letter in खु, पु, मू, धू, बू, and पू, they are not done so in कु, फु, and फू. Instead, they are represented underneath the tail-like part following the vertical bar of the consonant-letter. Such a practice confuses the young learner and renders the writing system of Nepali less practical and even less scientific.

Presentation

In general, the material is well-presented in *MNK*; a veritable feature of the textbook is that it is amply illustrated. A number of lapses remain, however. To cite a glaring example, the language of command used in most Exercises of *MNK* is vague. The command given is: मिलने शब्द कापीमा लेख 'Write down the matching word in answer-copy'. The command, however, should read: चित्र हेर। चित्र सँग मिलने शब्द कापीमा लेख। 'Look at the picture. Write down the word that matches with the picture in answer-copy'. This lapse occurs throughout *MNK* (pp. 33, 34, 37, 41, 44, 47, 50, 53, 56, 59, 62, 68, 70, 78, 81, 85), and it diminishes the pedagogic value of an otherwise well-written text.

Summing Up

To sum up, *MNK* may be a suitable textbook for Nepali-speaking pupils of Grade 1; for non-Nepali-speaking pupils, however, *MNK* may turn out to be an inept specimen of a textbook. Rather than lessen the existing high rate of educational wastage and attrition in primary education in Nepal, *MNK* may continue to contribute to it.

BOOK REVIEW

My Kind of Kathmandu: An Artist's Impression of the Emerald Valley. Dysmond Doig. Indus & Imprint of Harper Collins, India, 1994. Pages 208. Price: NRs 2072.

Way back in 1978 when I met Desmond, I distinctly remember him being excited about a new book he was working on. *My Kind of Kathmandu* has at long last hit the Kathmandu book stalls. Desmond said "...it will be different; not the usual touristy kind written about Kathmandu." When I prodded the artist, writer and genuine Nepal lover, to tell me more, he, as if to skirt the topic, started talking about Calcutta: "I simply loved that city, I still do, probably its past still lures me there now and then, but it has certainly lost a great deal of character. The haphazard urban development has killed the very soul of the city. Now I'm mortified at the thought that the very same may happen to Kathmandu, this city of art and culture. If planners and policy makers don't watch out, Kathmandu may turn into a mini-Calcutta." He couldn't have been more right.

He said this was one of the reasons that prompted him to bring out the book to capture in water colours and sketches the city as he first saw it. The smell and the sounds; the vivid and vibrant colours; the tinkling of temple bells; festivals in quaint brick-paved alleys; vast expanses of virgin green fields stretching to meet the surrounding green and purple hills; temples even within the Ring Road shrouded in mystery and legend, waiting to be discovered. When Godavari, Budanilkantha, Chaubhar and Pharping were distant, one day treks through idyllic green fields and surroundings; when dramatic monsoon skies were vividly reflected in paddy fields; when Wong's Peace Restaurant was probably the only Chinese restaurant in town; when the sparkling Bagmati and Bishnumati rivers were revered symbols of a throbbing ancient culture; when the Emerald Valley was in the real sense the enchanting home of the gods.

Desmond, in *My Kind of Kathmandu*, has successfully captured these along with the mud, brick and wood Kathmandu he loved and once knew: his kind of Kathmandu that once was in the fifties and early sixties a drowsy easy going city that retained the timeless magic of the centuries. While browsing through the vibrant sketches and water colours lavishly displayed in *My Kind*

of Kathmandu, this timelessness suddenly comes alive, as if by sheer magic within the walls of the drawing room, and lures the reader into the world of the artist away from the concrete and glass Kathmandu of today where even ancient temples are vulgarly lit by blinding modern-day neon lights.

The water-colour world of the artist, depicted as only Desmond could, takes us on an exotic luxury tour of Kathmandu, Patan, Bhaktapur, Thimi, Kirtipur, etc. and renders colourfully the history and legend of Swayambhu, Boudha, Harisiddhi, Pharping, Dakshinkali, Choubhar, Godavari, Panauti, Budanilkantha, Surya Binayak, Changu Narayan, Bajra Barahi right up to Chandeshwari and in the process even describes in detail the little known Guru Nanak Math, a forgotten shrine of the Sikhs on the way to Balaju. The water colours that have so brilliantly captured these destinations throb with life not found in prize photographs.

It is precisely because of this that one will grimace in absolute agony to see these exquisite paintings so unartistically splashed all over the volume, like clumsy centrespreads, that gruesomely murder the very spirit and continuity that the artist breathed in those colourful renderings. Had Desmond lived to see some of the atrocities, especially those of Nasal Chowk (p8), the Shweta Bhairab (p.30), Asan (p.90), Bhim Sens's Tower (p.98), Jagat Narayan Temple (p.126), Old Patan Bridge (p.128), A Courtyard of Cane Weavers (p.130), Kumari Ghar (p.152), Bhairab Temple (p.154), Kirtipur (p.162), Choubhar (p.164), Dhyani Buddha (p.170) and the Temple of Masks (p.188), the artist in him would have surely rebelled and vehemently disapproved of the "murder" committed in his name. Had he been alive the layout of the volume might have been quite different and would certainly have befitted the very nature of the artistic undertaking.

The lively text, which is again art dissolved into prose, made even more interesting by personal accounts and experiences punctuated by wit, irony and a sense of humour unique to Desmond alone, is bound to hold readers spellbound. The marvellous story teller here in true form, and in spite of the ungainly size and weight of the volume, makes it hard to put down even for a brief respite. His tale of the coronations of King Mahendra and King Birendra, of forgotten temples and immortal courtyards, ancient palaces and grand festivals, colourful rendering of history and legend, magic and superstition, medicine men and soothsayers is brilliant. It also tells us of Sylvan shrines, Freak Street, two vanished cities, the Hill of the Camphor Tree of a Gateway to a Vanished Palace, Taleju's Barking Bell and a Death Drum and an old oil Press. A visit to the Kaiser Library makes interesting reading, and the hilarious personal accounts at the Royal Hotel and encounters with Prime Minister Tanka Prasad and with well known expatriates like Boris Lissanevitch, Father Moran, Col. Jimmy Roberts,

Major Dudley Spain, Gordon Temple, Han Suyin and Barbara Adams lend the book a unique flavour.

Why the 80 kg of completed manuscript and sketches of *My Kind of Kathmandu* that were sent to the publishers of London were stalled and “shelved in dusty obscurity” is a bit mysterious when Desmond was alive then. But if the years lost resulted in the volume being unceremoniously hurried through the press, as can be seen from the poor editing, glaring proof errors and clumsy layout, then it has been a very poor compensation indeed. A compensation at which Desmond would have glared absolutely petrified and surely taken Duby and the team to task in spite of the labour pains the team as a whole underwent in bringing his personal Shangri-la alive.

In spite of the shortcomings the volume still stands out easily as the best and most fascinating portrait and biography of Kathmandu to date. Nothing less of course could be expected from Desmond Doig who wrote as exquisitely as he painted and who probably knew the nooks and corners of the Valley better than any local.

Going back to that encounter with Desmond in 1978, I distinctly recall the artist saying that one of his paintings – of a Jyāpu under a tree beside a crumbling temple with flower behind his ear pulling peacefully at his hookah in some remote Kathmandu village and staring contentedly at his green fields – would adorn the cover of the volume he was so excited about. That was one painting I frantically searched for in the pages of the coffee table publication. I wonder what happened to it. Was it misplaced? Lost? Set aside? Or is it still languishing in some corner under “Kalyan’s bed”? It would have surely been a magnificent prologue to Desmond’s kind of Kathmandu, his personal Shangri-la; to his love affair with what once was the Emerald Valley.

– Ananda P. Shrestha

BOOK REVIEW

Water Resource Development: Nepalese Perspective. Coordinators Bhekh B. Thapa and Bharat B. Pradhan (IIDS, Kathmandu), Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1995. Pages. 275. Price Rs. 350.

From the chronic shortage of water in the capital city; the annual cycle of death and destruction wrecked by the monsoon floods elsewhere in the country to the perennially politicised waters of Koshi, Gandaki, Mahakali (read Tanakpur) and no Arun rivers, water is literally a matter of life and death for Nepal. The scale of the contradiction, just like the gap between the much vaunted 42,000 MW hydro power potential of the country and the actual production of a tardy 232 MW is quite staggering.

On the one hand, textbooks from the primary level onwards feed the Nepalese on the staple diet of utopian rhetoric that Nepal's salvation, when it does come, will be through its immense and inexhaustible water resource potential, purportedly the second highest among all countries.

For an average man on the *goreto*, such nationalistic chest thumping can not be sustained in the light of his personal experiences; drinking water shortages; parched, dusty fields; and dark, *tukki*-light dwellings.

But the strange linkage between poverty and profit, privation and potentiality has meant that water resource utilization has remained one of the hottest and often acrimonious debate both at the political and intellectual level after Nepal's entry into the modern era in 1950.

In this backdrop the book under review *Water Resource Development: Nepalese Prospective* will be a timely contribution to the ongoing debate in the country and to some extent the South Asian region where the discourse often tends to degenerate into highly partisan and nationalistic jingoism. The book, segmentally structured into 10 papers by seven writers, links the significance of water resource utilization to development, agriculture, irrigation, energy and inland water transportation. The technical side of hydrology and hydropower generation is also provided to some extent. A brief chapter each is also devoted to the environmental aspects of water resource development and the interesting case studies on the highly controversial Koshi and Gandaki projects done with India.

Although not based on original research, the various chapters in the book have summarised some of the existing but disparate information and data in the field in a ready-to-use convenient manner. But some confusion regarding statistics has been left which could have been eliminated through better editing. For example, pages 95 and 122 have given the hydropower generation in the country as 232 MW and 227 MW respectively for 1990. But these minor slips do not in any way diminish the importance of the work. Setting a rather modest goal, the preface states: "The present volume will have served its purposes well if it can stimulate further detailed inquiry" on the issue.

But in an effort to maintain an objective posture, the work has deliberately sidestepped the contentious historical, political and bilateral issues related to water resource development in Nepal. Going to some extent in this direction, the Tanakpur hydro project has been totally omitted from the map at the beginning of the book. As a result the fine collection of relevant information lacks a central thrust and thread weaving through all the chapters.

How can water resource development – something as costly and pervasive in its impact as to require national and international intervention – be located anywhere but in the historical and economic matrix of our country and the region? Development should not be taken only in a technological vacuum. Such basic questions how much of the country benefits from these technological marvels; whether the cost of production per unit of electricity and irrigation water economically is viable; and whether the massive structures as high dams are ecologically permissible can not be swept under the carpet.

This is particularly true of Nepal's past performance in this sector. Due to rampant corruption, mismanagement and inefficiency in power generation, Nepalese consumers are forced to pay one of the highest electricity fares in the world. In this respect the book states that the cost of small plants "has been nearly 3,000-4,000 US \$ per KW" (p. 111). But the book conveniently fails to mention why the cost of mega projects such as Arun III is projected to cost over 5,500 US \$ per KW. To be economically feasible, electricity should be available at under 6 cents per unit, according to experts. the Nepalese pay over 7 cents per unit now and all the projects in the pipeline are estimated to cost more than the feasible limit.

Secondly, by opting for objective respectability rather than critical analysis, the authors have missed the internal and external political and historical dynamics so crucial to the issue at hand. For example, who makes the water agenda at home and what are the interests at play? Can some sections still ensure sectarian interests by pushing through environmentally

questionable and economically inadvisable projects? It is being increasingly felt that the politician – bureaucrat – technocrat – business complex can serve its interest just as well through commissions, contracts and consultancies no matter what the economic, social and environmental worth of the project to the country. Here the objectives of the global capital and local comprador are in perfect unison. For example, the book would have proven immensely relevant for the future if it had provided an incisive analysis of Arun III and the interplay of various forces that contributed to the present stalemate instead of apologia for the Least cost Electricity Generating Plan (LCEGP). There is a hint that the learned authors might have decided to respect political correctness, a tendency quite prevalent among Nepalese intellectuals and academicians.

Thus in accounting for the low level of development despite the four decades of development planning, chapter one notes: "A poor resource base, difficult topography, low domestic savings, inadequate domestic resource mobilization leading to excessive dependence on foreign aid resources, an under-developed human resource base and a poorly developed infrastructure and institutional framework pose strong challenge to Nepal's development effort." No doubt, all these factors are valid, but this is only one part of the equation. The development or underdevelopment of any country must be viewed within the global capital and labour and market, especially in the current phase of globalization, multinationals and the resulting dependency. As eminent Nepal scholar John Cameron wrote in a recent seminar paper: "In Nepal's case, the dependency was exacerbated by being the periphery of a periphery." We close our eyes to such forces at our own peril.

It is surprising that the book – part of a national effort at a non-governmental level study to promote cooperation in Ganges-Brahmaputra-Barak (GBB) river basin among Nepal, India and Bangladesh – has chosen to give scant coverage to the precedents and prospects for meaningful cooperation on a bilateral and sub-regional level.

The regional atmosphere for collaboration in water resource is less than encouraging with deep suspicions, grievances and selfishness on every side. The Helsinki rules on international rivers have not obviously seen much light in this part of the world. For example, when it comes to sharing water from the Farakka barrage, India asserts the right of the upper riparian to divert much of the water to its side, leaving Bangladesh high and dry to complain of injustice. But when it comes to sharing water and power from river projects with Nepal, India takes the lion's share and botches any attempts at multilateral approach to problem resolution. The skewed benefit sharing arrangement is attested by the figures on page 208: the Koshi project irrigates 969, 121 ha. of Indian land compared to an insignificant 11,300 ha.

of Nepali soil. Apparently, none of the joint projects did Nepal receive more than 5 per cent of the total irrigation water or electricity. India's preference for unilateralism in these matters has made joint exploitation and equitable benefit sharing of this unlimited resource a distant prospect.

The other development paradigm flaw of the book is that it assumes whatever hydro power is generated must be exported for 'development' to take place. It gives scant attention to the need or the fact that even with the heavy load-shedding regime in force, Nepal's present electricity generation of 249 MW (including 22 MW of thermal generation) barely suffices to serve just 10 per cent of the total population. Common sense tells us that just to electrify the whole country of 20 million people at the present very low consumption level would require another 2250 MW of power. Would this in any way be a lesser development objective?

The economic, social and environmental returns from the total electrification of the country would be immense. Momentous possibilities for the real, down-to-earth development would unfold. It will unleash its own economy. If development and progress is viewed as sustainable, inward looking and people serving, then the authors will not have to worry about finding external markets for Arun III (201 MW), Kali Gandaki II (660 MW), Burhi Gandaki (600 MW), Upper Karnali (240 MW), West Seti (360 MW) or any other hydropower projects we might care to develop in the future. Market worries will seem genuine when mega projects such as the 10,000 MW Karnali come into operation.

As to doubts to whether rural folks can afford the 'luxury', they certainly can. If the ones who have been lucky enough to be connected to power thus far have been coughing up the present exorbitant rates, others too can, especially so as they will be only substituting the expensive firewood and kerosene for the environmentally-friendly hydropower.

If there is any silver lining to historical late coming for third world countries, it is to avoid falling into the trap of banana or other 'export' economy without first developing a strong internal production and demand. Let's hope Nepal will do it with her water resources.

Saubhagya Shah